



PARLIAMENT AND INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SINO-
INDIA BORDER DISPUTE, 1962

ABSTRACT OF THE
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

By
(Miss) S. Naheed Wizarat

Under the Supervision of
Professor S. A. H. Haqqi
Head of the Department of Political Science

T-1516

Red In Computer

Department of Political Science
Aligarh Muslim University,

Aligarh


1974

**PARLIAMENT AND INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SINO-INDIA
BORDER DISPUTE, 1962. .**

**ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS SUBMITTED FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

By

(Miss) S. Naheed Wizarat



**Under the Supervision of
Prof. S. A. H. Haqqi
Head,
Department of Political Science**

**Department of Political Science
Aligarh Muslim University
Aligarh.**

Foreign policy is a broad net-work of objectives, principles and means to attain them, that an independent and sovereign state pursues in order to meet the contingencies of its diplomatic requirements. The architect of foreign policy tries to design it in such a way as to fulfil the enlightened national interest in the light of the nation's permanent domestic requirements and fluid and fast changing international situations. The principal problem is the identification of the national interest at a particular time by its ruling elite. A single man of eminence or a small coterie of men at the apex of political structure decide as to what it ought to be at a given time. Attainment of independence in 1947 raised a multitude of domestic problems like planning and economic development, restructuring of administration, adoption of parliamentary democracy, realisation of secularism and eradication of centrifugal forces such as linguism, casteism and communal violence. Along with this mess of socio-economic and political problems, the problem of foreign policy was no less significant. As a developing country, India's ambition was far from being a mere quest for power. India had

to consolidate and project its image as a peace-maker to the antagonistic bipolar post-war world. India searched out in non-alignment a panacea to all international ills. The crux of the problem for India was to reconcile the two leaderships of the non-aligned groups and Afro-Asian region. In order to accelerate the pace of economic advancement India has to enlarge the area of peace. Tranquil borders and amiable terms with the neighbouring countries were the two pre-requisite to be achieved through the gimmicks of foreign policy. However, the border dispute with China happened to be an acid test to it. The trial to have negotiated peace utterly failed in the context of China.

Nehru's leadership was the most remarkable factor in India's political life. He held almost a monopoly over foreign policy making. Foreign policy of India became what Nehru intended to make it.

India adopted parliamentary democracy which requires interdependence of the Executive and the Parliament. In fact the Executive is subordinate or subservient to Parliament. The Executive is constituted from the Parliament and is responsible to the latter

for all its functions. The foreign policy making and implementation requires a proper liaison and interdependence of the Executive and Parliament which is ensured through the parliamentary system. The crux of the problem is to allocate this responsibility between the legislature and the Executive with regard to foreign policy.

The present thesis is an attempt to examine the main features of the foreign policy of India and the role of the Indian Parliament in shaping, controlling, directing, supervising and scrutinising it. Instead of exploring all the aspects of foreign policy, it is a special study of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute-1962. The first chapter deals with the Foreign Policy, its chief determinants and tenets. It includes a detailed survey of National-Interest as the major determinant. Nehru happens to be the Chief Architect of India's policy. Guided by the Western realism and oriental idealism, Nehru designed the principles of foreign policy to meet the requirements of a developing country.

The second chapter makes a broad analysis of the role of various agencies such as the cabinet,

the External Affairs Ministry and the Minister and Nehru as the dimmvirate combining in him the twin offices of the Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs. It also attempts to present the general organisation and functions of the Ministry of External Affairs. An attempt has been made to make an analytical study of all these agencies that can partake of the responsibility of formulating the foreign policy of India. As a matter of reference, it also studies the role of Parliament as the supreme legislative body in the Indian parliamentary set-up. The Cabinet which enjoys the confidence of the people and the Parliament gets an upper hand over the rest of the agencies. Moreover, one cannot ignore the mighty presence of the 'gentle collosus', Nehru as the chief steersman of the cabinet. The overall analysis of the mode of work in the cabinet shows that Nehru's keen insight in foreign affairs, his monopolistic nature, popularity and egoism in not consulting his cabinet colleagues in most of the matters made the cabinet a body subservient to his whims and caprices. Till Nehru was at the helm of affairs, no one had the guts to oppose him in the

making of major policy decisions nor he was in the habit of consulting his colleagues. Absence of consultations had eclipsed the role of other agencies. The parliament is not entrusted with the task of making foreign policy, consequently the most pertinent role is played by Nehru. However, the Parliament is entitled to supervise the entire machinery of administration.

The third chapter makes an analysis of the processes of parliamentary control namely the Parliamentary Questions, Ministerial Statements, various Motions such as the general resolutions approving or disapproving of the foreign policy, No-Confidence Motions, Adjournment Motions and Debates. In a parliamentary system these are the instruments through which the Parliament makes it obligatory over the Executive to account to it ultimately for all its activities. Through all these modes the implementation of foreign policy is brought to books. In a Parliamentary system, the Executive is sensitive to parliamentary criticism. These instruments of Parliamentary control are dealt at large with regard to the multitude of foreign policy problems. Measures

are suggested for their effective utilisation.

These measures provide to the members of Parliament, the maximum opportunity to keep themselves informed of the latest developments in the foreign policy arena and international gimmicks.

Questions raised by the Members of Parliament efface the misunderstanding from their minds. It is the liveliest and most brisk mode of imploring relevant scrutiny of the decisions taken by the Executive. Debates on foreign policy resolutions provide an opportunity for discussion and criticism with which the Executive can benefit itself. The chapter also points out the limitations of these instruments.

The Fourth Chapter makes a comprehensive study of the impact of the Opposition in a parliamentary democracy. It is an attempt to highlight the need to have organised Opposition in the Parliament. No Government can function without the existence of an effective Opposition. In India where the multi-party system operates, the role of the Opposition ought to be more defined and relevant. The ultimate decision of the national interest by the Government must be

based on the broad consensus generated by the Opposition. The Opposition formulates healthy public opinion. However, in the wake of independence in India, the Congress Party enjoyed the stream-rolling majority and political preponderance over the rest of the parties. Nehru's position in Parliament was undomitable. Till now, the Congress had an overwhelming numerical majority. The variety of factors that reduced the Opposition to play a less articulate and pertinent role have been analysed. The Opposition was disjointed, disorganised, ineffective and lacked unanimity. Nehru was less sensitive to it. However, the reactions of Opposition were quite sharp over the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations, the failure of the India's policy to meet the trend, withholding of information from the house and skirmishes at the border in the light of Nehru's repeated assurances to have a peaceful border. Most of the criticism of the Opposition was wide off the mark. Measures are suggested to make it more effective as to perform the role it is destined to play in a parliamentary democracy like India. The problem under study is the Sino-India Border Dispute.

An attempt has been made to review the reactions and criticisms of the major Opposition parties. Their validity for the ruling party has been assessed. The Opposition should try to cultivate unanimity, coalesce on major issues, should present concrete alternatives and avoid criticism for the sake of criticism of merely to play to the gallery. The Parties should not be organised on the basis of caste or religion and their number should be reduced by law so as to give rise to a unified and organised Opposition. The Government should evolve a policy to make more consultations.

The emergence of a more articulate Opposition after the Sino-India debacle is a promising sign. The rise of a full fledged Opposition would not be a liability but an asset to the better development and success of parliamentary democracy in India.

The V chapter is an attempt to give an insight into the history of the Sino-India relations. It probes into the genesis of the border dispute, legality of the historical but imaginary McMahon Line and the cartographic aggression. It peeps into the cordial phase of the Hindi Chini Bhai-Bhai, Panchsheel

the Chinese refusal to accept that Sino-India border was settled, Tibetan revolt, recognition of the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet which finished the buffer state between China and India, granting of Political asylum to the Dalai Lama and the increased Chinese expansionist designs. The White Papers are discussed at large and at length. The host of factors led to deteriorate the relations to the extent that a full scale war occurred. India needed peaceful borders and amicable relations with the neighbours. But the situation ripened at the border in such a way that all efforts to the amicable settlement of dispute, miserably failed and a direct confrontation became inevitable. Nehru had many misconceptions about the Chinese designs and moves. However the conflict between India and China happened to be the first conflict between the Communist power and the non-aligned state. The India-China war was an acid test to India's foreign policy which made her assess the situations more realistically. The weakness in meeting the contingency make it incumbent upon the nation to shun the idealism in foreign policy, increase defence preparations and not to remain complacent.

The VI chapter is a case-study of the 1962 debates -- held in the Parliament over the Sino-India Border Dispute. It describes the actual use made of the parliamentary processes like the Question-Hour, General Debates, General and specific foreign policy Motions, No-Confidence and Adjournment motions over the Sino-India Border Dispute of 1962. An attempt has been made to study the problem in the light of the behaviour of the members of the Parliament while speaking in the House. The study centres round the Lower House of Parliament, the Lok Sabha due to its popular nature, numerical strength and efficacy in a parliamentary system. Certain limitations to the role of Parliament have been pin-pointed, as are imposed upon it by the parliamentary system itself. During the crucial year of invasion-1962, the Members of Parliament did not demand to hold any discussion over the white Papers. However, their occasional reference is found in abundance. The decline in health and popularity of Nehru, increase in the prestige of Opposition incidentally helped the Parliament to gain a stature of eminence in the Indian Political system.

The VII Chapter is devoted to the detailed analysis of Parliament, its constitutional position, nature of proceedings, legislative control over foreign policy and foreign relations and the inevitable limitations on the measures of parliamentary control. The position of Parliament with regard to the treaty-making is also analysed. An attempt has been made to scrutinise the role of the Parliamentary Committees, namely the Consultative Committee, its organisation and general functioning. It also discusses the financial control of the Parliament. There is a host of factors both political and constitutional that limit the role of Parliament in the field of foreign policy. The crux of foreign policy is negotiation, secrecy and urgency. The Members have got their party affiliations, to safeguard the interests of their constituency and a pledge not to disclose information. The Committee works as mini-Parliament. The need to take Parliament more in confidence is emphasised to enable it to set guide lines for foreign policy and make more concrete suggestions and programmes. Its role as a registering authority is not sufficient. Though the Parliament merely conducts the expost facto

enquiry, no government can afford to ignore its directives.

The conclusion highlights the limitations of Parliament in foreign policy domain. It suggests that the Members of Parliament should be given more information and the consultation with them should increase. They should try to create more interest in foreign policy problems so that a proper balance could be maintained in their interests. The problem of inter-dependence of the Cabinet and Parliament has also been examined. A proper liaison should be maintained in parliamentary approval and the Executive power, to initiate and implement policy. In fact the control of foreign policy by the Executive is equally democratic in spirit. However, parliamentary subservience is not a myth and a balance and coordination is to be maintained between these two significant branches of government. Foreign policy should not be left to the 'generalists', it should be entrusted to the 'experts'. Much remains to be done to streamline the defects of our diplomacy in order to take more positive steps in the realm of foreign policy. Suggestions are also made to accelerate the

the Committee work of Parliament in order to
facilitate more parliamentary consultations.



**PARLIAMENT AND INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SINO-
INDIA BORDER DISPUTE, 1962**

**THESIS SUBMITTED FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN POLITICAL SCIENCE**

By
(Miss) S. Naheed Wizarat

Under the Supervision of
Professor S. A. H. Haqqi
Head of the Department of Political Science

Department of Political Science
Aligarh Muslim University,

Aligarh

1974



T1516

T1516



18 SEP 1976

Bound in Computer

CHECKED-2002

C O N T E N T S

PAGE

a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t

p r e f a c e

CHAPTER I : INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY 1

Introduction; Chief Determinants;
National Interest and Foreign Policy;
Main Tenets of Foreign Policy;
Preservation of Peace; Non-alignment;
India and the U.N.O.; Anti-colonialism;
India and the Commonwealth of Nations.

CHAPTER II : AGENCIES IN THE FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN INDIA 44

Role of the Cabinet; The role of the
Prime Minister - Nehru; Role of the
Ministry of External Affairs -
Organisation and Functions; Role of
Parliament and its Committees.

CHAPTER III: INSTRUMENTS OF PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF FOREIGN POLICY 83

Question-Hour - Origin; Procedural
changes during the III Lok Sabha;
Rules relating to Questions;
Allotment of days for Questions;
Short Notice Questions; Half an hour
Discussion; Question Hour in practice
and its utility; Motions and Resolutions;
No-Confidence Motions; Motion for
Adjournment; Parliamentary Debates as
instrument of control of foreign policy
and its significance.

CHAPTER IV : ROLE OF OPPOSITION 124

Introduction; Importance of Opposition in the Indian Parliamentary Democracy; Sino-India Border Dispute and the major Opposition Parties; Communist Party of India; Jan-Sangh; Swatantra and the Praja Socialist Party; Utility of Opposition.

CHAPTER V : SINO-INDIA RELATIONS AND THE BORDER DISPUTE 158

Introduction; McMahon Line and the Simla-Conference; Tibetan Revolt; The Dispute develops; The Three Sectors; Border-Dispute and its historical background; Chinese invasion vis a vis India's policy; Colombo Proposals.

CHAPTER VI : DEBATES - 1962 - A CASE STUDY 200

Introduction; Questions in the 1962 Lok Sabha; Demands for Grants; Papers Laid on the Table; The Debates on the Motions; Half an Hour Discussions; Adjournment Motions; Ministerial Statements; Influence of Parliament.

CHAPTER VII : ROLE OF PARLIAMENT 240

Constitutional position of the Indian Parliament; Measures of Influence; Question-Hour, Debates, Motions and Resolutions; Demands for Grants; Parliament and International Treaties; Parliamentary Committees and their Role; Consultative Committee of Parliament - Organisation and functions ; Financial control of policy; Factors eclipsing the role of Parliament; Parliament and the Sino-India Border-Dispute; Influence of Parliament.

c o n c l u s i o n

a p p e n d i c e s

b i b l i o g r a p h y


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

.....

I am deeply indebted to my reverend teacher and supervisor Professor S. A. H. Haqqi for his perennial intellectual inspiration to me. No words of mine can express the gratitude I owe to him for his unflinching support, valuable guidance and scholarly comments. I express my sincere gratitude to my teacher, Professor S. Nasir Ali for the keen interest he showed in my research despite all his preoccupations. His suggestions and guidance from time to time equally facilitated my work. I am thankful to the University authorities and the U.G.C. for awarding me the research scholarship and the Fellowship, without which the present work would not have seen the light of the dawn. I am also thankful to my teacher, Dr. S. A. H. Bilgrami, Reader in the Department of Political Science for his assistance whenever I needed it.

I would be failing in my duty if I do not thank my colleague Dr. Murtaza Khan for his assistance at various stages in the completion of this work. I also express my warm thanks to my friends, Miss Tanvir Sultan, Miss Elizabeth George, Miss Rehana Amin and Miss Iqbal Khanam. My special thanks are due to Mr. A. Ansari of the Sapru House Library for helping me in the location of the relevant data. I am equally

grateful to my brother Mr. Mustafa Wizarat for his cooperation and constant inspiration. I am extremely grateful to Mr. Muzzammilullah and Mr. Taqi for typing out the manuscript in time.

(Miss)  S. Naheed Wizarat

P R E F A C E
- - - - -

The foreign policy of India has assumed new dimensions especially after the 1962 debacle, its study therefore warrants greater caution. Undoubtedly sizable literature has been produced on the various aspects of foreign policy, ever since India emerged as an independent entity on the political map of the world. But very little attention has been paid to the most crucial problem, i.e. the formulation of foreign policy and the role of Parliament in this regard. To what extent does the Parliament influence the decisions, affects the negotiations and determines the policy formulation, has not been paid due attention. The present work is an endeavour to analyse and comprehend the role that the Parliament can play in the ultimate analysis. The thesis is designed to deal firstly with the general aspects of the problem and then to examine the Sino-India border dispute.

With the help of historical documents and on the basis of day-to-day analysis of the Parliamentary proceedings, I have tried to make an unbiased and

judicious study of the various processes through which the Parliament in India can have a say and exert its influence in matters of foreign policy. However, the conclusions drawn about the role of Parliament are basically guided by the constitutional provisions regarding the role of Parliament and a through analysis of the proceedings of the Parliament, covering a period of roughly twenty years. Extensive use has been made of Parliamentary Debates, the constitution of India, the Letters, Notes and Memoranda exchanged between the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China, in the form of White Papers, Notes and comments in the various journals, periodic or annual Reports of ad hoc committees, the reports of the Ministry of External Affairs and the other Government of India Publications. Since Nehru remains undisputedly the chief architect of India's foreign policy, his speeches both inside and outside the Parliament constitute the most dependable basis of India's foreign policy.

The thesis consists of seven chapters and the conclusion. The first Chapter is the analytical exploration of the various factors determining

India's foreign policy. Nehru's ideology, combining in him ~~the~~ western realism and ~~the~~ eastern idealism, *the* historical legacy of Buddha, Asoka and Gandhi, geo-politics and the various Resolutions of the Indian National Congress, formulated in the pre-independence era ~~which~~ still constitute the cornerstone of foreign policy postulates. Some of the determinants being analysed are the principle of national interest, India's geographical situation, economic potential, military ~~power~~s and historical traditions. Non-alignment happened to be the chief doctrine of Nehruite foreign policy. Besides other factors influencing India's foreign policy, its chief tenets viz., ties with the Commonwealth of Nations, faith in peace and the United Nations, condemnation of apartheid and racial discrimination and anti-colonialism have also been dealt with in detail.

The Second Chapter is an enquiry into the functioning and processes of relevant agencies that can partake of the responsibility of making or unmaking of foreign policy namely the cabinet, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs and the

Parliament. Adequate attention has been paid to the role that Nehru played as a duuminate, combining in him the twin offices of the Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs. Consequently, Nehru occupies a unique position by virtue of his charismatic personality and official capacity. The chapter also deals with the working of the Indian Parliament and its committees in this regard.

The Third Chapter gives an insight into the various instruments through which the Parliament can control the foreign policy. It is at this stage that the Parliament can shape and mould the foreign policy, when it is debated in its forums. The chapter discusses the instruments of parliamentary control - major Parliamentary Debates, Question Hour, discussions on Motions, Resolutions and Demands for Grants and the Ministerial Statements.

The fourth Chapter makes a study of the impact of Opposition parties on foreign policy issues. The existence of Parliamentary Opposition as a corrective to the ruling party is one of the essential ingredients and pre-requisites of the successful working of parliamentary democracy.

The function of the Opposition ought to be no less significant than that of the party-in-power. In India, the Opposition has been rather hopelessly disjointed, weak and ineffective. It is a chaotic multitude consisting of several heterogeneous groups. Numerically also, it is quite unimpressive as compared to the thumping majority of the Ruling Party. The Chapter also makes a thorough study of the various existing Opposition parties, over the Sino-India border dispute.

The fifth Chapter examines the vicissitudes through which the Sino-India relations and the border disputes have passed. It analyses how the relations deteriorated, having passed through a long phase of cordiality and fraternity. The episode of the Dalai Lama fleeing from China and seeking political asylum in India, the Tibetan revolt, Longju incident, minor skirmishes on the border and the Chinese refusal to hold discussions on the McMahon Line presented a dismal picture, culminating in the 1962 Chinese aggression. The tragedy could have been averted if sane consuls had prevailed. The arguments for and against the respective claims of the contending

parties to the dispute have been weighed as judiciously as possible under the circumstances on the basis of available information in India.

The sixth Chapter is a case-study of the 1962 Parliamentary Debates over the Sino-India border dispute. It is thoroughly based on the Debates, Question-Hour, Adjournment and Calling-Attention Motions and Demands for Grants. The Lok Sabha Debates form the focus of the study, owing to its representative character, reflecting a lesser cross-section. Most of the problems, discussed in the Rajya Sabha, present duplication of the Lok Sabha proceedings, hence the avoidance of its material. The case-study covers the year 1962, the most crucial and pertinent, when the armed clash between the two erstwhile neighbours took place across the borders. It makes an analysis of the various parliamentary processes, discussed in the third Chapter. It also attempts to analyse the reactions of the Members, expressed through hectic or uproarious scenes, interruptions, occasional laughters, comic gestures, undue applaud or condemnation and purposeless walkouts.

The seventh Chapter analyses the role that the Parliament has played. It treats of the Parliament's constitutional position in this regard vis a vis the Executive branch of the government. It scrutinises the Executive responsibility in the light of various parliamentary processes through which the Parliament indirectly influences or directs the policy.

Besides this, the Chapter also takes into account the measures and means which ensure parliamentary supervision. It also deals with the role of Parliament in Treaty-making. It tries to analyse the factors and limitations which eclipse the role of Parliament in this regard. It also scrutinises the role of Parliamentary Consultative Committees. It suggests to ~~improvise~~ the activities of the Committees. Other measures are suggested to improve the position of Parliament in the field of foreign policy-making.

The Conclusion highlights the need to increase parliamentary supervision and control of foreign policy. Its committee-work should be galvanised and speeded up. Trends should develop to overshadow Cabinet despotism and strengthen the work of Parliament.

CHAPTER I

INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION:

The study of India's foreign policy is invariably the study of Nehru's foreign policy. Jawaharlal Nehru has been its chief "architect, engineer and the voice of his country's policy towards the outside world". The speeches of Nehru delivered by him at different times and places give an articulate expression to free India's foreign policy. "In Parliament and party caucus, within India and abroad, he has hammered on themes with remarkable consistency".¹

The major determinants and factors which underlie his policy are ancient Indian history and culture,² her geographical

-
1. Michael Brecher, Nehru, A Political Biography (abridged edition), London, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 216. Elsewhere, in the same vein, Brecher writes that Nehru almost held a "private monopoly" over foreign policy. Also "India's Defence and Foreign Policies", ed. A.B. Shah, Bombay, Manaktalas, 1966, p. 12
 2. Elsewhere Nehru said, "This policy is not the product of any inspiration or arbitrary choice but has its roots in the past history and way of thinking as well as in fundamental national exigencies" J.L. Nehru, "Changing India", Foreign Affairs , Vol. 41, No.3, April 1963, p.455.

position,¹ moralistic tradition of Buddha and Ashoka, Gandhi's ideology of peace and non-violence,² and Nehru's assessment of post war period marked by dominant conflagration of cold war which engulfed the globe and divided the world into two warring camps.³ Nehru had a vivid sense of power politics. In his first broadcast to the nation after assuming office in 1946, Nehru declared, "We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against - one another, which have led in the past to world war and which may again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale".⁴

-
1. Referring to India's geographical position, Nehru said in the Parliament, on March 17, 1950, "We are in a strategic part of Asia, set in the centre of Indian Ocean with intimate past and present connection with Western Asia, South-East Asia and Far Eastern Asia. Even if we could not want to ignore this fact. Now that a greater part of Asia is free from colonialism, our minds go back to the old days and the relationships with other countries in Western Eastern and South-Eastern countries". T.A. Nizami, The Communist Party and India's Foreign Policy, New Delhi, Associated Publishing House, 1971, p. 27.
 2. Even in the Parliament, the policy of the Government was supported on this ground. Seth Govinda Das said that the policy is based on Indian culture and civilization and in accordance with Gandhi's ideal of peace. Lok Sabha Debates November 26, 1959, II Series, No. 9, Vol. xxxv, column 1925. Also see Frank Anthony's statement in the same debate in this regard, col. 1938.
 3. K.P. Misra (ed.), Studies in Indian Foreign Policy, New Delhi, Vikas Publication, 1969, p. xii.
 4. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected speeches, September, 1946 - April 1961, New Delhi, Publication Division, Government of India, 1961, p. 2.

At some other place he said. that for the last three hundred years, since the nation-states in the modern world. have emerged, nations have relied for survival on this process of mobilized antagonisms. All these years, the nations of the world have been engaged in futile wars.¹ In a philosophical vein, S. Radhakrishnan also said that he was conscious of power politics and the perils of alignment.²

Such pronouncements of Indian leaders have reduced Indian foreign policy to "protest against power politics."³ Under Nehru's stewardship, India attempted to play a quiet and persuasive role in easing down the cold war tensions. In many a situation, in 1950's particularly. his efforts to iron out differences through discussion, conciliation, and persuasion yielded many good results. At present the irony of it is that it is not possible to decipher pin-pointedly India's role, as many of the state papers are not open to public perusal.⁴

-
1. J.L. Nehru's forward to Victor H. Wallace. (ed.) Paths to Peace, Melbourn, 1957, p. xv.
 2. S. Radhakrishnan, Occasional speeches and Writings, October, 1952- January 1956, New Delhi, p. 4.
 3. Indian Official, "India as a World Power," Foreign Affairs, 1948-49, Vol. XXVII, p. 550.
 4. K.P. Misra, op. cit., p. xiii-iv.

The immediate roots of Indian foreign policy are found in policy declarations of the All India Congress Committee.¹ This became articulate after the World War I, when Nehru was incharge of the newly created foreign office working under the invigorating leadership of Gandhi.² A study of the resolutions passed by the Indian National Congress from its inception throws light on the fact that the Party took keen interest in the external affairs.³

The meeting of All India Congress Committee in Delhi in 1921 was a "landmark in the history of India's foreign relations". K.P. Misra cites N.V. Raj Kumar that the resolution of 1921 was important, since it was the first significant declaration on the part of nationalist India. It further laid down the cornerstone of independent India's foreign policy. The Congress Session in Madras in 1927 passed a resolution of protest against the use of Indian troops in China. In 1957 Nehru confirmed that the foundations of India's foreign policy were laid down at the Madras Session of the Congress in 1927.⁴

-
1. Since its inception in 1885, the Congress always favoured an independent policy. The foundations of the policy of peace were laid by the Congress, when the British Government without consulting the Indian Legislative Assembly sent Indian troops abroad on the out-break of the World War II as quoted infra P. Trikamdas, "India and Empire" Political Science Quarterly, October- December 1938, pp. 607-608.
 2. Norman D. Palmer, "Foreign Policy of the Indian National Congress before Independence, Indian Political System, London, 1961, p. 238. Also see, Nehru, op. cit., p. 83.
 3. For details of resolutions passed by the A.I.C.C. since 1885, see N.V. Raj Kumar, (ed.), The Background of Indian Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 1952.
 4. Palmer, op. cit., pp. 239-40.

NATIONAL INTEREST AND FOREIGN POLICY

National interest is the most significant factor in determining the foreign policy of any country. Nehru said, "Every country's foreign policy, first of all, is concerned with its own security and with protecting its own progress.... security is protected by policies...."² and a deliberate policy of friendship with other countries goes further in gaining security than almost anything else. On 4th Dec. 1947, in a speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Nehru said, "Whatever policy we may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign policy of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say. We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of a country it governs and no government dare do anything which in short or long run is manifesting to the disadvantage of that country. Therefore, whether a country is imperialistic or socialist or communist, its Foreign Minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country".³

-
1. Adda B. Bozeman, "India's Foreign Policy Today: Reflections upon its Sources", K.P. Misra, op. cit., p.37
 2. Nehru, op. cit., p. 28. Also see Dorothy Norman, Nehru: The First Sixty Years, Vol. II, Bombay, 1965, p.473

Side by side, a nation's foreign policy ought to be a balanced blend of idealism and enlightened self-interest.¹ G.S. Bajpai cites Palmerstone's words to substantiate his proposition that there are no eternal friends or enemies but only eternal interests and that India's foreign policy has to some extent combined idealism with national interest.²

To "curb any separatist tendencies" and "to assume the leadership of area"³ were the two main aims in the minds of Indian foreign policy framers and Indian leaders.⁴ (Obviously, there was a consciousness of India's heterogeneous composition, its relative problems and existence and partition). In laying down the main tenets of foreign policy, Nehru emphasised non-alignment as a means to attain the goal of national interest.

1. G.S. Bajpai, "Ethical Stand in World Issues: Cornerstone of India's Foreign Policy," in K.P. Misra (ed.) op. cit., p. 25. Also see, Nehru, op. cit., p. 28 where Nehru says that "idealism alone would not do".
2. Ibid., p. 26. Also see, E.H. Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, London, 1958, p. 234. Where Carr points out that no realist can wholly disregard the wider moral issues and principles and no idealist can become entirely oblivious of self-interest".
3. Werner Levi, Free India in Asia, Minneapolis, 1952, p. 51. "Many times Nehru has appealed to his countrymen for unity on the ground that the whole of Asia is looking to India for leadership or he has assured them that because of India's high prestige abroad, Asian Countries are looking to her for guidance. Dr. Radhakrishnan has pointed out that leadership in Asia is open to India and that India's role will be very important. Sardar Patel once remarked that India has the potential to take over leadership".
4. Latif Ahmad Sherwani, India, China and Pakistan, Karachi, Council for Pakistan Studies, 1967, p. 64.

This enlightened self-interest is the most important justification of non-alignment policy. The position of non-alignment is that of a means to achieve the aims. It is not an end in itself.¹

On the eve of the independence of Ghana, President Nkrumah, made the following declaration, clarifying his main stand on the basis of national interest. He said, that in pursuing an independent policy, the Ghana government will have foremost regard, for the interests of the people of Ghana, and their economic and social progress. Every step in the government's power, internally as well as externally, would further the developments of the nation's resources for the common good.² National interest of a country is determined by "geopolitical economic and other factors, obtaining at a particular point of time".³

-
1. A. Appadorai "The Foreign Policy of India", in J.E. Black and K.W. Thomson's (eds.), Foreign Policies in a Challenging World, New York, Harper and Row, 1963, p. 485.
 2. Kwame Nkrumah, I speak of Freedom: Statement of African Ideology, London, Heinemann, 1961, p. 98.
 3. For geography as a factor in India's foreign policy, see Pradyumna P. Karan, "India's Role in Geopolitics", India Quarterly, Vol. 9, 1953, pp. 160-9. Also see, J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy, Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1970, pp. 26-43.

It is because of it that, the elements of National interest change with the variations in the national and international situations.¹ Nehru, who gave shape and content to India's foreign policy was fully convinced that it serves India's national interest. The critics, however, ever since the inception of India as an independent nation, criticised and doubted the validity of foreign policy principle, as also the yardstick of national interest, which is always different to different persons.²

Michael Brecher has enunciated the "elite" principle in explaining foreign policy. He hints that the key to understand the foreign policy system is, the world view of the small coterie of men in every state, who take foreign policy decisions in ultimate analysis.³ Foreign policy is not the manifesto of cherished ideals and emotional preferences of a leader or of nation, it is the art of reconciling the attitudes with the national interest.⁴

The crucial point is, the identification of national interest at a particular time by this ruling elite. The national interest has to be an amalgam of constants and variables.⁵

1. K.P. Misra, op. cit., p. 96.

2. Editorially, National Herald, (Lucknow), 10.4.69.

3. Michael Brecher, India and World Politics, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. vii.

4. Devdutta, "Non-Alignment and India", The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, Oct.- Dec. 1962, p.387

5. K.P. Misra, op. cit., p. XV.

Their importance, to a large part depends on the setting of the instruments by which they are surveyed.¹ Nehru, therefore, emphatically declared, that he had tried to look to the interests of India, as it was his primary duty.²

Nehru was conscious of the objective of India's foreign policy. He declared that every intelligent person sees that "a narrow national policy may excite the multitude for the moment just as the communal cry had done, but it is bad for the nation and it is bad internationally, as we lose sight of the ultimate good and thereby endanger our own good. Therefore, we prefer to look after India's interests in the context of World cooperation and World peace, in so far as the world peace can be preserved".³ In short, India's foreign policy, logically enough is- "cognizant of and responsive to the wider and broader interests"⁴ of India as well as of the World, which is based on conception and understanding of a less realistic an idealist like Nehru.

National interest is also wound up inextricably with economic development and interest.⁵ On December 4, 1947 in the

1. Robert C. Good, "National Interest and Moral Theory: The 'Debate' among Contemporary Realists," in Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good (eds.), Foreign Policy in Sixties, Baltimore, 1965, p. 271.
2. Dorothy Norman, Nehru: The First Sixty Years, Bombay 71, 1965, No. 10, p. 473.
3. Nehru, op. cit., p. 28.
4. K.P. Misra, op. cit., p. xvii.
5. Adda B. Bozeman, op. cit., p. 38.

Constituent Assembly, Nehru said that in ultimate analysis the foreign policy ought to be the outcome of the economic policy, as foreign policy will be rather vague, inchoate, and groping, without being governed by economic policy.¹ "Survival" and "Security"² had been the national interest of India. She wanted survival, external and internal stability, otherwise, India had no empire to hold, no trade monopoly to perpetuate, no ocean routes to safeguard, no international commitments or vested interests to preserve except Kashmir and no ideology to sell, but somehow India like other states is not engaged in quest for power.³

In short, it is a policy influenced by a variety of factors.⁴ It is a well "thought out" and "deliberate policy".⁵ "It is a policy", declared Nehru on December 9, 1958, in the Lok Sabha during the reply to debate on Foreign Affairs, "inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the circumstances of the World today...."⁶

-
1. J.L. Nehru, Independence and After, A collection of speeches, 1946-49. New York, 1950, p. 201.
 2. For details in assessing "Security" as the basis of national interest see, J. Bondyopadhyaya, op. cit., pp. 9-15.
 3. Devdutta, op. cit., p. 388.
 4. Nehru, op. cit., p. 197. (From Speech in Rajya Sabha on a private members resolution's on nuclear explosions, May 24, 1957).
 5. Ibid., p. 196, (From Speech in the Lok Sabha on the Defence Ministers resolution on nuclear explosions, May 22, 1957).
 6. Ibid., p. 80.

MAIN TENETS OF FOREIGN POLICY

It is clear from the above that India's foreign policy is the most important legacy of Nehru. It is his most, outstanding contribution to India which made him the path finder of the newly liberated countries of east and west, South and North.¹

Certain principles are defined by Nehru which form the corner stone of India's foreign policy. These principles are not a matter of abstract definitions but of definite goals. Foreign policy can not be grandiose, unitary or a comprehensive algebraic formula in this complex world.²

The principal source of Indian foreign affairs is neither Hinduism, Buddhism, Gandhianism, the Western European tradition, nor a rational analysis of reality in terms of India's long range national interest, but it is the complex biography of Nehru.³ Apart from the predominant role of Nehru in determining it, the role of other factors is not inconsequential.⁴

1. P.C. Joshi, "The Nehru Legacy", Mainstream III, No. 39 May 29, 1965, p. 18

2. J.D. Sethi, "National Security", Seminar, No.77, Jan. 1966, p. 28. Also see, T.A. Nizami, "The Architect of Modern India", Aligarh Muslim University Gazette, June 30, 1964 that Nehru's foreign policy was not a "Static Concept", but a "dynamic process" - "evolving, changing and upholding itself to meet the exigencies of time".

3. Adda B. Bozeman, op. cit., p. 32. Also see, K. Sadchidanand Murthy, "India's Foreign Policy: Ideological Moorings", Indian Foreign Policy, Calcutta, 1964, pp. 1-8.

4. K.P. Misra, op. cit., Editor's Introduction, p. VIII.

It means the inevitable determinants of the foreign policy namely history, geography, cultural background, economic potential, strategic position, military ^opower and its total power position also can not be overlooked.

PRESERVATION OF PEACE

The preservation of peace is the central aim of India's policy. It is in pursuit of this policy that India has chosen the path of non-alignment in any military or like pact of alliance.¹ This preservation and the enlargement of peace formed the backbone of India's policy because, for economic reconstruction, political stability and bringing up socialism in India, India needed tranquil atmosphere within and without. Moreover, PEACE, has been the keyword in Indian culture. Every prayer of an Indian ends in the desire for peace. Thus, the primary goal (of India's policy) has been the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security.² Our present policy flows from the past, while incidentally it also helps

-
1. Cited in J.W. Burton, International Relations, Cambridge, 1965, p.206. Also see Nehru, op. cit., p. 220, where Nehru shows the concern of every nation in the pursuit of peace in a speech in the U.N. General Assembly, New York, Oct.3, 1960. Also see p. 56, which enunciates, "If we can tilt the balance towards peace, it will be a great service to the world". Also see:—The most outstanding efforts in ensuring peace is that 1954, Agreement on Tibet which enunciates the Five principles of Panch Sheel. ~~And added~~, "By this agreement we ensure peace to a very large extent in a certain area of Asia. I would earnestly wish that this area of peace, could be spread over the rest of Asia and indeed over the rest of the world". Nehru, op. cit., p. 304. (From speech during debate on Foreign Affairs in Lok Sabha, May 15, 1954).
 2. M.S. Rajan, "Foreign Policy in Action, 1954-56" India Quarterly, July -Sept., 1960, p.213. Also see, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, - 1949-53, Second Impression, The Publication Division, New Delhi, p. 167

the maintenance of peace and the avoidance of war in the present day world.¹ Peace is also the main mantra for the solitary leader,² Nehru who explicitly mentioned, "our main stake in world affairs is peace"³ We want at least two decades of peace in order to be able to develop our resources. Nehru was very certain of the fact that every one wants peace. The great power blocs and the tiny developing nations, all want and talk of peace. It is a quality, it is a way, an approach and objective.⁴ Nehru almost passionately wished "peace" for his "One World".⁵

NON-ALIGNMENT

The cardinal feature of India's foreign policy is the policy of non-alignment. Nehru pioneered it in the world of the developing nations,⁶ hence almost in every foreign policy

1. Ibid., p. 195

2. Michael Brecher, op. cit., p. 151

3. Nehru, op. cit., p. 48. Also see, Vijayalaxmi Pandit, India's Foreign Policy, "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 34, No. 3 April 1956, p. 433, where she specifies that this approach of peace is India's traditional philosophical and historical outlook.

4. Nehru, op. cit., p. 56. Also see P. Trikamardas, "India and Empire", Political Science Quarterly, Oct.-Dec. 1938 pp. 607-8.

5. Ibid., p. 11.

6. For details see, Independence and After, A Collection of more Important Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, Sept. 1946, Delhi 1949, p. 199. Also see, K.P. Misra, "The concept of Non-alignment: Its Implications and Recent Trends", in K.P. Misra (ed.) op. cit., p. 91. Nehru - Nasser and U Nu are called "high priests of non-alignment. Ibid., p. 96

speech by Nehru, there is an insistent proclaim and adoration for this policy. On Sept. 7, 1946, in his first broadcast to the nation Nehru said, "we propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to, world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale."¹

In the post war era, dreadful antagonism existed between the two great powers, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.. Nehru was fully conscious of this vital and menacing division. The two blocs were at daggers' drawn on every major and minor issue that the world was confronted with. This gave birth and sustenance to COLD - WAR, which became the stark reality after the World-War II. East and the West formed two warring camps.² It is desirable, Nehru declared, "for all the countries not to insist, not to lay stress on separate groups and separate blocs".³ The two blocs always appeared hostile and on the verge of war. Nehru realised the adverse consequences of cold-war phenomenon and concluded that it is in India's benefit and national interest to remain aloof from bloc politics.⁴ At the

1. Nehru, op. cit., p. 2

2. For details see, T.A. Nizami, op. cit., p. 27.

3. Nehru op. cit., p. 11.

4. For details see, K.P. Misra, "The Concept of non-alignment: Its Implications and Recent Trends", in K.P. Misra (ed.) op. cit., pp. 95-97.

time of independence, India was economically under developed and politically at sixes and sevens. Thus, for economic reconstruction and political stability, India needed economic and military assistance from all quarters. Nehru was against attaching India to any particular group.¹ This external isolation has given to India ample opportunity to remain engaged in internal reconstruction against international bipolarisation.² It was utterly realistic "for India to avoid" false step "of bloc - entanglement and Nehru did it consciously. Thus Nehru was earnest in developing a definite foreign policy for the country in the light of fluid conditions of the world."³ Nehru wanted that India should become the world's leading neutralist power.⁴ Generally, the pursuit of peace, liberation of subject peoples, elimination of racial discrimination and furtherance of international peace and security are the objectives for all nations to pursue, India endeavoured to attain these objectives, not through getting aligned with the great power blocs, but through an independent approach, a policy of non-alignment. It caused a great deal of misunderstanding in the USA.⁵

-
1. Nehru, op. cit., p. 27. (From speech in the Constituent Assembly, Dec. 4, 1947).
 2. It is not isolation as such but just the policy of having an unjaundiced outlook, see, Vijayalaxmi, op. cit., p. 433.
 3. Ibid., p. 29. "Even after ten years of this avowed policy, the policy of non-alignment remained valid ... no responsible person has suggested remotely, that there should be a change in India's basic policy, the policy of peace and the policy of non-alignment." Statement by Frank Anthony, Lok Sabha Debate Nov. 6, 1959, Second Series, No. 9, Vol. XXXV, Col. 1937.
 4. Peter Lyon, "Neutralism as State Policy: The case for India", K.P. Misra (ed.) op. cit., p. 89.
 5. B.N. Chakravarti, India Speaks to America, Bombay, Orient Longmans, 1966, p. 8.

The policy of non-alignment is an assertion of independence and democratic right of freedom of action whereas neutrality or isolationism, stems from indifference.

In India, non-alignment received ~~applaud~~ from almost all quarters. Nehru accepted non-alignment as a part of independence of judgement on the basis of merits of an issue. He said that even from the point of view of opportunism and independent judgement, straight forward and honest policy is the "best policy".¹ Clarifying what is non-alignment Nehru asked, "What does joining a bloc mean? After all it can only mean one thing: give up your view about a particular question, adopt the other party's view on that question in order to please it and gain its favour the question only arises when we are opposed to it on that point, therefore we give up our view point and adopt the other one in order to gain favour".² Nehru was particular to emphasise that non-alignment did not mean isolation. When he said that we should not align ourselves with any power bloc,

*. Ibid., p. 35

2. Ibid., p. 36

it does not amount to mean that we should not be closer in our relation with all countries.¹

Non-alignment to Nehru was something positive, dynamic and definite. It is not in itself a policy but it was "a part of policy".² It was not "sitting on the fence"³ and it was not sheer opportunism and wooing of the desired country. However, this policy should not be confused with neutrality, as neutrality operates during war. It is more restricted in its implications. "We are only uncommitted to certain principles, policies and objectives".⁴

India's desire based on its national interest stems from the realisation of its own weaknesses-economic and military.⁵ The other justification of its policy is its strategic position and geographical situation. India cannot align with Communist groups for the obvious reason of the presence of Pakistan, her enemy number one and the Western ally, in the same way. She cannot align with the west for the mighty presence of China, the monster of blue ants.⁶

India's policy has not denied her the opportunity to participate freely in world affairs. Our policy is not a passive policy or a negative policy, was Nehru's assertion in his

1. Ibid., p. 47. Also see, M.M. Rehman, Politics of Non-Alignment, New Delhi, Associated Publishing House, 1969.

2. Ibid., p. 79

3. Ibid., p. 80

4. B.N. Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 12.

5. Ibid., p. 13.

6. A. Appadorai, op. cit., p. 486

speech in the Constituent Assembly on March 8, 1948.¹ In short, Nehru concluded it as follows, "It is positive, constructive policy deliberately aiming at something and deliberately trying to avoid hostility to other countries, to any country as far as possible".²

Nehru was not insistent on the point that India should play a dominant role in world affairs. India was not to acquire a predominant position. If ever India was to play a part in world affairs she should be mindful of her own strength, problems and country's affairs. National interest can not be put at stake. Nehru clarified that India did not want to interfere in international affairs, except where she felt that intervention might help others or where something affected India directly.³ Non-alignment has been India's distinguished mark through which world's attention is attracted towards India.⁴

1. Nehru, op. cit., p. 32. Also see, p. 148, where Nehru says that our policy is not "escapism" those who think that "our policy is inane are mistaken". (From reply to debate in the Constituent Assembly on India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth of Nations, May 17, 1949).

2. Ibid., p. 45. The rise of non-alignment in the international world is compared with the rise of adult suffrage on the national scene. In theory, any nation can adhere to non-alignment but in practice, it was largely confined to the emerging nations of Asia and Africa who had been and continue to be the weaker nations of the world. G.R.K. "Content of Non-Alignment", Mainstream, V. No.8, Oct. 22, 1964, p. 9

3. Ibid., p. 70

4. Nehru, op. cit., p. 82. (From Speech at the Bangalore Session of the Indian National Congress Sadasivnagar, Jan. 17, 1960). Also see Rajdoot, "Sunlight on the Summit or Sunset?" Mainstream, Vol. V, No. 8, October 22, 1964, p. 15. Where the author maintained that in 1950's non-alignment played a big role as it was suited to a bipolar world. Its function was that of a "bridge" between the two cold war camps.

India was also interested in the Asian uplift with the result that the Asian Relations Conference was convened at New Delhi, on March 23, 1947, at a time when the world was standing on the "threshold of a new ^eperiod of history" and "dynamic Asia", was to take new ventures.¹ But India did not want to create a third power bloc. "In the first place it is not feasible to create an effective third bloc strong enough in a military sense, due to the fact that all the uncommitted countries would appear pygmy-like, compared to either of the two giants, secondly, such a bloc would be undesirable, as it would not serve the mighty cause of peace, next, a policy of non-alignment implies non-alignment of the uncommitted countries with one another."²

Among the non-aligned, India occupies a position of eminence as India was one of the earliest countries to adopt non-alignment and later, it was regarded as the yard-stick to gauge independence of a new nation in international affairs.³

-
1. Ibid., p. 248. In an inaugural address at the Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March 23, 1947 where Nehru laid down new ideals for Asia and Asians and expected Asia "to function effectively in the maintenance of peace", page 251. He said that Asia should, "cooperate together for that larger ideal of 'one world'", p. 252.
 2. B.N. Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 14.
 3. "The Problem, " Seminar, No. 77, Jan. 1966, p. 11. Indian non-alignment is often compared with the policy of non-entangling alliances of Washington. Werner Levi drew attention to this point of striking parallel.

Nehru dreaded that alignment and pactomania had yielded undesirable results to the world, in the last few years. The spread of this policy to Asia has not added to the world's security. It has deviated people from thinking on economic progress and developing minor strength and bolstered up countries by military means which can only be temporary. It had rather retarded the progress of a country.¹

In fact, the strategic aims of all the non-aligned nations ought to arrange a detente between the two hostile blocs and somehow India did it.² The politics of non-alignment is the politics of peace, a state of military as well as economic powerlessness and desire for survival. Moreover, this policy was more activist and participating than the independent and the peace-area approach. Undoubtedly, non-alignment was developed as a measure to face the cold-war in the world. Whatever may be true, the fact remains that for India the policy remained thoroughly unchanged.³ In the beginning this policy brought dividends to India, later it started earning indifference and hostility of big powers.⁴

1. Nehru, op. cit., p. 98.

2. The Problem, op. cit., p. 11

3. Devdutta, op. cit., pp. 397, 381.

4. Ibid., p. 393. Also see, B.N. Chakravarti, op. cit. p.8 for the same argument how the non-alignment created misunderstanding against India in the U.S.A.

Despite remaining non-aligned, India played a commendable role in Korean-episode and also as the Chairman for Indo-China. Nehru devised it so as to meet all contingencies that may confront India.

While it is probably true to say that the intentions of India's policy makers have remained broadly the same since 1947, the actual course of India's neutralist policy has gone through three stages.¹ During the years 1947-50, India was preoccupied with immediate tasks flowing from the newly achieved independence. Domestic and foreign policy tasks were closely linked. India showed strong faith in cordialties with Britain and championed Indonesian independence. Indian Neutralism seemed to be pro-Western.

From 1951 to 56, India pursued a fairly active mediatorial role and moved from a western oriented neutralism towards a more positive middle-of-the-road-position. The strength and limitations of Indian neutralist diplomacy were shown by her action or inaction on such issues as Korean, Indo-Chinese, and Suez wars and Hungarian resolution.² In this period, India's relations with Russia and China showed signs of improvement, with U.S.A. deterioration and with Britain showed fluctuations. From June, 1952, there was a new note of

-
1. Brecher reports that "the term to describe Indian foreign policy has undergone frequent changes. It began with 'neutrality' or 'dynamic neutrality', later became 'neutralism' and then 'non-alignment'. Nehru prefers the phrase 'positive policy for peace', he told the author in New Delhi on June 13 1956". Michael Brecher, op. cit., p. 563.
 2. For details see, K.P. Karunakaran, India in World Affairs, 1950-53, Bombay, 1958, and also Brecher, op. cit. Chapter 19.

criticism in the Indian Government's reaction to Western alliances. India consistently expressed her disapproval of almost all the western alliances and of western colonial empires. Indian diplomacy had two working assumptions that firstly, the Asian affairs should be decided by Asians and secondly, all the remaining vestiges of colonialism must be crushed.

The policy pursued during this period favoured and improved relations with Communist China. India at this period was developing a world role as was evident from advising settlements for the Asian and Algerian questions, her initiatives in proposing for a world disarmament agreement beginning with a nuclear test ban, her acceptance of the chairmanship of the committee appointed to supervise the implementation of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Laos, and her active role in the meetings of the Colombo-Powers and at Bandung in April 1955, Thus there was meeting with Tito and Nasser at Broni in Yugoslavia. In the U.N. this bloc became more unweildy and India's undisputed leadership began to diminish.¹ Later, the limitations of India's mediatory role were soon to become clear as, with the eruption of the Suez and Hungarian crises in 1956, India's neutralist policies were less effective than during the Korean and Indo-China wars.

Another factor which was influencing the course of

1. Ibid., p. 84

Indian policy was the development of Soviet aid programmes to India from 1954 onwards.¹ Thus by the end of 1956, India had evolved a neutralist foreign policy, recognised by both the cold war camps as independent, and if only by contrast with the year 1947-51, it seemed to be slightly inclined towards the Soviet bloc.² From 1957, India tended to content with a rather quieter role internationally, in contrast, with Egypt and Yugoslavia to be more moderate, less stridently radical and revisionist, even on anti-colonial issues. These contrasts were more evident during 1960-62.³ Since October 1962, the dispute with China had made all other issues subordinate.⁴

After one and a half decade¹ of hard won freedom, the first test of non-alignment occurred when, the Chinese invasion⁵ took place. In the context of this localised Sino-Indian War, non-alignment played the role of keeping out of cold-war from South-Asian region, where India and China, the biggest and the largest countries were at dagger's drawn.⁶ In the same vein, the editorial of the Indian Express of November 29, 1962 declared

1. Ibid., p. 84

2. See Brecher, op. cit., pp. 582-8

3. Peter Lyon, op. cit., p. 85

4. Ibid., p. 86

5. Satyanand Sinha, China Strikes, London, Blandford Press, 1964, p. 77

6. The Times of India, (New Delhi), 27.8. 1963

that the Chinese aggression on India's borders has swept away an accumulated cobwebs and disillusion.¹ A few people held that in the new situations, non-alignment has become all the more relevant and a few held to the contrary.² The U.S.A. has been highly critical of non-alignment³, which India followed as a diplomatic necessity and moral imperative. Despite the reluctance, U.S.A. came forth with massive aid to India.⁴

A question has often been raised that after the Chinese attack India should have abandoned non-alignment. Almost from all quarters of public opinion, press, journals and the Parliament, a hue and cry was raised that India should get aligned with the west, as USSR remained aloof and cold, whereas the US responded to the Indian cry with warmth and favour.⁵ The United Kingdom and USA deserve great credit for not asking the Indian Republic to abandon non-alignment. But the prospects of India's alignment with the west became bleak when "the most Socialist of all Socialists", the Chinese foster brother, USSR emerged as favouring

1. The Indian Express, (New Delhi), 29.11. 1962

2. Werner Levi, "Foreign Policy: The Shastri Era", Eastern World, London, Sept. Oct. 1966, p. IV. He held the view that Indian non-alignment is in dire necessity of revision in a multipolar world of today as compared to bipolar during post war era.

3. B. N. Chakravarti, op. cit., p.22

4. Ibid., p. 23. An American study published in August 1962, showed clearly that India had received more foreign aid, in sheer money terms from both the Soviet Union and United States than any other state. A volume of testimony about foreign aid given before the House of Representative appropriation Sub-Committee early in 1962 was published in August 1962. The Times (London) 30.8. 1962. Note K.P.Misra-The Table, p. 87.

5. Ibid., p. 23

India in the Sino-Indian collusion.¹ Hence the question of abandoning non-alignment became less pertinent in the light of the dividends it received in getting aid from both the cold war contending parties.

The policy of peaceful coexistence is closely linked with non-alignment. It is also a natural outcome of India's religious and social background.

Since the signing of the nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, thaw in cold-war is obvious, a question is asked about the validity and futility of non-alignment. The blocs have come closer in the first half of the last decade.² A few hold that when reapproachment is attained, non-alignment and peaceful coexistence would become the order of the day.³ Yet it is imperative that non-alignment be adjusted to changed conditions of modern international world.⁴

After the death of Nehru, Shastri reaffirmed his support to Nehru's policy. He followed Nehru's foot-steps in all respects. Though this responsibility was too great to be borne by Shastri.⁵

1. Ibid., p. 25. India received promises of military hardware from the Soviet Union. cf. about the validity of non-alignment G.R.K., op. cit., p.9.

2. Ibid., p. 36.

3. Ibid., p. 37

4. K.P. Misra, op. cit., p. 102.

5. Lok Sabha Debates, Sept. 14, 1964, Third Series, Vol. XXXIII No.6, IX Session, Column 1459. Also see, Nehru, op. cit., p.80, where Nehru emphatically predicted, ".... I am quite convinced that whoever might have been in-charge of the foreign affairs of India and whatever party might have been in power in India, they could not have deviated very much from this policy".

This new Prime Minister,¹ was not ready to deviate from what Nehru said. Shastri reaffirmed that non-alignment would continue to be the fundamental basis of India's approach to world problems and our relations with other countries.² H.N. Mukerjee is cited to have stated in the debate in Lok Sabha that Shastri has to bear the mantle of responsibility which has fallen on him due to passing away of the overpowering personality of Nehru. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that whatever the term denoted, the government of India's policy towards the cold war has throughout remained unchanged in substance.³ Shastri himself declared that there would be no deviation from the lines of the policy laid down by Nehru.⁴

To some extent, continued adherence to the so-called policy of non-alignment in both eras obscured alterations in the substance of India's foreign policy. But the criticism in official circles, questions and doubts have weakened the usefulness of non-alignment as a dogma.⁵ Myron Weiner is quoted to have said that today to be aligned with every body seems to be aligned with nobody.⁶ Towards the end of Nehru era and throughout the Shastri

-
1. Lok Sabha Debates, September 15, 1964, Third Series, Vol. XXXIII, No.6, IX Session, Column 1804, Statement by K.C.Pant that he was a "good man".
 2. Michael Edwards, "Illusion and Reality in India's Foreign Policy", in K.P. Misra (ed.) op. cit., p. 215.
 3. Devdutta, op. cit., p.p 297-380.
 4. Informal Letter, Talks of Shastri with British Prime Minister Churchill, London, Dec., 1964.
 5. Ibid., p. 185
 6. Ibid., p. 186

era, non-alignment was stripped of its missionary connotations.¹ During this period non-alignment was ~~tended~~ to turn into non-involvement.²

The most solid reality of post-Nehru era was the lingering of non-alignment.³ It was, however, noticed that Shastri searched for a new policy while in the meantime he clinged to the remnants of the old.⁴ Now the foreign policy tended to turn from appeals to the world to the implementation of concrete interests such as production of weapons, the purchase of war material and the building of strategic roads.⁵ The foreign policy shifted to realism from romantic idealism.

The reasons about this mild change were obvious. The foremost among them was the gradual and inevitable awakening of India to the realities of international politics. The concept of Asian Solidarity vanished in the realisation of inevitable hostilities among them. In the changed circumstances, Nehru's idea of an area of peace for the South and the South-East-Asia turned out to be a 'chimera'. There were born conflicts of national interest. The developments in the course of international politics detained India

1. Ibid., p. 186.

2. Ibid., p. 187.

3. Ibid., p. 223

4. Ibid.

5. Werner Levi, op. cit., p. 187.

to perform the leadership function either in her region or in the world which she assigned to herself during the first decade of her freedom. The second reason for change appeared to be the gradual disappearance of the prerequisites for successful non-alignment. This reduced the policy to more modest proportions during the Shastri era.

INDIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION.

Nehru has been most emphatic and equivocal in according his staunch support to the United Nations Organisations.¹ As early as in 1946, Nehru declared, "towards the United Nations, India's attitude is that of whole-hearted cooperation and unreserved adherence in both spirit and letter to the charter governing it. To that end, India will participate fully in its various activities and endeavour to play that role in its councils to which her geographical position, population and contribution towards peaceful progress entitles her".² For this solitary symbol of Hope,³ the main purpose is the maintenance of international peace and security. For the uncommitted nations like India

-
1. Nehru, op. cit. p.166. Nehru said, "..... that we adhere completely and absolutely to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and that we shall try, to the best of our ability to work for the realisation of those principles and purposes." (From Speech in the United Nations General Assembly, Paris, Nov. 3, 1948).
 2. Jafar Raza Bilgrami, "India and the United Nations", The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, April -June 1965, p. 52.
 3. Nehru, op. cit., p. 167. (From Message broadcast by the U.N. Radio network from Lake Success, New York, May 5, 1950).

it is a greater source of inspiration.¹

India is in favour of U.N.'s mediatory role, as the U.N. succeeded in its efforts to ease tension in Congo, Korea and Cuba,² moreover the task of disarmament also receives attention in the U.N.³ India feels that it is not only a debating body but also an institution which has undertaken a very heavy task and solved some of the really difficult problems.⁴ Likewise Nehru felt that in Tibetan episode in 1950, the U.N. should intervene because of the violation of human rights and aggression there.⁵

Nehru in very clear terms, established his close cooperation and sense of attachment to the UNO. He looked at the United Nations as an essential World Organisation to maintain peace.⁶ The principles of the UNO, when they aspire to do away with problems like colonialism, racial discrimination,⁷ and establish in this world, self-determination and achieve economic development-attract India more than the issues like Capitalism versus Communism, German-Unification and the liberation of satellites.⁸

1. Bilgrami, op. cit., p. 52.

2. Nehru, op. cit., p. 222. (From Speech in the U.N. General Assembly, New York, October 3, 1960).

3. Ibid., p. 220.

4. Ibid., p. 180. (From Speech in the Lok Sabha, Nov. 22, 1960).

5. Ibid., p. 346. (From Statement in the Lok Sabha in reply to a non-official resolution that India should take the Tibetan issue to the United Nations, September 4, 1959).

6. Nehru, op. cit., p. 63.

7. Nehru, The Indian Annual Register, op. cit., pp. 252-253.

8. Jafar Raza Bilgrami, op. cit., p. 52

Lal Bahadur Shastri, who seldom deviated from the path set by Nehru, clarified the same attitude in an interview where, it is maintained that the United Nations had won the support of entire non-aligned group and its paramount importance had been recognised. The United Nations is mentioned in every chapter of the Cairo-Declaration. It is, therefore, through the United Nations with which the non-aligned group has identified its common cause, the proposals of the Cairo-Conference would be carried forward. This Cairo-Conference has provided for consultation among the non-aligned countries at each session of the ~~United Nations in the furtherance of the role of the United Nations~~ to preserve international cooperation among the nations.¹

"For India the United Nations with whose creation this country was closely associated and to whose charter India fully subscribes, is less a Court of appeal or a forum that can mete out ready-made justice than the symbol of a universal assembly of Nations living and working in cooperation with one another...."²

India missed no opportunity in impressing upon the world organisation, the imperative necessity of tackling the problems of emerging nationhood and economic development with greater emphasis. India urged and influenced the half of Afro-Asian members to see the organisation as a means of pursuing not

-
1. "Great Importance of the United Nations" An Interview of Lal Bahadur Shastri, Review of International Affairs, Vol. XVI, January 20, 1965, No. 355, Belgrade, p. 4.
 2. "India and the U.N.", Link, Oct. 25, 1970. p. 16.

only for the problem of general interest as avoidance of war but also for the particular and peculiar interest in bringing to an end the vast vestiges of foreign colonialism.¹ In the political field, where peace-keeping operations were involved, India's role has been more obvious. When in 1950-51 apprehension of a major world conflagration over Korea was there, India endeavoured to localise the conflict and upheld the cause of the Korean people to decide their fate.²

India had been against the "compulsive" character of the U.N. She favoured mediatory role. She believed that the compulsive character would not help creating an atmosphere of peace.³ India was a passionate supporter of the principle of racial equality, fundamental human rights, equality of rights and status for all⁴ and this passion found justification in the Charter in provision against the racial discrimination and apartheid.

India basically believed in the elimination of want, disease and illiteracy which affects badly the greater population of the world. India had extended its full cooperation in the work of its specialised agencies and fields, through bilateral

1. Bilgrami, op. cit., p. 52

2. Link., op. cit., p. 16

3. India and the United Nations, New York; Manhattan Publishing Company, 1957, p. 144.

4. The United Nations Conference on International Organisation, 1, April 29, 1945, p. 245.

arrangements and its approach to economic and technical assistance.¹ Since India is adverse to colonial imperialism, Mrs. Laxmi N. Menon, India's Minister of State for External Affairs said that she felt within herself the dreams, the throbbing hopes and the aspirations of millions of other people, who were no better than what India was a decade ago.² For the achievement of the foreign policy objectives, India invokes the United Nations as a 'Vehicle of Communication'.³

From the dedication to the realisation of the declared objectives of India's foreign policy, there emerged a subsidiary dedication to and dependence on an effective United Nations, as the essential instrument for their implementation. The U.N. stands for the following three main objectives:⁴

1. Vigilance against strong Great Power polarisation
2. Maximisation of Moral and Political aspect
3. Maximisation of Legal aspect of the U.N.

India emphasises the second aspect most, so she clings more to the II, III, IV paragraphs of Article I of the U.N. Charter, which are categorised under the heading of international cooperation.⁵

1. Bilgrami, op. cit., p. 54
2. The Statesman, Independence Supplement (New Delhi), 15.8. 1957.
3. Bilgrami, op. cit., p.56
4. Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi: The Diplomacy of India, Stanford, Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 12.
5. Bilgrami, op. cit., p. 55.

What is more related to foreign policy is the attitude of India towards the revision of the Charter. India considers an agreement between the Great Powers on matters of importance as indispensable. This is also in consonance with the avowed purpose of maintenance of peace and peaceful atmosphere. India attaches more importance to the practical organisation than to its structure and theoretical principles and the question of revision of Charter, is invariably related with theoretical aspect. So, what is imperative is the smooth operation of the machinery of the United Nations as it stands today. It should be accorded greater importance.

When the Charter was signed, India was one of the 28 countries which voted for the revision of the Charter within 10 years. India's delegate mostly emphasised the fact of the revision of the voting procedure in the security Council after ten years.¹ A few issues have invoked greater support from India as was the case with the representation of the People's Republic of China.² Mr. Menon declared in the General Assembly that this step would be most "substantial contribution" towards establishing stability in South-East-Asia and towards providing for non-interference in the affairs of other states and for arrangements on non-aggression,³ and that U.N. should be open

-
1. U.N. Conference on International Organisation, Documents, VII p. 242, and XI, p. 489.
 2. Ibid., p. 172. (From Speech at the inauguration of the Ninth General Conference of UNESCO, New Delhi, Nov. 5, 1956).
 3. U.N. General Assembly, 9th Session Official Records, 492, Plenary Meeting, Oct. 6, 1954, paragraph. 10.

to all peace loving countries of the world.¹

On December 10, 1962, Prime Minister Nehru, in a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General, U. Thant, has once again pledged India's support to the Secretary-General in all his tasks and to the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter.² India accorded its unflinching support to the decisions and aspirations of the U.N.. She gave even armed troops when India was asked for in case of Congo.³

India deems that the United nations should develop more constructive role as the "symbol of the aspiration of the people telling us to stand together and understand each other",⁴ it can not assure its task of establishing an effective instrument of international security, if the Great Power harmony lacks otherwise,

1. Message broadcast by the United Nations Radio Network from Lake Success, (New York, May 5, 1950). Also see for the U.N. represents "the timeless urge of humanity for peace", Nehru, op. cit., p. 168. (From Speech in Lok Sabha February 18, 1953).
2. News Item, The Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 21.1. 63. It also includes the reply of U. Thant where he confessed that "..... India has demonstrated its devotion of the cause of international peace and cooperation and its dedication to the high purpose of charter...."
3. News Item, The Hindu (Madras), 7.11.62. It is reported that India sent about 6,000 Indian troops to the U.N. India also sent troops to Ghaza strip.
4. News Item, The Times of India (New Delhi), 29.9. 54. Statement by S. Radhkrishnan.

the U.N.O. is illusory and self-defeating.¹ Today, it is encouraging that despite the unrelieved frustration and draw-backs, the U.N. remained mankind's only hope against war and settlement of international disputes without recourse to military conflict.²

It is said that India's role in the U.N. has been less conspicuous in its activity after the Chinese invasion of 1962. It is true to a larger extent, for, since then India got more obsessed in her own internal problems of utmost importance.³ Since then, two significant changes are noteworthy: India abandoned its active sponsorship of China's claims to the U.N. and that the representatives of China in the U.N. should require two-third and not simple majority.⁴ Since 1962, India's tendency at the U.N. has been to take a back seat to adopt an attitude of self-effacement. Due to India's preoccupation with the unwanted Chinese attack, her diplomatic inertia, lack of initiative, had allowed other countries to take her for granted. Still the U.N. is the only ray of hope and silver lining in the rather chaotic and troubled dark World of today, where shadows of war always loom large. The greatest test of the success of

1. Berkes, op. cit., p. 29.

2. "U.N. Silver Jubilee, " The Link, 25.10.70

3. "India and the U.N." The Link, 25.10. 70

4. Political Commentary by Inder Malhotra, The Statesman New Delhi, 11.12. 1964. For the technical aid which India received from the U.N. See the Eastern Economist, January 15, 1965, XLVI in article under the caption "India and the U.N. Technical Assistance".

the U.N. in its 29th Year is that it still exists. In the latest Arab-Israel War of September-October 1973, it had done commendable job, saved the globe from the devastation of a third World War.

ANTI COLONIALISM

India wants freedom for every dependent nation. Even before India attained her freedom in 1947, she had become a symbol and catalyst of national self-determination for most nationalist movements in India and elsewhere.¹

Out of two sources of non-alignment there are material and non-material factors which include legacies of history and philosophy. The legacy of Indian history is two fold - anti-colonialism and anti-racialism.² In international conferences also India did not fail to uphold the cause of anti-colonialism as among issues, agreed upon at Bandung in 1955 there was unanimous condemnation of colonialism.³ Goa is its flagrant example.

Extending his whole-hearted support to China in Spain in 1939, Nehru wrote that Indian reaction was not only on humanitarian grounds, but also to a growing realisation of the significance of the conflicts in the world which did not justify our national interest. Fascism showed a mirror to

1. Paul F. Power, "Indian Foreign Policy: The Age of Nehru", The Review of Politics Vol. 26, 1964, p. 257.

2. For details see, Brecher article in K.P. Misra, op. cit., p. 52. Also see, Ibid., p. 101

3. Vijayalaxmi, op. cit., p. 37.

imperialism which caused immense suffering to India. The growth of Fascism meant, the defeat for freedom and democracy for which we struggled, we followed, perhaps with greater clarity than elsewhere, the development of British foreign policy towards cooperation with the Fascist-Powers, thus our opposition to imperialism and Fascism.¹

India has always championed the freedom of subject peoples and has always raised its voice against the colonial and racial policies of imperialist powers. Herself being subjected to colonial dominations,² India sympathises with all those nations which are still under colonial domination. The political emancipation of subject and colonial peoples, has received India's consistent support. India wants to eliminate every form of colonialism from Asia. She has supported the independence movement in Indonesia, Algeria, Morocco, Tunis etc. This policy also stems from India's national interest as colonialism is still strong and tenacious and as yet it threatens the independence of India and other Asian and African countries.³ The end of colonialism would facilitate the economic and political development of all Asian countries including India herself. This anti-colonial stance

-
1. Friedman, "Indian Nationalism and the Far East", Pacific Affairs, March 1940, pp. 24-5.
 2. For details see, Bandyopadhyaya, op. cit, pp. 69-71.
 3. V. N. Phamin, "India's Role in World Affairs", International Affairs, Moscow, No. 1, January 1958, pp. 56-60.

has earned much indignation from the U.S.A., as the USA does not look with favour at this policy of lashing out against every sort of colonialism.¹

Attached with this principle to which India adheres strictly, is the abolition of racial-discrimination. India vigorously opposes racial apartheid in South Africa and the U.S.A.. India left no stone unturned to do away with it but failed due to imperialist designs of British and USA. In the Commonwealth also India tried to pressurise the Governments of South Africa to abolish it.² Nehru deeply appreciated the Russian Society for lack of racial prejudice and colonialism. Nehru as the Prime Minister of the Interim Government of India, declared that anti-imperialism and anti-racialism were the "Kerene/ of our foreign policy",³ which was evidenced by his subsequent efforts. Speaking at Columbia University in 1949, Nehru explained the basic objectives of his overall policy in which he laid main emphasis on anti-colonialism. The main objectives of that policy were, "the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major group of powers but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue; the liberation

1. U.S. News and World Report, January 27, 1965, p. 108.

2. Nehru, op. cit., p. 213 (From Speech in Lok Sabha December 8, 1958. Also see pp. 502, 544, 549 and 550).

3. See for details, Bandyopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 71.

of subjected peoples; the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual; the elimination of racial discrimination; and the elimination of want, disease and ignorance, which afflict the greater part of the World's population".¹

INDIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Since the very beginning of independence, Nehru was against any form of military alliance but this basic antipathy towards security alliance system does not amount to eclipse his cordial attitude towards the Commonwealth of Nations.² He said, that so far as India was concerned, she ^{is} prepared to enter into a treaty of friendship with any country in the World,³ and he regarded Commonwealth ties as a tie of mutual friendship and cooperation and understanding and not of domination and slavery. Moreover, India's internal problems and external policies are not affected by this tie.⁴ Commonwealth tie can also help expand area of peace- India's avowed ideal.⁵ Nehru once remarked that

1. Nehru, op. cit., (1947-53) 1, & 3, p. 401. For details of anti-imperialist policy as the main goal of non-alignment see Rehman, op. cit., pp. 22-29.

2. Nehru, op. cit., p. 20. (From Speech in the Constituent Assembly on the motion by the Hon. B.R. Ambedkar that the Draft Constitution, framed by Drafting Committee be taken into consideration, November 8, 1948).

3. Ibid., p. 61 (From Speech in reply to debate on Foreign Affairs in Lok Sabha, June 12, 1952).

4. Ibid., p. 153. Where Nehru is against the argument of many parliamentarians that the Commonwealth tie has limited in the slightest our independents sovereign status of freedom of action, internal or external.... "From Speech in the Lok Sabha on the Citizens Bill, December 5, 1955).

5. Ibid., p. 157

with regard to our internal and external policies India had functioned exactly as this House and the Government wanted to. The Commonwealth relationship did not mar our way in the slightest. India differed from the policies and practice of the other Commonwealth countries. It confirmed that our associations in the Commonwealth has been of great help to the cause of peace and cooperation. It is because of this staunch regard for the Commonwealth ties that our dignity, freedom of action and prestige had enhanced.¹

Nehru said that there was no doubt that our Commonwealth association helped us in extending the area of cooperation and the cause of peace.² India attended almost all Commonwealth conferences and asserted her faith in principles of friendship, cooperation and understanding.

Whenever there was a question whether India should continue in the Commonwealth, Nehru also emphasised the positive side of the question. In his speech in the Lok Sabha on July 23, 1957, Nehru said, that by being in the Commonwealth India was, in no sense, subordinate to anybody, or tied up to something that might come in India's way, then it would compell ~~them~~ to agree,

1. Ibid., p. 153-4. (From Speech in the Lok Sabha on the Citizenship Bill, December 5, 1955). Also see p. 133, where Nehru said, "Commonwealth is not a super-state in any sense of the term (From broadcast from New Delhi, on May 10, 1949).

2. Ibid., pp. 157-58.

who object to our being in the Commonwealth. Nehru also accepted that there was no sentimental ground for being in the Commonwealth. He rather posed a question: "... how our being in the Commonwealth has in practice, injured our policies in the advocacy of any cause that we hold dear? It has helped us in influencing others, and has helped us as regard to other matters too..... I am against breaking any kind of association".¹

Certain pragmatic changes of historic significance² have occurred in the Commonwealth, such as the enlargement of its membership by entry of Ghana and Nigeria etc. Our membership is most opportune and fruitful.

Speaking at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, on December 2, 1957, New Delhi, Nehru said that all the nations share something and that something is a tie, a commonwealth tie. This tie has got content and some useful purpose. It makes us think on some common lines, but apart from this commonsense we maintain our independent way of thinking, in approaching the domestic as well as the international problems. The Commonwealth countries shared among them parliamentary system and democratic approach. The Commonwealth represents these democratic institutions and the content of democracy that democracy means peaceful coexistence.³

1. Ibid., p. 158.

2. Ibid., p. 159.

3. Ibid., pp 159-60

India's support to the Commonwealth in no way means that India is in favour of colonialism. We left no stone unturned to do away with the malignant roots of colonialism. In a speech in the General Assembly at Paris dated November 3, 1948, Nehru said, "Asia had suffered all evils of colonialism and imperial domination and pledges to commit herself to save the freedom of every other colonial country. The countries like India having suffered colonial yoke do not apprehend it feasible that other countries should remain under its evil spell."¹ Krishna Menon, along with Nehru, always favoured the Commonwealth ties.² Although Shastri lacked all that Nehru possessed—charisma, heritage, experience, travel-wealth and aristocratic arrogance,³ he always tried to practice what Nehru propagated.

Shastri had little experience in international field. He allowed to cut down India's image according to her size and admitted that India's role in the past, as an international peace-maker was rather odd and unproportionate. He repeatedly assured the Lok Sabha that he would strictly follow the Nehru line in foreign policy. He never feared to adjust Nehru's policy to the changing world. This is what he boldly stated in the first news conference on June 2, 1964, that, ".... he would pursue a policy of friendliness towards all without getting involved in military blocs".⁴ India has greatly contributed to the evolution of the

1. Ibid., p. 164

2. Michael Brecher, op. cit., p. 312.

3. S. Vijanand Bharti, Can Indira Accept This Challenge, Bombay, 1966, p. 81.

4. Ibid., p. 81.

Commonwealth of Nations. He believed it to be an association of great value as it provides a base for building on the common cultural, economic and political links, established when its members were British colonies.¹

The successor of Shastri, Mrs. Indira Gandhi has also tried to follow the architect. In spite of minor changes the foreign policy of India is still the same as it was during Nehru regime.

1. Editorially, "Whose Commonwealth", The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 27.10. 1970.

CHAPTER II

AGENCIES IN THE FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN INDIA

ROLE OF THE CABINET

In the whole administrative set-up involved in the foreign policy making, the Cabinet happens to be the most important and intricate agency. It is the chief working organisation and the mouthpiece through which the country speaks to another country. The Indian Constitution places the formal executive responsibility with the President but like the British King or Queen, the President acts on the advice of the Cabinet and the Council of Ministers.¹ The Cabinet is composed of the senior members from the Council of Ministers appointed by the President and nominated by the Prime Minister. This miniature of the Parliament is collectively responsible to it for all its functions.

It has already been stated that when Nehru was at the helm of affairs, the foreign policy was his monopoly both in the Cabinet and the Congress party. Between 1947-50, Nehru was the duumvirate,² as Patel concerned himself more with the domestic affairs and the foreign policy was left exclusively to Nehru.

-
1. The Indian Constitution, 1956, p. 29. Article 53(1): "The executive power of the Union shall be vested in the President and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with this Constitution". Also see, p. 39, Article 74(1): "There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions".
 2. Michael Brecher, Nehru, A Political Biography, Abridged ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 151.

After Patel's death, Nehru became the undisputed leader of the Congress Party and unrivalled head of the Cabinet.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs before taking any decision generally takes counsel of his Cabinet colleagues but so far as the Indian Cabinet and the External Affairs Minister, Nehru, were concerned, his responsibility by virtue of his being the Prime Minister was so large that in this regard his normal representations to the Cabinet were explanations rather than clarifications given to the Cabinet members.¹ Krishna Menon was remarkably influential and was the principal adviser to Nehru on foreign policy issues, while other senior members like G.B. Pant, Morarji Desai and Maulana Azad had their influence confined to domestic affairs only.

Moreover, the making of foreign policy by the Cabinet in India has been merely an aspect of general functioning of the Cabinet. In the Cabinet, decision-making was singularly dominated by Nehru's charismatic personality. Ambedkar and C.D. Deshmukh chiefly complained of Nehru's practice of taking decisions without consulting the Cabinet. There are instances when decisions with regard to Kashmir were taken by Nehru without either consulting the Deputy Prime Minister or the Cabinet.² While describing the Indian Cabinet at work, Krishna Menon narrates his personal

1. Richard L. Park, *Macridis*, op. cit., p. 299. "A good deal of consultation takes place outside the Cabinet". Also see Brecher, op. cit., p.239, that on foreign policy questions the manner of Nehru was, "informing rather than debating".

2. Ibid., p. 140.

experiences in the Cabinet meetings that Nehru, "was not the person who sought consultation",¹ and before really discussing out the matter he would say, sometimes, 'here it is, let us agree on this'. The members of the Cabinet took ample interest in discussing foreign policy questions and on majority of questions, the Cabinet colleagues agreed with Nehru, who mostly informed them than debated the matters.²

Though till 1950, Nehru's position in the Cabinet was peerless, the foreign policy making within the Cabinet did not have an altogether smooth sailing. There was no challenge to Nehru's position as the chief architect of India's foreign policy, he, however, took little or no notice of the Cabinet members, their agreement, disagreement or frustration. Consequently in 1950, Shyama Prasad Mukerjee and K.C. Neogi resigned from the Cabinet in protest against the Nehru-Liaquat Pact between India and Pakistan and Nehru took no notice of the event. Later, in 1957, B.R. Ambedkar also resigned, whose major criticisms were against Nehru's policy of friendship with China.

In the Indian Cabinet there has been a Foreign Affairs Committee. So far as Menon knew, it was an Indian invention and the first of its kind, which consisted of the members nominated by the Prime Minister. Nehru used to be the chairman of nearly all committees in the early days. Menon, Nehru and two or three

1. Brecher, op. cit., p. 241

2. Ibid., pp. 237, 243.

others were in it. Later on both its scope and membership were enlarged owing to the feeling that foreign affairs had been treated as the private preserve of Nehru. It did not meet very often. It met, for example, to finalise the delegation to the UN, the decision was already taken and members were informed of it. There were other sub-committees and ad-hoc committees of inquiry too.

To improvise the effectiveness of the Cabinet in foreign policy matters, a standing Committee on Defence was formed, but the committee remained ineffective in "influencing the formation of foreign policy". Nehru was its chief member who dominated others like the Defence, Home and Finance Ministers. Patel was also its member but he took negligible interest in foreign affairs. Azad was in it as the Education Minister and Menon as the Minister without portfolio. In its essential nature, this Committee was not very much different from the Cabinet, still, "the policy questions were not usually brought before it by the Prime Minister".¹ Menon further explained, "how much should be said and what should be discussed", was a matter for the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, that is Nehru.

The position of these Committees in influencing foreign policy decisions appears ambiguous. The following dialogue

1. J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy, New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1970, pp. 140-141.

between Brecher and Menon is an evidence to it:

Brecher: "Menon, as you look back on the working of the Cabinet and these Committees, particularly in the realm of foreign affairs, would you regard them as being in any sense participants in decision-making or in shaping policy, or were they not really crucial to the decision-making process, but more organs of consultation in the very broad sense?"

Menon: By and large they did not shape policy although they did at times". Menon further stated there was no example when the proposals of the above mentioned Defence Committee, "had to be postponed since die".¹ Some Committees took years to decide a thing.

The Standing Committee on Defence was the Cabinet itself. The decisions taken by it were tantamount to decisions taken by the Cabinet unless the Prime Minister wished otherwise. Certain questions were taken by this Committee alone. The Committee met more than any other Committees of the Cabinet.² But, on the whole its deliberations, expected to influence the policy, failed in their endeavour due to Nehru's personality, his mode of thinking and deciding things. Its inability to influence foreign policy

1. Brecher, op. cit., pp. 280, 251.

2. Ibid, p. 246

was partly the result of Nehru's unchallenged leadership and the way in which he generally treated the Cabinet, and partly due to the fact that during that critical period, the Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, held identical views with the Prime Minister on Defence and foreign policies.

Very often Nehru failed to consult his Cabinet colleagues and acted either on his own discretion or on the advice of Krishna Menon. M.C. Chagla stated that Menon was responsible for the policy decisions with regard to Hungary in 1956 and the Goa action in 1961, and all that Nehru subsequently did was to defend Menon,¹ hence Menon's role in Hungary and Goa, in decision making was much more important than that of either the Cabinet or Nehru himself.

During the last phase of his life, Nehru often failed to consult the Cabinet on important policy matters, either because he was losing his grip over things in general, or because perhaps he was too fatigued to pay serious attention to important matters. A glaring example was his statement on October 13, 1962, before the Chinese attack, through which he ordered the Indian army to drive the Chinese out of NEFA area. There is evidence to confirm that in the Cabinet meeting, it was decided that the Indian troops should observe the status quo and should not take any initiative to oust the Chinese troops.² Viewed in the light of the Cabinet

1. Bandyopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 141. For details see pp. 141-43.

2. For details see, B.M. Kaul, The Untold Story, Bombay, 1967 pp. 385-7.

decision, the declaration looks rather odd, but not when it is examined with reference to Nehru's character and status. It has been suggested that Nehru acted like this because "..... (a) he wanted to put on a bold face and thus assuage the resentful public opinion on his China policy, without actually intending to provoke a conflict; or (b) he hoped to scare away the Chinese, who were obviously preparing for an armed attack, by such bold statements; or (c) he was wrongly advised by some close associates".¹

During the recent 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of friendship, the members of Opposition tacitly admitted that this treaty was not referred to the Cabinet. The angry Union Health Minister, Uma Shanker Dixit, while replying to newsmen at Bhubaneswar drew his attention to the recent observation of the former Deputy Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, that the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi had bypassed the Cabinet before it was signed and was presented to the Cabinet only for formal approval as a fait accompli. However, getting more mild, Dixit tried to save Mrs. Indira Gandhi. He said that the treaty was, "a delicate diplomatic move", which warranted informal consultation at the outset. "This was her great contribution to Indian democracy because she even consults opposition leaders before taking the

1. Bandyopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 144.

final decision."¹ Thus, in the presence of a powerful External Affairs Minister and the Prime Minister, the role of Cabinet gets eclipsed. It can be even reduced to negligible minimum, if the Prime Minister is capable enough not to put the things for the Cabinet approval.

Another flagrant example in which the Cabinet was side-tracked was India's abortive participation in the Conference of Islamic-States held in Rabat, in 1969, leading to the Rabat fiasco. Parliament raised a hue and cry to defeat Indira Gandhi-regime. All uproar was due to the fact that the decision was taken without Cabinet consultation.

On the basis of available information, one can conclude that from the time of India's independence up to the present day, the Cabinet in India has not functioned as the highest and collective decision-making authority with regard to foreign policy. There has always been concentration of decision-making authority in the Prime Minister and to a small extent in the Minister for External Affairs in the post-Nehru era, which is bound to militate against rationality in the making of foreign policy. Moreover, most of the details about Cabinet process, its meetings, agenda etc., are ambiguous as they are kept confidential to the core. Menon once remarked, "I am not prepared to disclose what comes on a Cabinet Agenda".²

1. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 27.8. 1971.

2. Michael Brecher, India in World Politics: Menon's View of the World, op. cit., p. 235.

ROLE OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER,
NEHRU

In a Parliamentary system, the Cabinet is the steering-wheel of the ship of the state and the Prime Minister is the steers-man. The Prime Minister plays a decisive role in every matter, for he is more than, "the first among the equals" or inter stellas luna minores (a moon among the lesser stars). The office is powerful enough to make him the key-stone of the Cabinet arch. The ultimate stamp over the decisions of the Cabinet is that of the Prime Minister since he is the leader of the majority Party and almost a direct choice of the people whereas most of his colleagues owe their offices and status to him. Nehru was certainly a, "giant among pigmies" rather than the first among the equals.¹ The office itself involves power, side by side Nehru enjoyed a position of eminence because of his enigmatic personality and charismatic leadership combining in him both the offices of the External Affairs and Prime Minister. Perhaps, in no other democratic state one man dominated foreign policy as Nehru in India. Indeed, so overwhelming was his influence that India's policy came to mean in the minds of people everywhere, the personal policy of Pandit Nehru. Practically speaking, Nehru has been the philosopher, architect, engineer and the voice of his country's policy towards the outside world. He has impressed his personality and views with such overpowering effect that foreign policy may properly be termed

1. Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography, op. cit., p. 15.

as his private monopoly. No one in the Congress or the Government and the Opposition ever challenged his control in this sphere.

Out of all the factors and determinants which shaped foreign policy, Nehru's ideology, educational background and thinking are paramount. In India, public opinion, political parties, emerging pressure groups, parliament and Cabinet did not play their roles effectively as is expected of them in a democracy. It made Nehru's singular position as the maker of India's foreign policy almost completely undisturbed. With an aristocratic background, western education, political backing of Motilal Nehru, Gandhi and other Congress leaders, Nehru was to play an influential role in Indian politics. Since Nehru returned to India for several times he was elected President of the Congress Party and since the Madras Session of the Congress (1927), he had become the recognised spokesman of the Congress on foreign affairs, because he was more interested in foreign affairs and better informed than others. Due to his ability, insight and interest in international relations, the later resolutions of the Congress were inspired, drafted and piloted by Nehru.

In 1942, Gandhi openly declared Nehru as his successor. The "uncrowned King of the Indian Republic",¹ Nehru enjoyed supremacy in every field, and virtually exercised unchallenged and monopolistic jurisdiction over foreign affairs.

1. Brecher, op. cit., p. 14.

In the Interim Government and later as well, Nehru was incharge of External Affairs of India. The foreign policy statements which Nehru made as the Prime Minister of the Interim Government especially on September 7, 1946, laid down the cardinal features of India's foreign policy.

When in 1951, Patel died and Purshottam Das Tondon weakened in health, Nehru's stature ~~embettered~~ with regard to domestic and external affairs.¹ Virtually, Nehru appeared to be indispensable for the Congress, the Cabinet, the Parliament and the country. Till his death in 1964, his leadership retained a quality of something approximating charisma. He retained the, "sole repository of final decisions, master in his own household", and enjoyed, "extraordinary status within the Congress".²

Nehru combined in him, "a queer mixture of the East and the West, out of place everywhere, at home nowhere",³ but left a "trail of glory and a legend behind him", "like some triumphant Caesar".⁴ Though Nehru had much of his Western education, nevertheless, he was impressed by the Gandhian doctrine of non-violence, Ashokan and Buddhist doctrine of peace, Socialism

1. Ibid., p. 229.

2. Brecher, op. cit., pp. 436, 435.

3. John Day, J. Nehru, Towards Freedom: The Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru, 1942, p. 353.

4. Chanakya, "The Rashtrapati", The Modern Review (Calcutta), Vol., LXII, Nov. 1937, p. 546.

of the East and was deeply influenced by modern European humanist philosophy. Thus he often visualised 'One World' as a deeply committed internationalist. There were the various cross-currents in his intellectual make up. It is often suggested that Nehru sometimes failed to synthesise them into a coherent intellectual pattern. Nehru used to keep himself busy in parliamentary business and processes. In a parliamentary session, during question-hour, Nehru used to stay on until its conclusion. This showed his interest in foreign policy matters. He spoke for hours and hours together when the motions regarding the international situation and the policy of the Government of India thereof, were debated.

The year 1956 marked a "turning point" in Nehru's Foreign Ministership. It was because of the Hungarian episode and Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt coupled with the events of 1959, notably the Tibetan revolt, China's border incursions and Eisenhower's visit to India. Thus, the crises of 1956-57 produced a round of the edges and ironically, a greater sense of inner calm in the face of external turmoil. After 'the year of crisis', began the disenchantment of Nehru's political leadership. His open criticism started at boiling point in and outside Parliament. Since then Nehru was deprived of universal adulation. The intelligentsia started levelling staunch criticism against his stand on China. The Members of Parliament raised an uproar against Nehru's calculated and deliberate attempt to hide relevant information from Parliament.

This criticism gained momentum in the wake of the border crisis with China in 1959.

Nehru was an idealistic-realist. At times he soared higher and higher sitting ^{in his} ivory tower and at other moment, he appeared as a down to earth realist.¹ In his attempt to present a synthesis of idealism and realism, Nehru said, "we propose to look after India's interest in the context of world cooperation and world peace, in so far as the world peace can be preserved".²

In his approach to the Kashmir issue, Nehru showed the synthesis of two approaches when he said, "we have indeed been over-scrupulous in this matter" and that "we went out of our way to make a unilateral declaration that we would abide by the will of the people of Kashmir as declared in a plebiscite or referendum".³ The idealistic approach of Nehru is evident from the reference of the issue to the UN, in the light of infant UN being made a plaything of the then bipolar world. In March 1948, Nehru openly confessed in a speech in the Constituent Assembly, "our making a reference on this issue to the Security Council of the United Nations was an act of faith, because we believe in the progressive realization of a world order and a world government". If Kashmir was an integral part of India and a domestic issue, it should not have

1. For details see, Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 34, 51, 73.

2. Ibid., p. 28

3. Ibid., pp. 445, 451.

been taken to the UN by India and if it was an international issue, Pakistan's subsequent claims to it would be justified. The Kashmir Question, the bone of contention between India and Pakistan, was solely dealt with by Nehru in the international arena. His realistic sense made him realise that the pledge of plebiscite was out of the way and impracticable yet, it is believed, he acted as a prudent statesman.

Nehru was the Congress Party's acknowledged spokesman on foreign affairs. In fact he was, "the soul of the Party".¹ Nehru's insistence on India's membership in the Commonwealth as an independent Republic was an illuminating example of his dominant role in the shaping of India's foreign policy. Nehru was inevitably influenced by a host of factors in this decision. The most remarkable and significant was his realization that India could not remain isolated in the world of tension and that the Commonwealth link was the most advantageous of all links. Mostly Indian trade was carried on with the Commonwealth countries; its foreign exchange reserves were tied up in the Sterling-Area, its military power then depended on the weapons made in Great Britain. This has also enabled India to assist the Indians settling abroad.

Nehru enjoyed an indomitable stance within his Cabinet.² From 1947 to 1958, there had been four Congress

1. Brecher, *op. cit.*, p. 162. "Viewed in the perspective of the duumvirate, it was an act of high statesmanship, for it was the first real stabilizing act in India's relations with outside world".

2. For details see Supra on the Role of Cabinet where the role of Prime Minister Nehru is also discussed at length.

Cabinets, all headed by Nehru. At no time the government faced a vote of no-confidence for the Congress had an over-whelming majority in the Parliament. The main cause of the stability of Cabinet system in India had been Nehru's pre-eminence. In foreign affairs, Nehru relied on Menon largely. In cabinet meetings, it was said, "the Prime Minister has great skill in winning his colleagues to his view point by persuasion".¹

So far as the Sino-India border dispute is concerned, Nehru was central to all its decisions, discussions and negotiations. His policy towards the people's Republic of China was somewhat steeped in idealistic moorings. He made an ideal assessment of the Chinese intentions and took their gestures of friendliness and cooperation at their face value, of which more later. Similarly, in regard to the Goan question, Nehru was all in all in its decisions. In his Goa policy (as in his Kashmir policy) Nehru made a firm commitment to certain high principles at the outset, which was indicative of his political idealism, but eventually retreated from his position mainly owing to the persistent failure of the idealist approach against the then inflexible Portuguese Government.

Nehru's monopoly in foreign affairs was willingly accepted by his colleagues and even acclaimed by members of Parliament. L.M. Singhvi, a member of the Lok Sabha, went to the extent of saying that it was fortunate to have a man of distinction

1. Brecher, op. cit., pp. 172-73 and 176.

and eminence like Nehru to preside over the formulation of our foreign policy.¹

Nehru's greatest contribution to India and international world had been his persistent cry for non-alignment, the cardinal feature of India's foreign policy. The other leaders of this camp were Tito and Nasser. The policy was in favour of national interest to Nehru's mind, though after the Chinese aggression and India-Pakistan tussle, demands to quit non-alignment were raised, but Nehru stuck to it. Nehru was so much convinced of its being in the national interest that he said, "it is completely incorrect to call our policy Nehru policy. It is incorrect because all that I have done is to give voice to that policy. I have not originated it. It is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind..... inherent in the circumstances of the world today..... I am quite convinced that whoever might have been incharge of the foreign affairs of India and whatever party might have been in power in India, they could not have deviated very much from this policy".² Even his successors, Shastri and Mrs. Indira Gandhi, followed his suit and expressed their desire to move on the pre-determined line. It is in this context that India's active

1. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, No. 4, Vol. XIII, 1963, February 21, Fourth Session, cols. 605-6.

2. Nehru, op. cit., p. 80.

participation in the non-aligned Summit Conference (Sept. 1973) at Algiers is to be seen. And today, the main tenets of the policy as engineered by Nehru are the same.

The Prime Minister himself was the External Affairs Minister, he devoted considerable time to supervise and control the foreign policy. Yet, vast nothingness existed between Nehru and the bureaucracy. The bulk of Civil Servants, princely members and the upper echelons of the army personnel were in favour of a pro-Western policy. It was Nehru, his personal experience, socialistic outlook and belonging to a poor nation like India, which saved the Western-orientation of our foreign policy. It goes to the credit of Nehru and his towering leadership that he was able to keep the bureaucracy almost completely out of basic policy decisions, and compelled it to submit itself to the political guidelines laid down by him with regard to foreign, defence, domestic and economic policy.

In the post-Nehru era, the role of the External Affairs Minister has deteriorated, because after Nehru, the External Affairs Minister has not been the Prime Minister. Firstly, the calibre of the succeeding leaders and members was decisively lower and secondly, they were less popular and have to act under the control or the shadow of the Prime Minister. In the highly fluid conditions of modern India, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which Foreign Ministers have been able to exercise their own judgment in decision-making. Now, there have been as

many as five Foreign Ministers from 1964-70 and within such a short period, no Foreign Minister can be expected to exercise formidable influence or take firm policy decisions.

Nehru, like the Cabinet, dominated the proceedings in Parliament also. His pre-eminence can only be compared with that of Churchill at Westminster during the Second World War. It is suggested that sometimes, while in Parliament, Nehru sat ~~henched~~ over with a pensive expression on his face. At other times he would crease his brows as he listened to a sharp attack from the Opposition. Frequently he would ~~rudge~~ one of his colleagues into silence or leap up to rescue a Minister, who feebly answered the questions. Often he rose in anger when he felt that an insult has been hurled at the Government. Still at other times he would make moving and solemn speeches. On the whole, Nehru was extraordinarily active during debates. He used to make himself present in all sessions. He was tolerant to the Opposition. Due to his learning and interest, he was consulted by the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs before the business of the day was decided.¹

To conclude, the most articulate expression of Indian foreign policy is to be found in the speeches of Nehru. In Parliament and party caucus, within India and abroad, he hammered on these themes with remarkable consistency. The emphasis may

1. Brecher, op. cit., p. 178.

have shifted but never the main principles of the policy. The role that Foreign Affairs Minister plays varies from country to country, but nowhere one man dominated foreign policy as Nehru did in India. INdeed, Nehru was the philosopher, architect, engineer and the chief spokesman of India's policy towards the outside world.

ROLE OF THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONS

INTRODUCTION: In a parliamentary democracy, domestic and foreign policy is the prerogative of the Executive. The Foreign Office carries on the directives of the Executive. On account of the farflung and highly complex nature of the foreign policy, the Foreign Office performs the significant function of feeding it with 'Information' and 'Advice'. The elite at the apex of decision-making consists of the Foreign Minister, Prime Minister and the Cabinet, the Foreign Office is sur-charged with the work of analysing and evaluating the available data and recommending concrete measures. Its role is vital and detailed in foreign policy making without, however, bearing the odium of responsibility. The Ministry is solely responsible for the conduct of India's relations with the other countries. It also deals with country's representation at the UN and advises the Ministries, as far as their relations with foreign Governments and institutions are concerned.

The Ministry of External Affairs bears the real brunt of

foreign policy planning. When Nehru was at the helm of Affairs, the Ministry as an agency was less assertive and subservient to a single man. After his death, its position subsequently improved.

HISTORICAL RETROSPECT:

The history of the Ministry of External Affairs goes back to 1784, when for the first time a Department to deal with foreign affairs was created in the Government of India, by the then Governor General, Warren Hastings. This Department was known as the Secret and political Department with three branches—Secret, Political and Foreign. The Secret branch dealt with all Government transactions concerned with wars, negotiations and diplomatic missions abroad. The Political branch dealt with the correspondence with the Residents and Agents in the Indian States. All matters relating to transactions between the Government of India and the Foreign European Powers were looked after by the Foreign Branch.

In 1842, the nomenclature of the Department changed to Foreign Department and was organised in three branches, Foreign, Political and Domestic, under the direct control of the Governor General. Owing to the increased work of the Department, a second post of Secretary was created in 1914. This change in the organisation of the Department and the addition of one more Secretary also carried with it the change of the name of the Department. The two Secretaries were designated as the 'Foreign' and 'Political' Secretaries. The 'Foreign' wing dealt with all

the matters pertaining to the frontiers of India and the 'Political' wing dealt with all other matters emanating from the Indian States and areas administered by this Department¹.

In view of the constitutional changes, brought about by the Government of India Act 1935, a vast increase in the volume of work in the two Departments occurred and the Department was bifurcated into External Affairs Department and the Political Department.

The work connected with the Indians Overseas was originally dealt with in a section of the Department of Education, Health and Lands. Since 1941, that section was made a separate Department. In 1945, the Indian overseas Department was entrusted with the work connected with Burma and the Commonwealth countries, including the work relating to the rights of Indians in the countries.

Jawaharlal Nehru took charge of the Department of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations in 1946, when the Interim National Government was formed. In 1947, the Department of Commonwealth Relations was amalgamated with the External Affairs Department leading to the constitution of the 'Commonwealth Relations Wing' of the Department, which was renamed firstly itself/as the Department of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations and later as the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. In March 1949, the amalgamation of both

1. The Indian Institute of Public Administration, The Organisation of the Government of India, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1958, p. 37.

the wings of the ministry was completed and it was finally redesignated as the Ministry of External Affairs. The Deputy Minister deals with all the other Divisions except China, Pakistan, the United Nations and Conference Divisions, which are dealt with directly by the Minister of External Affairs.

The Secretary General is the administrative head of the Ministry and official adviser to the Minister on matters relating to foreign policy and is responsible for the supervision and coordination of the work of the Ministry. The Foreign Secretary is incharge of the Eastern, the Western, the China, the United Nations and Conference Divisions. Important administrative matters are dealt with by the Special Secretary in collaboration with the Foreign Secretary and the Commonwealth Secretary. The Ministry maintains its own Secretariat.¹

For administrative convenience, the Ministry is divided into sixteen Divisions. Each one of them deals with a number of countries, grouped on geographical or territorial basis. The Economic and coordination Division is responsible for coordination of political and economic policies affecting India's international relations.

-
1. In the Secretariat there is a variety of Secretaries ranging from Secretary General to Foreign Secretary, Secretaries External Affairs and a number of Additional Secretaries. For details see- Organisational set-up and Function of the Ministries/Departments of the Govt. of India, Secretariat Training School (Ministry of Home Affairs) Government of India, IV ed., New Delhi, 1969, pp. 53-54.

During 1963-64, due to increase in the work relating to China, the China Sub-Division in the Eastern-Division was constituted separately. Besides, the present External Publicity Division and Economic and Coordination Division have been reconstituted into two new Divisions namely, the Economic Affairs and the Information and Coordination Division. The Ministry has got its own Foreign Services, the appointments to which are made on the basis of competition.

In accordance with the recommendations of the Estimates Committee of Parliament, it has been decided to revive the Foreign Service Inspectorate. Necessary preliminaries connected with its formation have been completed. When the Sino-India border dispute erupted into a full-fledged war in 1962, the North East Frontier Agency of the Ministry started and speeded both the rehabilitating programme and planned development. This Agency received a number of visitors from amongst the members of Parliament, political delegates and social workers.

FUNCTIONS AND ORGANISATION: The Ministry is responsible for the work connected with foreign affairs, consular representations, Indian Foreign Service, treaties, emigration, passports and Visas, NEFA, NAGA Hills etc. It also administers such laws as Indian Emigration Act, 1972, the Reciprocity Act 1943, the Post-Haj Committee Act 1932 etc.¹ The Ministry of External

1. The Indian Institute of Public Administration,
op. cit., pp. 38-39.

Affairs has got its own Secretariat and a number of subordinate offices. There is no attached office functioning under this Ministry. There are a number of Diplomatic and Consular Offices situated practically all over the world. By virtue of their peculiar and unique position they are not considered as subordinate offices. The Foreign Minister is the political head of the Ministry who is assisted by the Deputy and State Ministers and two parliamentary Secretaries. The Secretary General is the administrative head of the Ministry assisted by a number of subordinate staff.

At the moment, the Ministry has 85 Sections of which 38 are Administrative and 47 are Territorial and Technical Divisions. These sections are grouped into eleven Divisions.¹

1. Ibid., p. 40, These Divisions include:

1. American Division:- South and North America
2. Western Division: UNO, UK and Europe
3. Eastern Division: China, Japan, Korea, Nepal, Mongolia, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA
4. Southern Division: West Asia, South-East Asia, North Africa, Sudan, Ceylon, Iran, Burma, Afghanistan and Colombo Powers
5. African Division: Africa, and other colonies
6. Pakistan Division:
7. Protocol Division: Emigration, Protocol etc.
8. Administrative Division: Accounts and Budgets, General Administration, Establishment work.
9. External Publicity Division:
10. Foreign Service Inspectorate.
11. Historical Division.

The enormous net-work of administration is carried on successfully through them. Six Divisions are created so as to cover relations with nearly all nations ranging from America to Pakistan and China etc. The Protocol-Division is responsible for all ceremonial matters such as receptions, preparation of credentials and formal arrangements with regard to treaties and other agreements. The External-Publicity-Division is significant in the sense that it carries on propaganda of policy and relations abroad. In the columns of the Parliamentary Debates, it is the most criticised and applauded Division. It also renders valuable assistance in organising the exchange of good-will missions and cultural delegations. The Foreign-Service-Inspectorate makes investigations in respect of allowances and general administrative matters and recommends measures to the Government of India so as to achieve greater efficiency and economy in the operation of missions abroad. The Historical-Division is responsible for the preparation and maintenance of research papers and records for consultation by the Ministry.

The vast network of the missions and posts maintained abroad by the Ministry, is the main source of information to it. They prepare the code and directory of world events and developments. These missions are ultimately responsible for the effective implementation of foreign policy.¹

1. At present (1970) there are 168 Missions and Posts abroad. For more details see, Report 1969-70, Govt. of India, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 1970, Appendix VIII.

There are different modes through which the Ministry plays its role- . political, economic, military and cultural diplomacy, propaganda and external-publicity-machinery, Intelligence and policy-planning, personnel-planning and coordination.¹

POLITICAL DIPLOMACY: A rational foreign policy is based on the availability of detailed and accurate information regarding general international situation and political developments. An effective evaluation of information constitutes the basic task of the Ministry. The first ingredient in policy formation is, the processing of the available information, leading to an analysis of proposed alternatives in consonance with the circumstances. Commenting on this 'Reporting' the Pillai Committee on the Foreign Services, has observed that only on the basis of accurate information, a policy can be formulated and it is the primary duty of the Foreign-Service to maintain a continuous supply of information to the Ministry of External Affairs, by means of accurate and perceptive reports on current events. Information is not sufficient by itself, and needs to be supplemented by interpretative analysis and by advice as to change or modification of policy.²

The Missions are the ears and eyes of the Government and the subsequent policy is followed by their reporting, sent

1. J. Bandyopadhyaya, The making of India's Foreign Policy, Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1970, p. 154.

2. Pillai Committee Report, 1960, p. 14.

to India in the form of monthly reports, prepared by the Secretaries. An equally potent source is the special reports sent by the heads of the Missions to Foreign-Office. During emergencies, wireless communications are frequently resorted to. Our U.N. representatives also send regular reports on the international situation. It facilitates the reassessment of the material obtained from a country.

A great deal of diplomatic activity takes place through the foreign Missions located in New Delhi through the Foreign Minister and his counterparts, which include personal discussions, exchange of views, delivery of important letters, submitting notes of protest, Notes Verbal and Aides memoires like the White Papers. Another significant source of information is the news flashed by the international press, radio and television. A lot of information in India is procured by the covert network of intelligence system, which provides the Government an insight into political crises in a foreign state and also secret knowledge of the relations of the state with the other states.

The Ministry analyses all the empirical data and assessment received from the various sources. It processes it into concise documents on each international problem in relation to India's foreign policy. To quote the Pillai Committee Report, ".... the strands of foreign policy are manifold and are factioned by many hands, but it is for the Foreign Office to weave them into a coherent whole".¹ Measures are taken to improve the efficiency

1. Ibid., p. 20.

of the Foreign-Service to meet the present and future needs of foreign-policy-planning.¹

The advice and suggestions of the heads of Foreign-Office also assist the Foreign Minister in arriving at rational decisions. However, the advisory role of the Ministry was overshadowed by certain factors. Firstly, the matchless status of Nehru, his personality and accepted authority on history and international relations. The bureaucracy remained subdued due to his towering leadership. Secondly, the senior positions in Foreign-Office were manned by people of Nehru's influence, who lacked the nerve to object Nehru on foreign policy problems. Thirdly, the foreign policy during this period was more concerned with generalities. However, Nehru consulted some of his close associates like, N.R. Pillai and G.C. Bajpayee. He paid considerable attention to the reports of K.M. Pannikar from China and Krishna Menon from London and the U.N.O., which in fact, only buttressed Nehru's preconceived notions on foreign affairs. Unlike Nehru, M.C. Chagla relied largely on the advice of his Secretaries. During the gap of one and half years, between Chagla's resignation and the appointment of Dinesh Singh as the Minister of External Affairs, when Mrs. Indira Gandhi was both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, the influence of the Foreign-Office as well as the Foreign Secretary in the making of foreign policy, considerably increased.

1. Ibid., p. V.

ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY:

It is equally potential an element in contemporary international relations. Like Britain, there has been a lot of pondering over economic diplomacy in India too, hence a powerful organisation of the Ministry to deal with this vital aspect of foreign policy. Diplomacy and national interest are closely linked with economic development. The Pillai Committee Report sheds ample light on its working.¹ Foreign and defence policies are also interwoven as diplomacy has military connotations. With the result, foreign policy becomes an amalgam of economic and military policies. With regard to economic diplomacy, the Ministry performs strategic, operational and observational functions.

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY:

Our cultural tradition, economic underdevelopment and military backwardness make cultural diplomacy one of the most important elements of India's foreign policy. Cultural diplomacy involves the projection of India's cultural image abroad through its representatives and exchange of cultural delegations. Diplomacy in modern world is carried through propaganda and external publicity. Nations invest enormous funds on propaganda measures. Effective propaganda warrants that global and regional interests should be collateral with general foreign policy goals. For effective propaganda, targets should be carefully evolved and devised in the light of

1. Ibid., pp. 170-71

national interest. There should be frequent evaluation of the overall contribution of propaganda machinery, which requires proper coordination and planning. The Pillai Committee provides innumerable suggestions to improvise the working of the External-Publicity-Division.

The information gathered through overt or covert sources, relating to political, military, economic and social developments in various states and international relations, constitute another function of the Ministry. This information is processed and evaluated from a vantage point of national interest. This business, which is held confidentially, is known as intelligence.¹ In 1967, a separate unit called the External Intelligence Organisation was formed under the Cabinet. The mass of reports-political and otherwise, prepared by the Missions, stationed abroad, constitute raw-material for the intelligence. However, in India, the working of intelligence organisations is marked by inefficiency, ineffectiveness and delays.

The activities of the Ministry of External-Affairs should be coordinated in order to facilitate foreign policy-planning, which is the backbone of diplomacy. The chief task

1. "Intelligence is both a science and an art, - a science because investigation and analysis is as painstaking as research in chemistry or physics; an art because intelligence analysts and estimators need intuition and vision to interpret and forecast events". Kurt, The Making of Foreign Policy- East and West, Philadelphia 1965., p. 117.

of the external publicity is to secure coordination. The work of external publicity, which was originally managed through the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, has fallen upon the Ministry of External-Affairs. Now the Division is actively engaged in collecting, briefing and dissemination of publicity material.

Foreign policy-planning and implementation largely depends on the Ministry, which treats of the crux of current problems and policy research. The Policy-Planning and Review-Division is controlled by the Joint Secretary who provides the rationale of improvement and trends in international politics. The Indian Foreign Services are organised as specialised services for the whole range of India's foreign relations-political, consular, diplomatic and military. The Foreign Office renders significant services in the conduct of external relations. If it is organised in a better manner, its specialised expertise and effectiveness can facilitate the negotiations amidst designates who set up the guidelines of relations. The determination of international links, is the chief concern of the Foreign Office, which works under the umbrella of the Ministry of External Affairs.¹

The role of the Ministry assumes great dimensions in the sense that continued guidance from the Ministry is not

1. For details see, Report of the Committee on the Indian Foreign Service, Ministry of External Affairs, 1965.

merely ornamental. A foreign policy, however, well-defined, demands for its implementation, expertise and experience. The role of Ministry is of constructive import and cannot be labelled superogatory. Expediency demands that the Foreign-Office must develop sufficient competence to deal successfully with the basic needs of foreign policy, in this changed pattern of international relations. The Ministry should set up a well-knit organisation and mechanism for adequate consultation and coordination with such Ministries as Defence, Information and Broadcasting and Civil-Aviation. In order to compartmentalise foreign relations and policy, an integrated system should develop so as to help the Executive in planning and implementing it. Foreign Policy-planning, as a systematised exercise of forethought, is an expedient innovation over the past system, with the result the Foreign-Office should employ better techniques in this regard. Purposive planning based on full understanding of current events and future trends, designed to secure the national interest, is an indispensable factor in the conduct of foreign policy today.

Foreign policy-planning is related to the framework of basic policy, established by the highest constitutional authority. In India it means, the Government of the day and Parliament through which the government derives its power. Planning is concerned with policy problems, present or anticipated that arise in the course of handling foreign relations.

The direction and planning is obligatory on the Secretary-General. The recently constituted Foreign policy and Review-Committee should be accorded permanent footing under the chairmanship of Secretary-General. The Committee examines the problems of long-term planning to achieve foreign policy objectives. It also analyses the important aspects of foreign policy, in the light of fast changing international situations. The work relating to Parliament at official level also needs effective coordination, in order to accelerate the pace of policy-planning programme.¹ The Ministry ought to supply to the government the necessary guidelines and situation reports, which can be of immense help to the latter. The Legal and Treaties Division of the Ministry tenders juridico-political advice to the Ministry which helps drafting of treaties and negotiations.

PARLIAMENT AND ITS COMMITTEES:

The role of the Legislature depends largely on the form of government a state has got. In a Presidential system if the principle of separation of powers is in operation, a clear line, with regard to administration and making of foreign policy, is drawn. In a Parliamentary system where the ultimate responsibility is vested in a Parliament, it gets ample opportunity to scrutinise, discuss and approve the policy.

1. Ibid., p. 31.

The position of Parliament, branded as the 'talking shop', in influencing foreign policy varies from country to country. Its role, "is determined by an interplay of fairly stable constitutional elements and of more ephemeral elements, such as the political climate, the strength of the parties, and the character of the leading personalities involved". All the systems fall, "within a spectrum the one end of which lies in the Soviet Union", where the Supreme Soviet, their Parliament, is denied effective power, and on the other hand is the United States, "where the principle of checks and balances assures the legislature a coordinate role with the executive".¹ India occupies an intermediate position where the Parliament and its control is made effective by the adoption of Westminster model.

The policy-making belongs to the Executive branch of government. The Parliament confirms rather than initiates policy. Theoretically, Parliament is expected to influence

-
1. Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 25. Also see, K.C. Wheare, Legislatures, compares the British and the American systems at large. In the UK "... the whole process of negotiation, signature and ratification lies within the legal powers of the Executive: participation by the legislature is not required". Indian position is more or less similar to the British position.



T1516

and control foreign policy in a variety of ways. Parliament's resolutions, which support or oppose the policy suggested by the government, forcing the government to adopt new policies or reorientate the old ones, vitally affect the broad network of the policy. The constituents of parliamentary influence include, control over the purse, power, to sanction appropriations, reducing or increasing the budget and the demands for grants and authority to set up ad hoc or expert Committees, to affect the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. The Members of Parliament, who are experts in foreign affairs, can also exert their influence in this regard by levelling valid criticism and suggesting remedies. The role of Parliament is not fixed as the polestar. With a strong Opposition within the Parliament, its role can be enhanced.¹ The role of Parliament in foreign policy is that of scrutiny. It can conduct enquiries if it is not furnished with relevant information.² The duty of the Executive is, to develop means to keep the Parliament well-informed. The timely information fed to Parliament, would enable it to influence the decisions and to

-
1. J.C. Kunzru, "Formulation of Indian Foreign Policy", Parliamentary Studies, Vol. II, No. 4, September 1958, p. 22.
 2. Paul Martin, "The Role of the Canadian Parliament in the Formulation of Foreign Policy", Parliamentarian (London), Vol. I, October 1969, p. 264. Also see p. 265 where the lines occur, "... Parliament is concerned with the realities of the day and its Members therefore need special opportunities and facilities".

fulfil its function of keeping people in touch with the public affairs. Another factor which determines the influence of Parliament is the nature of the party system. In a single-party system, fundamental difference is not visible between the Government and the Legislature and the Government dominates. In the American two-party system "fluid majorities give the legislature great importance". In the British two-party system where the party discipline is rigid, a majority Government, commanding a reasonable majority in the House of Commons is fairly secure from interference. A stable multi-party system can paralyse the Government as for example, in the Fourth Republic and to some extent in the German constitution.¹ The Indian position is unique and appreciably different, despite the multi-party system, the Congress has been in power at the centre with overwhelming majority. During the first and the second Parliaments, there was stream-rolling majority of the Congress Party. Consequently, parliamentary approval of the policy was a formality.

The Rules of Procedure in the Indian Parliament, theoretically provide provisions for a well-planned control over policy discussions. The Parliament can withhold assent

1. Frankel, op. cit., p.25

on any policy motion and resolution. Whether the policy is approved or not, detailed discussion and debate occurs on it. The Members also put forth many pieces of advice, which may affect the future course of policy decisions. The other instruments of parliamentary control, discussed later at large, are the Adjournment Motions, No-Confidence Motions, Short-Notice Questions, Half-an-hour discussions and Question-Hour.¹ These modes of accountability, in a parliamentary system enable the Parliament to throw a piercing search-light in every nook and corner of policy decisions and actions. Nothing falls short of the perview of Parliamentary scrutiny. The opinion of the members of Parliament, as expressed during debates, help to identify the controversial issues with the public-opinion, which acts as a restrain on the party-decision-making in the House.

The Parliament can also influence the formulation of the foreign policy through its Consultative role. The practice, however, varies from state to state. In the United States of America, the convention of consulting the Secretaries of State, President and individual Congressmen has grown. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign

1. Richard L. Park, "India's Foreign Policy" in Roy C. Macridis, Foreign Policy in World Politics, (ed.) II ed. Eaglewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1962, p.301.

Relations perform not only an important consultative function but also keep a constant check on foreign policy, through their inquiries, hearings and cross-examinations of members of the Executive. In the United Kingdom, such a formal committee of Parliament is lacking, though there is the convention of consultation between the Members of government and important Members of Parliament. However, in India such a Consultative Committee of Parliament is in existence. The details with regard to the working and functioning of this Committee have been given in the Chapter on the Role of Parliament.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES:

The Committees of the Parliament are one of the effective ways of legislative control over the foreign policy. Their nature and size varies from state to state. They are found in the legislatures of the European countries and the United States of America, but in most of the Commonwealth - Parliaments, such Committees are missing. In Great Britain, the setting up of such Committees has been advocated but the Opposition parties are reluctant to join a committee, which would remain committed to the policy, advocated and pursued by the government. Where there is a good deal of agreement between the government and the Opposition about foreign policy in the Commonwealth countries, the Opposition parties prefer to avoid cooperation through the Parliamentary-Committees.¹

1. Wheare, op. cit., pp. 185-89

Foreign Affairs Committees of the Parliament are not legislatures themselves. The Minister of Foreign Affairs would frankly express his ideas in the Committee, if he is assured that what he says, will not be divulged to the legislature as a whole. Members of this Committee are bound to maintain secrecy. It is pointed out, with regard to the working of the Foreign Affairs Committee that it keeps the Legislature in the dark about the discussion, that occurs on its forum. The democratic control of foreign policy is not achieved through such Committees. Their utility is mitigated, though their work is highly evaluated.

The extent to which the Parliaments and the Foreign Affairs Committees can be kept informed, depends on the nature of that country's foreign policy. Where the country pursues a policy of neutralism or non-alignment, the Parliament and its Committees would remain quite informed. Whatever be the extent of information to the Parliament and its Committees, the importance of its impact remains intact. In foreign policy matters the Committees and the Parliament play a second fiddle to the Executive branch of the government. In a parliamentary system, like ours, the Parliament seldom provides prior consultations. What it avails, is the opportunity to approve fait accompli. The Parliament exists, to approve of the broad outlines of the foreign policy, which provides confidence to the Executive, that it enjoys parliamentary approval. The need is to improvise and galvanize the working of its Committees and increase parliamentary accountability.

CHAPTER III

INSTRUMENTS OF PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF FOREIGN POLICY

QUESTION-HOUR

Question-hour is the first hour of every sitting in the Parliament. It is one of the most widespread procedures in parliamentary practice¹ and the most interesting part of parliamentary proceedings.²

The procedure of asking questions is British in origin and character. It attracts the galleries and gives to the Parliament the great significance, it possesses. The ratio of questions on a particular field shows the interest of members in the administration of foreign policy problems. Raising questions is a modern method for supervising the general policy pursued by the Government.³

Asking questions is one of the "surest ways of bringing administration to book."⁴ It is a regular feature of the Parliamentary life in India which facilitates to put the Government on parliamentary trial.

1. Parliaments, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Capetown, Cassell, Unwin Brothers, 1962, p.271. Also see, Ibid., p. 267.
2. S.L. Sankdher, "Administrative Accountability to Parliament", Indian Journal of Public Administration Vol. XII, No. 3, July-September, 1966, p. 360.
3. B.B. Tiwari, "Parliamentary Questions", Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, Vol. I, No. 3 July-September 1967, p.37. Also see Macridis, op. cit., p.38
4. Sankdher, op. cit., p. 367

ORIGIN OF PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS:

The British Parliament's procedural committee described question-hour as, the readiest and the most effective method of parliamentary control over the actions of the Executive. In Great Britain, the first question in Parliament was asked in connection with foreign affairs.¹ However, in India, it was not so. In the first session of Parliament on 28th January 1950, no question was raised and the first part of the Proceedings with regard to questions was never published.²

This mode of direct "catechising" is not followed in all the countries. In India the present procedure of questioning was adopted as a result of several modifications. The present Rules of Procedure in Lok Sabha contain the raison d'être of the experience gained over the years. Under the Indian Councils' Acts of 1861, the function of the Legislative Council was limited to legislation. The members could not enter into grievances, call for information or examine the conduct of the Executive through questions. There was no such questioning procedure. After 1885 when the A.I.C.C. came into existence, it insisted on responsible government. Lord Dufferin, the then Viceroy, in his 1888 Despatch recommended inter alia,

1. Tiwari, op. cit., p. 38

2. Parliamentary Debates, Part II, Proceedings other than Questions and Answers, Official Report, Vol. I, 1950, 28th January 1950 to 23rd February 1950, I Session, Column I.

the right of asking questions by members of the Legislative Council. The next stage came during the Minto-Morley Reforms by the Indian Councils' Act of 1909. Under the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, the Legislature became bicameral and its powers increased. Under these Rules, not more than five questions, asked by the same member could be called for answers. The landmark in this regard was reached in 1947-50, the most significant of all changes, occurred when the Rules with regard to questions on foreign affairs were abrogated yet the number of questions kept on increasing.

After 1950, several alterations are made such as with regard to limitations of number of questions for oral answers and half-an-hour discussion etc.

PROCEDURAL CHANGES DURING THE THIRD LOK SABHA:

During the Chinese-aggression, when the country was facing grave emergency, the Third Lok Sabha came into existence. The President proclaimed it on 26th October 1962.¹ The Speaker, in a meeting on November 7, 1962, with the leaders, representatives of all Opposition groups in the House and the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, decided upon the three procedural changes which are specially about the three types of Questions which are as follows:

1. Starred
2. Unstarred
3. Short Notice Questions

The latter being the questions which relate to a matter of urgent public importance and can be asked with

1. Ibid., pp. 38-40.

shorter notice than the period of notice, prescribed for an ordinary question.

RULES RELATING TO QUESTIONS:

A minimum of ten clear days notice is necessary for a question to be answered. The Ministers are however, entitled only to five days, notice before question is put on the Order Paper.

ALLOTMENT OF DAYS FOR QUESTIONS:

After the fixation of the dates of sitting of a session of Lok Sabha, allotment of the time available for answering of questions with regard to various ministries on different days in rotation is made. If on the allotted day, holiday falls, the question will not be asked during the whole week.¹ And the Minister to whom the question is addressed, shall forth with, lay on the Table, a written reply to the question and no oral reply will be required for such a question and consequently, no supplementary questions shall be raised thereof.²

After the date is announced for the session, list of questions called "Subject List" is given to the Ministers concerned. Questions are an informative device hence their scope is reasonably limited. On the list of questions not more than thirty questions can be laid for Oral answers in one day.

1. Ibid., pp. 41-42.

2. Ibid., p. 47.

The Ministers are supplied with questions at least five days before the date is fixed for asking questions. After the question is raised by a Minister, it is open to any member of the House to ask supplementary questions; and in India they are alarmingly raised. A Member can withdraw a question by Notice before the sitting for which his question has been placed on the list. Answers to questions proposed to be given in the House by the Ministers are not open for publication, until they have been actually given on the floor of the House or laid on the table.¹ They are purposefully not open for public perusal.

SHORT NOTICE QUESTIONS:

In a day not more than two such questions are put up. The average number of short notice Questions in the session of six weeks duration is about 12. Even this question can be followed by subsidiary short-notice Questions.²

HALF AN HOUR DISCUSSION:

As a matter of sufficient public importance this discussion is provided as an offshot of the Question Hour.³

1. Ibid., pp. 43, 45, 47, and 49

2. Ibid., p. 50.

3. Tiwari, op. cit., p. 50

Thus the question-hour pinpoints the administrative errors and puts, "a search light on its failures".¹

QUESTION-HOUR IN PRACTICE:

The Questions can be raised individually as well as in collaboration. For example, the Oral question No.40, with regard to the Colombo Powers' fresh move to settle Sino-Indian border Dispute was raised by 7 members in collaboration namely, P.K. Kumarcān, R.K. Bhuwalka, S.C. Deb, Krishna Chundra, M.P. Bhagawa, A. Subba Rao, and A.M. Tariq.²

In the first Session of the II Lok Sabha, the number of questions, Oral and written was as follows:

- (1) Oral answers to Questions- 743³
- (2) Written answers to Questions - 559⁴

Only 4 questions were about the Sino-India border dispute, in which none was of any serious nature.

And in the II Session of the Parliament, only one question was raised with regard to Indo-Pakistan Canal Water Dispute (Q. No. 81) 19 Members raised it,⁵ and every Minister,

1. Ibid.

2. Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, Official Report Vol. XLV, No.2, 19.11.1963, Col. 238.

3. Lok Sabha Debates, II Series, No. 17, Vol. II, 315-57, Col. 3133.

4. Ibid., Col. 3202.

5. Lok Sabha Debates, II Series, Vol. III, No.2, 16.7.57 Cols. 3633-34.

whose concern it ^{may} have been, was there to bear his responsibility for his acts of omission and commission. It is during the Question-Hour that, "the Government is able to quickly feel the pulse of the nation and adopt its policies and actions accordingly".¹

Questions raised by Members help to efface misconceptions from the minds of the members of Parliament. They are meant to gather information on a certain specific issue, for instance Bansilal enquired from the Prime Minister whether the Chinese military contingent has withdrawn from the demilitarised zone in Ladakh and what steps the Government took to meet the situation. Dinesh Singh informed the House that a Protest Note, against its establishment had been lodged with the Chinese Government.²

Through Questions in Parliament, the Members get an opportunity to maintain their day to day contact with their constituencies and the public in general, whose grievances of executive or administrative character are brought to the notice of the Government. Questions also enable the ministers to gauge the popular reaction to their policy and administration. This also keeps the civil servant on his toes. It also compels the Ministers to be alert, thus preventing those petty injustices which are commonly

1. Tewari, op. cit., p. 37

2. Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, Official Reports, Vol. XLIV, No.3, 16th August, 1963. Written question No. 80 Col. 372.

associated with bureaucracy and parliamentary democracy.¹

Similarly in 1959, when Jaswant Singh saw a report about the Chinese crossing the Indian border at Barahoti, he enquired of Madam Laxmi Menon if the report was correct and the latter replied in the negative satisfying the particular Member as well as the House.² Questioning is a device to keep the House informed of the latest developments in any field. Question-hour is the liveliest time in Parliament. It appears to be an engrossing period for the Cabinet and the Members of Parliament. If it is desirable, the question can lead to further questions. The purpose of supplementary questions is to extract information not to enter into an argument with the Minister concerned.³

1. Tiwari, Op. cit., p.52

2. Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, Official Report, Vol. XXVI, No.3, 19.8. 1959, written question No.274 col. 1101.

3. See, Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, Official Report Vol. LIX, No.2, 8.9.64. Oral answer to Question No.38, Cols. 228-229- raised in collaboration by Raini Reddy, S. Rama, Mahabir Dass to furnish information about the fact of Chinese infiltration into North East of Bhutan, their claim line in Tashi Yatse etc., the construction of the Chinese air fields. Mrs. Laxmi Menon replied that about the former, there is no information, the middle one, in the negative and confirmed the last one about the newly constructed net work of roads and publication of wrong maps. Also see the written answer to question No.44, col. 238.

Also see, Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, Official Report, Vol. XLIV. No. 3, 16.8.63, oral answer to question No.75, cols. 353-4. When the Deputy Minister Shri D.R. Chavan gave a positive information to the question "how many times China has violated the Indian air space since she declared unilateral cease-fire?"

While answers may be long or short according to the mood of the Minister, questions should be short and to the point. The Members of the Rajya Sabha are more prone to argumentation: as compared to Members of the Lok Sabha.¹

(Continued from the previous page)

raised by R.S. Khander, Shri Ram Sahay, Chavan said, "Twelve times since 21st November 1962 on the basis of information available to date to Government".

Also see, for information Q. 1966. "Chinese intrusion into Indian territory".

Question No. 9 raised by Shri Ram Singh and K.C. Baghel asked the Minister of Defence to State:

- (a) the details of intrusions of the Chinese troops into Indian territory during the last three months;
- (b) what is the number of casualties suffered by both sides in clashes that the intrusions due to the Indian Defence forces?

Minister of Defence, Y.B. Chavan:

- (a) "During the period from November 1965 to Jan. 1966, the Chinese committed 40 intrusions into Indian territory and Sikkim, sector wise details is given below.

NEFA	11
Sikkim	8
Ladakh	20
U.P.	1
Total		40

1. Editorially, "Questionable", Indian Express, (New Delhi), 16.5.68. The Rajya Sabha member is compared to Oliver Gold Smith's, village school master, who, though vanquished, keeps on arguing.

Question-Hour brings to light the principle of ministerial responsibility and therefore, the Question-Hour and the inter-pellation does not happen to be a mere device for obtaining information, but a very direct form of control, which is linked up with the history of the parliamentary system itself.¹

Undoubtedly, raising question is a valuable right of a Member of Parliament.² Like the 19th century Great Britain, the questions are raised and answered in India with appalling frankness.³ The Supplementary Questions put the Ministers to acid tests. It may often expose the failures of the policy decisions. The answers by the Ministers should convince the Parliament of the Minister's answers of their departmental activities. It subsequently builds the image of success on the general public.

Question-Hour is not only a device to elicit facts but also to provide an opportunity for the display of parliamentary reactions. A supplementary question involves subtle care, as it can not only sidetrack Oppositional comments but also confuse

1. Parliaments, op.cit., p.265. Also see, Tiwari, op. cit., p. 52, "The Question Hour is the very life of parliamentary democracy. It gives tone and vitality to the institution and on the manner in which the Question Hour is utilized depends the degree of success which democracy can achieve. And in India this is democratically utilized".
2. Shankdher, op. cit., p. 361.
3. Peter G. Richards, Parliament and Foreign Affairs, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1967, p. 83.

the whole matter. It can be a suitable device to further elucidate any issue if pertinent question and pinpointed answer is given.

Sometimes very relevant and pertinent questions are raised and answered on the floor of the House. Regarding the Sino-India border dispute, Ram Subhag Singh asked the length and breadth of the road constructed by the Chinese Government in the Indian territory in Ladakh. In 1954, the Government got the information for the first time that this road is being constructed. The Government was doing its best to stop this construction. Nehru furnished this information in details, that the Sinkiang Gartok High-way ran approximately 100 miles through the Indian territory in Eastern extremity of Aksai-Chin in Ladakh. The first doubts arose in 1957 and the following summer, the Indian Government decided to send two reconnaissance parties. Having confirmed this news, a Protest Note was lodged by Delhi on 18.10.1958. Many supplementary questions followed this information.¹ Thus the Parliament was furnished with

1. Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, Official Report, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, Oral question No.15, Cols. 22-25. Also see Parliamentary Debates, Parliament of India, Official Report, Vol. I, No.1, 6.2.52 Part I, cols. 1-2. Oral answer to question No. 2. where the question was asked by Shri Raj Kanwar about the "U.N. military observers in Kashmir", their strength the contingent which met their expenditure, the country of origin and the number of observers.

relevant information by the answers. A question, in fact, is primarily asked for the purpose of obtaining information on a matter of public importance. Questions which contain arguments, inferences or defamatory statements or otherwise refer to the character or conduct of any person except in his official or public capacity are not admitted by the Speaker. Moreover, if the subject matter of a question is sub-judice, it is not permitted to be raised. The most significant point about a question being that questions directly involving policy-matters are not allowed, for it is not possible to enunciate completely policies within the compass of an answer to a question.¹ Furthermore it is not desirable to disclose the secret intricacies involved in a policy decision. Sometimes such questions are raised which act as the gambit for a challenge to government policy in the form of a brief interrogation through supplementary questions.²

The volley of questions keeps the Government vigilant and alert. Asked by B.D. Khobaragade, about the publication

1. Tiwari, op. cit., pp. 43-44. Also see the Annexure attached therewith between pages 53 and 55 under the caption, "condition of admissibility of questions." Where such Rules occur (XI), "it shall not raise questions of policy too large to be dealt with within the limits of an answer to a question."

2. Richards, op. cit., p. 87.

of a wrong map in the Chinese magazine, 'China Encounter', Mrs. Laxmi Menon replied that the Government endeavoured to efface the misconception from the minds of other states through its information services to correct the erroneous impression created by the Chinese false publicity.¹

Often, very silly questions are raised. As, in the wake of Chinese threat on NEFA, Ram Subhag Singh, in collaboration with Shri Radha Raman, Smt. Mafida Ahmad and Bhagwati, asked Nehru, if the press report about the village Aka being washed away was correct as mentioned in the Statesman (New Delhi), October 26, 1957. Nehru confirmed that the report was "fictitious" and basically without "foundation"²

Both the members of the Party in power and Opposition utilise their right in this respect. Sometimes the questions are directed to either the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister, or the Deputy Minister or the Minister of State. Often, difficult and embarrassing questions are raised, anyway the Minister of External Affairs cannot dodge the barrage of questions encountering him. Like debates, the Question-Hour

-
1. Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, Official Report, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, 10.2.60, Written question No.60, Col.242.
 2. Lok Sabha Debates, II Series, No.23, Vol. X, 10.12.57 Column, 4439.

procedure remains under the control of the Speaker, and if the Speaker ever fails to exert his proper control, the Question-Hour and the supplementaries may degenerate into a frivolous debate.¹

Sometimes the question are not answered on the ground of public interest. Its notable example was the refusal by Y.B. Chavan on the ground that it was not in the public interest when P.L. Kureel asked him to disclose the Government's ascertainment with regard to the new roads and border posts constructed by the Chinese government to increase road building in NEFA.² However, due to the fear of questions, the Government keeps its accounts in an apple pie order.

The Ministry of External Affairs is often questioned about its publicity function. On the floor of the House, raising the bogey of questions is not monopolised by a particular

1. Tiwari, op. cit., p.48. Also see, Ramesh Narayan Mathur, "Parliamentary Procedure in India", Parliamentary Studies, Vol. 2, No. 5, October, 1958, p. 29. Where he writes, "The Speaker as the guardian of the rights and privileges of the House is bound to admit question which bring to light abuses and injustices of the administration."
2. Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, Official Report Vol.XLIX, No. 7, 15th September 1964, written answer to question No.200 cols. 1332-3. Also see, col. 1342, in the same debate written answer to question No.37, raised by Ram Sahay in connection with aerodromes built by China near the Indian border. Mostly after 1957 the questions on foreign affairs were asked on China hence the frequent reference to these questions.

Ministry or Minister. With regard to the Ministry of External Affairs various members were obliged to answer on the floor extending the area of information of the Members of Parliament.

An unguarded and spontaneous reply on a matter of foreign policy can produce an awkward situation for the Government. The Minister has to be careful and cautious in his answers, and, moreover, has to keep himself well aware of facts and developments so as to avoid any embarrassment.

There has been a steep rise in the number of questions raised against the Ministry of External Affairs.

The following Table shows the rise in questions, raised against the Ministry of External Affairs between 1957 and 1961.¹

Years	Total Questions	Questions under EA	Percentage
1957	8,310	327	3.91%
1958	13,806	575	4.16%
1959	13,992	626	4.47%
1960	12,212	588	4.79%
1961	14,480	717	4.95%

1. Second Lok Sabha, Activities and Achievements, 1957-62, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1962, Statement No. XIII, p. 25

The number of Starred Questions answered during the Question-Hour has been on the decrease from Lok Sabha to Lok Sabha. In the First Lok Sabha^{of} 52-57, the average number of questions orally answered was 15 to 20 but in the Third Lok Sabha of 1962-67, the number of questions orally answered came down to 5 and 10. The average of orally questions in the House of Commons is 22 to 25.¹

In fact, a question acts as a catalyst which forces Government to frame policy after prolonged period of hesitation and doubt.² Sometimes questions may lead to the appointment of a commission, a court of enquiry or even legislation when matters raised have been grave enough to agitate the public mind.³

STATEMENT SHOWING THE NUMBER OF QUESTIONS UNDER
VARIOUS MINISTRIES ANSWERED IN THE SECOND LOK SABHA
(UPTO THE END OF 15TH SESSION) 4.

Name of Ministry	Number of questions
Defence	2,334
Atomic Energy, (Dept. of)	265
External Affairs and P.M. Sectt.	2,829
Home Affairs	5,492
Total (of questions in all Ministries)	62,800

1. Tiwari, op. cit., p. 48.

2. Richards, op. cit., p. 88.

3. Tiwari, op. cit., p.37.

4. Second Lok Sabha, Activities and Achievements, 1957-62, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi (62), Table No.XII.

The method of questions and parliamentary interrogation is important in a variety of ways. It enables to obtain the Governments' views on a changing situation or a new problem. It keeps the Minister in touch with public opinion and provides an opportunity for critics to challenge any aspect of foreign policy.¹ It is a "safety valve and swift method of calling attention to wrongs otherwise overlooked".²

-
1. Also see, Kenneth Young, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy", The British Journal of Sociology, 1955, Vol. VI, pp. 172-73, in which the values of question time is stressed.
 2. Tiwari, op. cit., Tiwari cites Alfred C. Bossom to have explained it as a vehicle for both Governments and members to dispell illusions, explain uncertainties, remedy injustices and reassure the public."

The following table reveals the trend of the number of questions asked under various Ministries. The Ministries which have been the subject of major attention are Food, Agriculture, Commerce, Development and Cooperation, Home Affairs, Education and Railways and each recording more than 7% of the total followed by Ministries of Commerce, Defence, External Affairs, Finance, Health, Family Planning, Irrigation, Food etc., recording more than 3% of the total. The rest in general have recorded less than 3% of the total number of questions.

STATEMENT SHOWING THE NUMBER OF QUESTIONS
ASKED BY MEMBERS IN THE THIRD LOK SABHA
DURING THE YEARS 1962-66 UNDER VARIOUS MINISTRIES

Name of Ministries	1962 Total	1963 Total	1964 Total	1965 No. Total	1966 No. P.Total
Defence including erstwhile Department of Defence Coordination 4th & 5th session	464 4.39	690 7.52	566 5.70	791 6.71	648 3.82
Department of Atomic Energy	56 0.50	35 0.38	39 0.39	63 0.53	107 0.63
External Affairs	565 5.35	401 4.46	475 4.78	759 6.44	823 4.85
Home Affairs	846 8.01	672 7.32	749 7.54	1204 10.21	1644 9.69
Total					

Activities of Third Lok Sabha 1962-67 (Statistics & Charts),
Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, October, 1967.

A total of 1,62,334 notices of questions were received from Members during the sixteen sessions of the Third Lok Sabha from 1962-1966. Out of this 58,440 questions representing about 35% of the total receipts were admitted.

Starred questions are those for which oral answers are required. Unstarred questions are those for which only written answers are to be furnished and short Notice Questions require oral answers within short notice. The table below shows the proportions of the Notices received and "admitted".

STATEMENT SHOWING THE DISPOSAL OF QUESTIONS RECEIVED
FROM MEMBERS DURING THE SESSIONS OF THE THIRD LOK SABHA.

Questions	No.	Percentage to total	Questions	No.	Percentage to total
Starred	1,45,580	89.68	Starred	14,312	24.49
Unstarred	12,021	7.40	Unstarred	6,133	10.49
Short Notice	4,733	2.92	Short Notice	288	0.49
			Starred qs. admitted as Unstarred	26,916	63.17
			Short Notice Questions admitted as Starred and Unstarred	791	1.36
Total	1,62,334	100.00		58,440	100.00

Activities of Third Lok Sabha, 1962-67 (Statistic & Charts),
Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, October 1967.

MOTIONS AND RESOLUTIONS:

Motions regarding India's foreign policy and Resolutions regarding significant situations provide another opportunity to the Parliament to control foreign policy. These motions lead to lengthy discussions on the floor of the House resulting in the policy shifts. When the Parliament is in session, these Motions and Resolutions enable it to be kept informed of the latest international developments. They provide publicity for explanations of ministerial policy and enable the Cabinet to discern trends of the opinion of the Opposition. They create a focus of scrutiny for ministerial actions and enable the Ministers to present their clarifications to some of the confusions arising in the minds of the Members of Parliament which may amount to parliamentary support for the policies of the Government. The Motions regarding International situations provide ample opportunity for an elongated debate on the main tenets and specific trends in foreign policy. In India such Motions and Resolutions are moved by the Minister of External Affairs at a given time. The focal point of criticism during such discussions is the failure of the Government of India, either in the policy itself or in its implementation in a given situation.

Almost during every session Nehru used to move this motion, followed by his broad interpretation of the international happenings vis-a-vis the policy followed by the Government of India. The motion proceeds by speeches of eminent parliamentarians. The

Opposition members who weigh the policy of the Government, with applaud or jaundiced eye, level criticism against it or praise it. They freely move amendments and try to add things to the original motion by a substitute motion. After, one or two days or even a week long debate, the motions are either entered and stand passed or are rejected. On no occasion during the Nehru regime, an important motion was rejected. Despite criticisms by the Opposition parties, they fully endorsed the policy of the Government from time to time. The longest debates were held on the Sino-India Border Dispute during 1957, when for the first time, the fact of Chinese road building was disclosed to Parliament, most of the time was devoted to the discussion of Sino-Indian Border Dispute and the policy followed by the Government of India.

Between May 10, 1957 and May 31, 1957, during the Ist Session of the II Lok Sabha, 106.36 hours in sittings were given, no discussion was held under the Ministry of External Affairs, no significant foreign policy issue was raised. In the President's address which spells out the broad policy lines of his Government, no reference was made to foreign policy. What gained primacy was railway budget and general discussions. This reflects the non-seriousness of the Members in foreign affairs ~~vis-a-vis~~ the economic issues of the nation. Even a cursory glance at the motions reveals that the Members were preoccupied with the domestic issues, hence the absence of any foreign policy issue as a matter of urgent public importance.¹

1. Lok Sabha Debates II Series, Vol. II, No. 17, 31.5.57
(Resume) col. 3363.

Since 1957 onwards, China became the pivot of debates. Nehru realised that China was something more than a mere neighbour and the question of Sino-India border needed attention.¹ While moving the motion regarding international situation Nehru appalled the increasing amount of interest that the House started taking in international affairs. He felt that it was important that not only the parliament but also the whole country should increase their interest in international affairs, without, however at the expense of the domestic problems, which always call for primary consideration. The domestic problems are affected so much by international events that it helps to have this larger perspective. Ultimately Nehru left this discussion, to the House to have as much time as possible to express their own opinions and tender suggestions to the Government for further action.² The debate was concluded in ascertaining the approval of the policy of the Government.³ As compared to Lok Sabha debates, the Rajya Sabha debates are less heated, less passionate and less sentimental. Since the Upper House consists of more sophisticated personnel, the debates are more calculated and cool.

1. Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, Official Report, Vol. XVI, No. 8, 27.3.57, Col. 725.

2. Ibid., col. 724

3. Ibid., col. 865.

In the last session of 1957 Parliament, the Lok Sabha discussed the motion on international situation taking about 8 hours time, which centered around the looming problems in Goa, Indonesia, Pakistan and Ceylon. After a long play-way with it in which members of Parliament spoke, it again ended with the adoption of the motion approving the Government's policy. All the other Amendment Motions were withdrawn.¹

In every session such motions are moved, and if the situation is taxing and demanding, more Amendment Motions are moved and debated. Sometimes the House praises the manner in which the Government carries on its business with the wisdom and advice of the Parliament in the handling of foreign affairs.² Nihar Ranjan Ray, while emphatically supporting the policy of the Government, expressed his appreciation for the way the Government had been thoroughly performing its duty in terms of the policy that the people of this country have laid down through their two Houses of Parliament.³

In 1956, the highest recorded number of sittings of the Lok Sabha took place. It was 151 times, consuming 1026 hours in one and a half decade from 1950-66. The next grade was in 1951,

-
1. Lok Sabha Debate II Series, Vol. X, No. 28, 17th December 1957, col. 6018
 2. Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, Official Report Vol. XXX. No. 8, 18.8.60 col. 1238 statement by Sudhir Gosh.
 3. Ibid., Cols. 171-72

when in 150 sittings 987 hours were employed.¹

STATEMENT SHOWING THE NUMBER OF DURATION
OF ANNUAL SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE (UPTO THIRD
LOK SABHA).

Year	No.of sittings	Duration of sittings in Hours
1956	151	1026
1957	106	668
1958	125	781
1959	123	792
1960	121	798
1961	102	668
1962	116	730
1963	122	787
1964	122	753
1965	113	730
1966	119	810

NO-CONFIDENCE MOTIONS:

Sometimes Motions of Non-Confidence in the Council of Ministers are adopted. The maximum were adopted during 1962-67. 102-13 hours were consumed in such discussions, which threw

1. Activities of Third Lok Sabha, (Statistics & Charts)
October 1967, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, p. 8

ample light on the foreign policy of the nation, consuming 2.8% of the total 3742.40 hours.¹

TABLE NO. XXI

RESOLUTIONS DISCUSSED IN THE THIRD LOK SABHA

Date/Day on which the Resolution was discussed	Subject matter	Name of the member in-charge	Time	Action taken by the House
--	----------------	------------------------------	------	---------------------------

(A) Government Resolution

Third Session

8.11.62)				
9.11.62)				
10.11.62)		Shri J.L.Nehru	37/47	Adopted
12.11.62)	Chinese Aggression			
13.11.62)				
14.11.62)				

Third Session

8.11.62)		Shri J.L.Nehru	37/47	Adopted
9.11.62)				
10.11.62)	Approval of Proclamation			
12.11.62)	of Emergency under			
13.11.62)	Article 352 of the			
14.11.62)	Government.			

Fourth Session

19.3.63	Administrative policy	Shri Hem Barua	1.15	Withdrawn by leave of the House
---------	-----------------------	----------------	------	---------------------------------

Third Lok Sabha, 1962-65 a SOUVENIR, Part II: Statistical Statements, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, March 1967, pp 66-67.

Date/Day on which the Resolution was discussed	Subject matter	Name of the member in- charge	Time	Action taken by the House
--	-------------------	-------------------------------------	------	---------------------------------

NEFA

21.2.64	Proclamation of Emergency	Shri Tridib Chaudhuri	2.32	Negative
---------	------------------------------	--------------------------	------	----------

Twelfth Session

6.3.64	} Quitting of Commonwealth	Shri Bhagwat Jha Azad	5.16	Not conclu- ded
24.9.65				
12.11.65	} "	"	0.25	A substi- tute motion by Shri S.N. Das
26.11.55				
30.11.65				
			0.47	
			0.15	

regarding the adjournment
of the Debate on this was
adopted by the House on
12.11. 1965.

STATEMENT SHOWING THE TIME TAKEN BY THIRD LOK SABHA ON
VARIOUS KINDS OF BUSINESS DURING FIRST TO SIXTEENTH SESSION

Type of Business	Time taken on each item	Percentage to total time.
Adjournment motions	Hours Minutes * 41.25	1.1
Bills-		
(a) Govt. Bills	548.24	19.8
(b) Private Members Bill	119.34	3.2
Calling Attention Notices (Rule 197)	111.00	3.0
Discussions		
(a) Half-an-hour Discussion(Rule 55)	7	1.4
(b) Short Duration Discussion (Rule 193)	59/13	1.6
Motions		
(a) Motions (Rules 191 & 342)	378/43	10.2
(b) Motions of No-Confidence in the Council of Ministers.	102.13	2.8
(c) Motions for modification of statutory Rules, Rule(235).	6.28	0.2
Presidents' Address	105.01	2.9
Questions	564.41	15.1
Statement by Ministers (Rules 372)	68-40	1.8
Miscellaneous	222.27	6.0
Total	3732.40	100.00

Activities of Third Lok Sabha 1962-67 (Statistics & Charts)
Lok Sabha Secretariat - New Delhi, October 1967.

MOTION FOR ADJOURNMENT:

The Indian Parliament often utilizes these motions to carry another debate to which it can lead. It happens to be highly convenient for it allows speeches to range widely unrestricted by the terms of a reasoned motion for debate. The Adjournment motion can also be used to permit debates initiated by the back-benchers. It also includes half-an-hour-discussions.

In the Third Lok Sabha, 41.25 hours were taken by various adjournment motions, which comes to 1.1% of the total time consumed by other kinds of business.¹ During the III Session of the II Lok Sabha from 11.9.57-21.12.57, 23 such motions were received, none was admitted and all the motions were withheld by the consent of the speaker.²

MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS:

Statements of ministerial policy are often made to the Parliament after the Question-Hour. This device of parliamentary process is useful, for it enables the Government to give the House its views of the latest developments and many international issues affecting India's national interest abroad.³

-
1. Activities of Third Lok Sabha 1962-67, (Statistics and Charts) Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, October 1957, p.18.
 2. Lok Sabha Debates, II Series, Vol. X, No.32, 21.12.57, Co.7202.
 3. See, A.M. Thomas, the Minister of Defence Production, the statement relating to situation on the India-China Border, Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, Official Report, Vol. IX, No.3, 16.2.66 cols. 312-317. He stated "since a

Contd....

These statements can be made in reply to private notice questions that are pre-arranged with the Ministers. The Ministerial pronouncement is generally followed by questions and if the matter is of great importance, the leaders of the Opposition parties can make statements and it can assume the status of miniature debate. It is probable that this statement may be made and debated on the motion of adjournment.

Some procedural modifications are necessary if the Parliament wants to remain fully informed in moments of grave crisis and tension. During the III Session of the Lok Sabha between 11.9.57 and 21.12.57, 59 notices on matters of urgent public importance were received and 10 statements were made.¹

(Continued from the previous page)

large number of questions have been asked by members of Parliament about the happenings since then, I am making this statement to indicate the upto date position". After November 30, 1965, it is the first statement to be made. He adds that during the months of December 1965 to January 1966, the Chinese committed 27 violations 19 of them were in Ladakh, 4 in NEFA, 3 in Sikkim and one in U.P. The Chinese have increased their military potential and since then, there has been no change of policy of the Government of India.

1. Lok Sabha Debates, II Series, No. 32, Vol. X, 21.12.57, Col. 7202.

Very often the Ministers make personal statements to the Parliament when some misreporting takes place. A minister who resigns due to policy misunderstanding may also make clarification-statements. Although such occasions are uncommon, they can be debated and commented upon in later debates. Most important statements made by Nehru are as follows:

1. Indo-West Pakistan Border Conference on 9.2. 62 and
2. on 23.3.59 and 8.5.58 on the situation in Tibet and
3. on 24.3.61 on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference¹.

OTHER OPPORTUNITIES:

The other miscellaneous items in the time table of the Parliament, specially the Lok Sabha, give enhanced flexibility to its proceedings providing additional opportunities of discussing the foreign affairs. For instance, on the publication of an important report, the Government obliges the House to discuss its conclusions. Often such a discussion is disallowed owing to the time factor as well as to avoid detailed commitments in relation to the conclusions. In the same way, the private members' time hardly make any major contribution to parliamentary discussion of foreign policy but, however, it can be of value if used to examine a specialized or secondary topic that is generally overlooked.² Although discussions may also result while

1. Lok Sabha: Activities and Achievements, 1957-62
Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1962, New Delhi, pp. 108, 109 and 110 Table No. XXXVI.

2. Richards, op. cit., p. 95

considering the reports of financial committees, Public Accounts Committee or any other Committee but these Committees are not the proper forum for broad discussion on international problems. The financial committees do not challenge Government policy, on the contrary they ensure legality and economy in the use of public funds.¹

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES:

The Parliament, "the forum of debate"² is not allowed to tie its hand in negotiations and the course of discussion with foreign powers is not revealed to it before-hand, it is privileged to hold frequent debates to have a know-how of international problems and participation in those discussions. Hence in both the Houses, a wide-range of topics pertaining to foreign affairs and policy are debated and discussed at large ranging from the main principles, their relevance to present day international situation, disarmament, commonwealth ties to foreign aid and its advisability.

Most of the time in Parliament is spent on general debates, questions and ministerial statements. The question period and the general debates, exemplify the usefulness of Parliament's role with respect to policy-making.³ Since

-
1. Ibid., pp. 95-6. The statement is originally attributed to the British Committees.
 2. K.C. Wheare, op.cit., p. 185
 3. Leon D. Epstein, "British Foreign Policy", Roy C. Macridis (ed.), op. cit., p. 38. The statement, though with regard to British system is equally applicable to Indian Parliament.

Parliament is understood to be a "platform on which views are to be expressed and exchanged" freely, "a wide range of views finds expression in the Parliament".¹

Parliament debates foreign policy issues vigorously and significantly. It is free from independent decision-making. The popularly elected Lok Sabha is the main forum but occasionally it is also discussed in the Rajya Sabha. Debate is an important instrument of influence and control. Though both the Houses debate international situation, the Government principally defends its policy in the Lok Sabha. In each parliamentary debate, a wide spectrum of views finds a forceful expression by members of Parliament, the main centre of attention is on the give and take between the party leaders i.e. the Prime Minister and expectant leader of the shadow Cabinet. The debate takes place between those who are literally responsible for policy and those who would like to become responsible. In fact it is "a discussion between a government and its alternative".²

In a debate for Motion regarding international situation in the Lok Sabha, the language of which is always the same is read out by the External Affairs Minister, as

1. W.H. Morris Jones, Parliament in India, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1957, p. 327.

2. Leon D. Epstein, op. cit., p.37

follows: "That the present international situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto be taken into consideration". Then the interested members participate and beg to move a couple of Substitute Motions but generally after a long discussion the debate ends by a solemn proclamation of approval by the Speaker.—

"This House having considered the present international situation and the ^{policy of the} government of India in relation thereto approves the said policy". On a particular day, i.e., December 17, 1957, 6 hours were taken by the above mentioned debate and later on the motion was adopted.¹

In India, the session of Parliament starts with a formal speech by the President, delivered by him in a joint session. In this speech, the policy of the Government or Cabinet is stated. This Address is followed by a Motion of thanks, allowing a wide-ranging examination of government policy that lasts usually 5 days. Subsequently the debate on international situation takes place. Very often, in a debate on President's address, foreign policy becomes the major point of attack. Such as in the first session in 1960, foreign policy was the major point of controversy during the debate on President's Address, in which a "bit of acrimonious exchange took place".

1. Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series, No. 28, Vol. X, 17th December 1967, col. 5879 for the motion moved and col. 6018 for motion adopted.

To some Members of Opposition, the Note to Chau-Eh-lai by Nehru seemed, a fundamental reversal of policy as stated in the President's address. Some Members called it a betrayal of "faith". Never before, Nehru has to save his stand more and justify his policy.¹

Frequency of major foreign policy debate varies very considerably. If the international scene is tense and causes a deep division of opinion between the parties, arguments thereon shall be more animated and heated, "..... if the international scene is relatively peaceful and the parties are in general agreement in their attitudes towards foreign policy, debates are infrequent and when they do take place are normally calm".² When in 1963, the world was having a peaceful atmosphere showing prospects of thaw in the cold-war, the nature of debate was quiet. The debate in the early 63, affirmed its "fresh" faith in non-alignment as a fruitful policy. Even in the serious conflict with China and in the hour of danger to India's security, it proved to be an intelligent and sound policy. This was the feeling among the members, only the Swatantra Party wanted alignment with the West.³

-
1. "The Debate on Address", Notes and Comments Parliamentary Studies, Vol. IV, No. 3, March 1960, p.6.
 2. Paul Martin, "The Role of Canadian Parliament in the Formulation of Foreign Policy", Parliamentarian, London, Vol. I, October, 1969, p. 262.
 3. Editorially, "The Making of Foreign Policy", National Herald, (Lucknow), 21.3. 1963.

The tone of debate is greatly affected by whether it is expected to end with a challenge to the Government in the division lobbies. When the speech is by the Prime Minister, the Chamber remains crammed up. Since the major parties in India generally agreed on basic principles of foreign policy, these debates generally ended without a vote being challenged. Critics^{of} Parliament often comment unfavourably about the scarcity of attention the Members pay in the Chamber. One of the really hot debates in Indian Parliament on a foreign policy issue was, on the attitude adopted by the Government of India on Russian intervention in Hungary.¹

There is a democratic element in debating and holding public discussions on vital problems. The implication is that, it is a matter for the experts, yet it is less majestic to suggest, however hesitantly, that some aspects of defence are legitimately the concern of the entire country and therefore should be fully debated,² but there is a tendency in the Government to take resort to the contention that certain matters cannot be discussed for security reasons. Efforts in Parliament and elsewhere to obtain material data on defence matters generally flounder against

-
1. J.C. Kunzru, "Formation of Indian Foreign Policy", Parliamentary Studies, Vol. II, No.4, September 1958, pp. 21-22.
 2. "Swings of the Pendulum", article by Surveyor, Times of India (New Delhi), 11.4. 1960.

the dead wall of security requirements. Except for a few notable contribution in debate by persons who take an intelligent and keen interest in defence matters and apparently have their own sources of information, the debates in Parliament reveal the handicaps caused by lack of adequate information.¹

In Britain and other Commonwealth countries, there are frequent debates in the legislatures, some directly upon questions of policy, others arising out of debates themselves.² Very often the nature of debate reflects the amount of interest the country shows in foreign affairs. For the Lok Sabha session in the mid-December 1962, it is said, "the temper in the Lok Sabha Debate reflected the new mood of the country. The present crisis has spot-lighted the fact that the nation stands solidly behind Mr. Nehru in Emergency".³

Thus, the best opportunity available to the individual Members of Parliament to participate in foreign policy matters, is the debate, which is held at intervals in the whole House. They support the policy, if they are satisfied and criticise it vehemently, if they are dissatisfied. The foreign policy debate in the Lok Sabha on September 29, 1964, was "a spirited

1. P.V.R. Rao, Defence without Drift, Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1970, p. vi.

2. Wheare, op. cit., p. 194.

3. The Indian Express. (New Delhi), 12.12. 1962.

debate throughout", when L.M. Singhvi did not give his support to the non-alignment policy. He felt that, "there was no need to extol" the non-alignment policy, "and adopted it for ever" as it may, "sap the vitality of the country" and that, "the time had come when the policy of exemplifying non-alignment should be reviewed realistically with a view to giving it a forward looking content". On the contrary Menon favoured it whole heartedly.¹

Debates in Parliament are a wilful obstruction to Executive despotism. It provides an opportunity for issues to be discussed but it is only an expostfacto scrutiny of issues. It is ironical that the debates take place after the issue is over. They are mere formalities but still they affect the Government decisions as the government is sensitive to Parliamentary opinion. During debates, Members are to express as to what constitute good for the country and what modification of the existing policy is required. During the debates, the Members have full liberty to criticise the administration for their past performance and suggest how they should behave in future or how a particular measure should be carried out or implemented. Actually, administrative accountability arises out of administrative responsibility. The parliamentary debates serve to remind the administration of their duties and obligations. They affect

1. The Times of India, (New Delhi), 29.9.1964.

the administrative thinking and action in a variety of ways. That subtle influence, which cannot be measured in terms of visible units, pervades every influence, within all the ranks of administration.¹ Through parliamentary discussions, the Parliament approves the policy. While implementing it, the Government is guided by various view points expressed on the floor of the House. Whatever may be the issue, the tone of the discussions and the motions had always ended in the approval of the policy of the Government of India thereto.

The rank and file in India is less concerned about foreign affairs and foreign policy dilemmas. The account of the proceedings in the Lok Sabha is comprehensively followed up by the leading newspapers, to keep the sizable educated minority informed of parliamentary debates.

In India, the debates in the Houses present uproarious scenes. An emphatic example was the last day of the Monsoon Session of Lok Sabha in September 1970, when the Speaker, Dhillon, commented with resentment that if the Members could settle "every issue with the show of fists, there is no need for Parliament. If you sit in Parliament you have to argue and tolerate each other. If you think this is a forum just

1. S.L. Shankdher, "Administrative Accountability to Parliament", Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. XII, No. 3, July-September 1966, p. 367.

for shouting and showing fists then it is a 'wrong forum'. On the contrary, on less important issues at times the Debates take place in peace and calm, as the Winter Session in 1970, started in a subdued note without any angry debates or uproarious scenes.

Since one of the most important functions of the Members of Parliament is to criticise the executive, they debate great issues of public concern. They constitute 'a grand inquest of the nation', and act as what John Stuart Mill called, "a committee of grievances" and "a congress of opinions",¹ but it is also not the function of the Parliament to be the sole forum of debate or the sole committee of grievances in its country's political system, these functions must and should be shared with other bodies.² These other such forums of discussions include, special sessions of Committees, Seminars and Symposiums in Universities and commentaries in the Newspapers.

It is hard to comment about the standard of debates in Parliament. Sometimes they are high-flown and detailed when the mighty orators like Kriplani, Menon, Minoo Masani, Ashoka Mehta are there and sometimes low, when the lot is less experienced and less interested in foreign affairs. A Parliamentary Correspondent writes about the December 1967 (Winter Session) debate that it was insipid and that the Prime

1. Wheare, op. cit., p. 1

2. Ibid., pp. 233-34

Minister's speech contained little evidence of any fresh thinking and further suggested that it was high time when the foreign affairs need whole time attention. Parliamentary debates would have been richer had real political organisation preceded the speech-making.¹ Often their performance is extempore and thus there was every likelihood for its having a low standard. The problem is how to ameliorate and improvise the standard of Parliamentary debates. Out of the volley of suggestions, the most notable being given by a Parliamentary correspondent having listened to Debates of the second half of November in IV Lok Sabha, 1967. He put forth two administrative suggestions that the Government should use the forum of Parliament to inform and to explain its major policies and to seek the advice of the members on them. It may be argued that the latter aspect is looked after in the committees of Parliament, but that is not entirely the case and secondly the Opposition parties should expedite the process of polarisation among themselves and should not cancel each other as Opposition groups.² The eminent parliamentarian like H.N. Mukerjee realises the need to make the parliamentary debates more parliamentary. While speaking in Parliament over the motion

-
1. "Parliament in session" by Parliamentary Correspondent, Parliamentary Studies, Vol. XII, No. 1, January 1968, p.12.
 2. "Parliament in Session", A Parliamentary Correspondent, Parliamentary Studies, Vol. XI, No. 12, Dec. 1967, p.15.

regarding International situation and the policy of the Government of India in relation thereto, he said that if the members of Parliament wanted to push him out of Parliament, ways and means are open to them to do something about it. But he failed to understand why this kind of deviation into an unmannerely exhibition of anti-parliamentarianism existed in the Indian Parliament.

A question may be raised how much a debate really matters. Although a bad governmental showing does not modify majority approval in the immediate circumstances, it weakens the position of the Cabinet leaders within their own party, leading to future changes in personnel or policy. It can also brighten the election prospects of the Opposition. A minister would find it difficult to survive if his own supporters find him a poor spokesman for the government and party.¹ A successful Minister has to be a fluent debator.

A. D. Dhar poetically laments for the 1970-Lok Sabha Session, "Ah, for the last Lok Sabha! for those angry interludes, those heated debates, that "zero-hour" which was always pregnant with crisis, for the perpetual possibility of the Government losing a vote, which kept the reporters..... to their seats".² However, successful use of the above mentioned instruments and organised Opposition would increase executive servitude and its failure would lead to executive despotism.

1. Leon D. Epstein, op. cit., p.37.

2. The Indian Express(New Delhi), 9.4. 1971.

CHAPTER IV

ROLE OF OPPOSITION PARTIES

INTRODUCTION

In a parliamentary democracy like India, the ruling Party is entrusted with the task of governing the country. It presupposes the existence of one or many parties to act as critics and opponents with a possibility of presenting the government with alternative policies. Opposition¹ is of permanent importance in such governments.² It is one of the major factors which affect and influence the formulation and implementation of foreign policy in a democracy. It is inherent in the nature of parliamentary democracy that the Government comes to the House periodically for the endorsement of certain of its policies. It is for the Opposition to see that the policies which the Government is currently following come from under the scrutiny of the House.

-
1. Opposition is derived from the Latin word 'oppositio' which means to oppose. The idea of opposition as an institution is British in origin. H.S.Fatyal, Role of the Opposition in the Indian Parliament, Allahabad, Chaitanya Publishing House, 1965, p. 1.
 2. D. K. Kunta, 'The Role of Opposition and Working in Parliament', Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 26-1-1970. "For democracy to be effective, it is necessary that its legislature should have not only a party in power but that it must have a very powerful opposition". Also see, Lok Sabha Debates, 17 September 1963, Third Series, Vol. XXI, No. 26, Fifth Session, Col. 6566, Smt. Gayatri Devi speaking, "consultation with the opposition specially in terms of national crisis is quite national. It is also a form of assuring continuity in foreign policy in democratic countries". Also see, Ibid., March 15, 1965, Series III, Vol. X, No. 11 Cols. 4293-4, Sri M. C. Chagla speaking 'Government is responsible to Parliament and to the country so is opposition. I do not think parliament can function with out a responsible opposition", also see Ibid., 13-2-1964, Third Series, Vol. XXV, No. 4, Col. 639, Sri Ranga's speech and also Shri Mahata speaking, Ibid., col. 650.

The Opposition exists to filter the policy framed by the Government in power. In a democratic system, the foreign policy decisions of the Government, like other decisions, are tested in the light of public opinion influenced by the political parties, press, filtered through the Parliament and finally approved by the Cabinet.¹ On the whole, the ultimate determination of the national interest by the Government is based on a broad consensus generated by the Opposition. The views of the Opposition as expressed in the House, greatly influence the press and the public opinion and thereby determine the popular reaction towards the ruling party and the Opposition. The existence of parliamentary Opposition as distinct from the ruling authority is one of the essential conditions for the successful working of the parliamentary Government. The foreign policy outlook of the Opposition parties inevitably affects such decision-making, not only because of the role that the latter usually plays in the Parliament but also because of their influence over the political system as a whole. Very often, within the ruling party or parties, the unanimity of opinion may be

1. Bandyopadhyaya, Op.cit., p. 5. Also see, W. H. Morris Jones, Parliament in India, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1957, p. 324 "In the absence of a proper Opposition, with adequate strength and enjoying due recognition, there can be no healthy parliamentary government, for the government will be uncontrolled and unresponsive." Also see the statement by the then Education Minister, M.C.Chagla, ".....it was the duty of the opposition to oppose. I concede that right to opposition It is the duty of opposition to be critical, to be vigilant, to keep the Government on its toes, to see that there is proper administration of this country but the opposition must also have a sense of responsibility." L.S.D., 15 March 1965, col. 4293.

missing on foreign policy issues. It is the task of decision-making which involves articulate balancing of the contrary and contradictory views within the ruling party itself.¹ The role of the Opposition in India during the decade 1952-62 was generally conditioned by the following factors :

1. The Congress enjoyed an unbroken political hegemony at the national level as shown by the following table. The Congress had functioned untill 1947 more as a national movement than a political party and had now the twin advantages of having a galaxy of national leaders at the helm of affairs and also of being the party, which achieved national independence.

2. Believably, Nehru's towering personality at the helm of decision-making was enough to rule out any serious threat to the ruling party by the Opposition. He was an indomitable force whose stature as a leader was unquestioned.

3. The Opposition was insignificant as compared to the overwhelming strength of the Congress with 354 seats out of a total of 486.² The Opposition was unaware of its implied responsibility. It was in the stage of infancy and lacked any strong basis or popularity.

4. There were no abnormal challenges to raise controversies against the ruling party. The Congress had

1. Bandyopadhyaya. op. cit., p. 83.

2. Ibid., p. 84. Also see, Abdul Fazl Usmani, Role of Opposition Parties in Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) 1962-67 (unpublished Thesis, 1970), pp. i & ii.
"It was a period of political calm and continuity which helped the germination of parliamentary system. It also helped the opposition parties to grow and learn the art and science of their role".

LOK SABHA GENERAL ELECTIONS*

PARTY POSITION

P A R T Y	First General Election 25.10.51 - 10.5.52		Second General Election 24.2.57 to 9.6.57		Third General Election 16.2.62 to 6.5.62		Fourth General Election 15.2.67 to 28.2.67		Fifth General Election 1.3.71 to 13.3	
	Seats Con- tested	Seats won	Seats con- tested	Seats won	Seats con- tested	Seats won	Seats con- tested	Seats won	Seats con- tested	Seat won
Congress	469	354	483	366	485	358	452	280	410	350
P.S.P.	400	20	175	18	168	12	110	13	60	2
C.P.I.	69	26	115	29	137	29	101	23	71	23
Jan Sangh	91	3	103	4	196	14	235	36	162	22
Others (Ind.)	946	83	580	71	716	44	670	44	726	43
Swatantra	---	---	---	---	173	18	177	42	60	8
Republican	---	---	---	---	68	3	66	1	46	---
C.P.I. (M)	---	---	---	---	---	---	57	19	50	25
S.S.P.	---	---	---	---	---	---	119	23	89	3
Akali Dal	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	13	1
V.H.P.	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	3	---
Congress (O)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	205	16
Muslim League	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	10	3

*Sham Lal (Ed.), A Times Of India Directory And Yearbook,
including Who's Who, 1971, (Times of India Press, Bombay), p. 837.

longer and more meaningful experience of 'dabbling' in international politics.

During the period, the Opposition parties, both on the left and the right as well as the various Opposition groups within the Congress exercised some influence on the making of foreign policy. Eminent speakers like Masani and Kriplani both applauded and criticised the policy.

When Nehru was there in the House, the Opposition seemed less articulate.¹ After the third General Elections, the Opposition however, became more active and articulate.

Critics of the existence of Opposition feel that it vainly indulges in obstruction tactics due to which so much time of the House is consumed by the procedural debates and privileges motions that it hampers the scheduled business of the House.²

Even till 1963, the single, strong and effective Opposition could not emerge in India to take the responsibility of the Government on its shoulders.³ Moreover, members of the Indian Opposition often used derogatory terms such as shame. Such remarks, by the order of the Speaker, are expunged from the official records of parliamentary debates.⁴

-
1. The Times of India (New Delhi), 21-3-63, "The ease with which the Prime Minister dominates the House on the subject of foreign affairs, is, in part, a tribute to the Opposition's quite remarkable bankruptcy of ideas ... Mr. Nehru therefore had an easy time - he usually does - in demolishing the feeble manoeuvres".
 2. Editorially "On to Parliament", The Hindu (Madras), 28-10-66, The editorial was in reaction to the debates in the House on 28-10-66.
 3. LSD, 20 August 1963, Third Series, Vol. XIX, No. 6, Fifth Session, col. 1655; statement by Smt. Renuka Ray.
 4. Lok Sabha Debates, 23 January 1963, Third Series, Vol. XII, No. 29 (c) V Ed. cols. 5995-5997. Also see, other Lok Sabha Debates in this context.

The Parliament in India abounded in noisy scenes, walk-outs and uproars.

Once Nehru was clarifying the Indian Government's stand over the Colombo Conference Proposals of 1962. Much disturbance was there on the Opposition benches. The Speaker had to pacify them by asking them to remain mute and speak only when they were asked. Referring to such a situation, the Prime Minister Nehru said, "I regret Sir, that this matter which we are discussing, which as the whole House realises is one of the highest importance and not only in the present but for the future also, should be reduced occasionally to a very much lower level by these interruptions".¹

Though, Nehru influenced the course of foreign policy thinking within the party, he could not and did not go very much against the broad consensus of opinion within the Congress Party. His main contribution was to 'harmonize and synthesise the rightist and leftist opinion on foreign policy and bringing them to common focus. His own foreign policy thinking and decision-making, were probably influenced to a considerable extent by the actual and potential reaction of the various Opposition parties to his moves.²

In the United Kingdom the Opposition is privileged to demand discussion on such policies, but in the Lok Sabha one

1. Ibid., col. 5997. In the same debate, when somebody said that in the past Nehru was not so severely interrupted as in 1963, the PSP member Surendra Nath Divedi said, "Interruptions are relevant I do not think that all interruptions are a taboo." col. 5998.

2. Bandyopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 85.

witnesses that such extraordinary discussions rarely occur. Moreover, in our form of democracy where the Government is amenable to the will of the House, it is the main function of the Opposition to see that the Government is allowed to act in the three main fields with detailed examination, analysis and due consent of the House.¹

In India sometimes the working of the Government is hampered by strong criticism. Khadilkar, while speaking over the Colombo Proposals in the Lok Sabha felt that the members of Opposition who participated in the discussion, disclosed that the honourable members from the Opposition have failed to grasp the significance of this move.² Frank Anthony felt that the need of the hour was that the Opposition must present a united front in the House while there was an emergency. This unity must be maximised not only in the House but also in the country. Speaking over the same motion, R.S. Pande felt that in a democratic set up the role of Opposition is as important as that of the ruling party, the Opposition should, as it does in Britain, emerge and come forth with alternative proposals and guidelines. He optimistically expected that a day must dawn when the Opposition would realise its responsibility, endeavouring to remain aloof from the instinct of provocation, election, votes and sentiments, and playing the role of solid and concrete Opposition. For the past, he regretted that the

1. K. D. Kunta, "The Role of Opposition and Working in Parliament", Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 26-1-1970.

2. Lok Sabha Debates, 23 January 1963, Third Series, Vol. XXI, No. 29, (c) V (ed)., col. 6088.

history of Opposition is not upto the expectations. It opposed for the sake of Opposition. Whatever is done by the Prime Minister and decided by the government is criticised and debated by the Opposition parties in the Parliament. The need is to give to the government full support and allegiance in the face of any eventual City. S.M.Banerji felt that the Indian Opposition consisted of reactionary forces.¹

Opposition is the ventilator of grievances. Yashpal Singh, in one of his speeches in the House clarified the role that the Opposition plays or had played. He thinks that the Opposition exists to criticise, not to admire. If the government has constructed a 100 miles road, the Opposition would not applaud it, if the 10 mile road is damaged or left unconstructed the Opposition would highlight the drawback.² In the same vein, Ravindra Varma said, "It is also necessary that the Opposition should not only point its finger at the failures of the government, but place before the House and the country a practical alternative..."³ The DMK Member, Manoharan expressed the role of the Opposition with sympathy rather, when he said that it was the duty of the Opposition to criticise and embarrass the Government. The duty of the Government is to listen. They should

-
1. Ibid., cols. 6070, 6096-7, 6098 and 6131.
 2. Ibid., 25-3-1963, Third Series, Vol. XIII, No. 6, Fourth Session, col. 1112.
 3. Ibid., 19-8-1963, Third Series, Vol. XIX, No. 5, Fifth Session, col. 1331, (Sri Ravindra Varma speaking over the motion regarding lack of confidence in the Nehru's Council of Ministers).

understand problems. While the Government speak, the Opposition should hear, while the Government condemn, the Opposition should search its conscience and if needed, should reform itself. There is absolutely no point in criticising the government for the sake of criticism itself.¹ But usually, the criticism of the Opposition has been less concrete.

The Opposition discharges its function of criticising and assessing the Government through the media of parliamentary processes. The Question-Hour is most important of them. It is the most commonly used device of obtaining information from the Government on various issues involved in foreign affairs and thereby sometimes focus attention on some issue or problem. It is a lively and useful weapon in the hands of Opposition.² The official records of the Parliament are

-
1. Ibid., 20 August 1963, Third Series, Vol. XIX, No. 6, Fifth Session, col. 1637, the same motion. Also see, Lok Sabha Debates, 25 February 1963, Third Series, Vol. XIII, No. 6, Fourth Session (c) V Ed., cols. 1009-10. (Sarojini Maheshi speaking)

Speaking about the acceptance of Colombo proposals and coincidence of Communist Party's siding with us, Sarojini Maheshi said that the friends in Opposition have criticised us severely. "... Perhaps they think that it is the duty of Opposition to oppose every thing said or done in the House by the ruling party. I do not know how many of them are able to realise their duty. Of course it is the duty of opposition to guide the Government properly when it does not go on proper lines. But many of them see to be under the impression that because they are in the opposition ... It is their duty to oppose everything said and done by the ruling party. The behaviour of some opposition party members at the time of the Presidential Address clearly speaks volumes."

2. "The question-hour enables the individual members to obtain information on any particular aspect of working of small Government and thereby turning out the defects, if any, focus the attention of the House and the Government on the deficiencies in any particular area or region or induce to take note of the same." K. D. Kunta, Op. cit., Also see, supra, III Chapter.

replete with relevant or irrelevant questions raised by the Opposition on crucial as well as insignificant matters but the information, if the Government so desires, can be withheld in "public interest".

Debates on Demands for Grants or on Motion regarding international situation and the policy of the Government of India thereof gives another opportunity to the Opposition to investigate and evaluate policy decisions of the Government. Every year the policy is laid down at least twice through the Presidential Addresses, which is subsequently debated, approved or criticised by the motion of thanks on the above mentioned addresses. The Opposition parties voluminously expressed their views whenever such opportunities were made available to them. Some regret that the Opposition, seems to be incapable of any original thinking. It rather confines its attention to the usual platitudinous debating against non-alignment as the chief principle of foreign policy. It is an unprofitable balancing act.¹

The Vote of Non-confidence along with Adjournment Motions is, "the last arrow in the armoury of the Opposition".² When Nehru was alive there was only one such motion as a result of the alleged failure of New Delhi to reach and assess Peking's intentions. The motion was moved on August 19, 1963,

1. N. J. Nanporia, "Renewal of Faith : (Commentary)", The Times of India (New Delhi), 26-8-1963.

2. Lok Sabha Debates, 15 September 1964, Third Series, No. 7, Vol. XXXIII, Ninth Session, col. 1807.
(Smt. Maheshi speaking over the motion of no-confidence)

but it failed miserably. When Shastri was there, two such motions were moved but they were also defeated. These motions, however, served to focus public attention on international issues, though without bringing about any significant change in the policy of the Government of India.

The Opposition parties in India have been divided among themselves on minor and major issues. Very often the Opposition showed interest in confusing the straightforward problems. With regard to the reaction of the Opposition parties on Colombo proposals, A.N.Vidyalankar, the Member of Parliament, felt, that the Opposition parties, "have attempted to sidetrack the issue, to confuse the issue". A lengthy discussion took place over the above mentioned issue but their speeches gave an impression as if the Congress benches were inactive or "paralysed".¹ The unanimity of opinion in Opposition parties is lacking there.

SINO-INDIA BORDER DISPUTE AND THE MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTIES

In the first three Lok Sabhas, the Opposition was neither numerically strong nor sufficiently vocal and the majority party members of the Congress Party in Parliament were happy over the opportunity they got to air their views,

1. Lok Sabha Debates, 23-1-1963, Third Series, Vol. XII, No. 29, (c) V Ed. col. 6393. Also see, Ibid., 20 February 1963, Third Series, Vol. XIII, No. 1, Fourth Session, col. 994, (Vasudevan Nair speaking that the intention of the Opposition is not to criticise the government vainly).

the Government to an appreciable extent started learning to behave strongly.¹ The Opposition's vigilance and role became vociferous after 1962, when China waged an aggression on Indian soils. The general feeling when the 1962 attack took place was, that the Opposition parties consented to every thing that was being done by the Government.² The following critical analysis of the opinions, criticisms and reactions of the major Opposition parties, viz., Communists, Jan Sangh, PSP and Swatantra show their respective roles in Sino-India border dispute and the policy of the ruling party.

The Chinese aggression was a crucial incident for the Communist Party of India. The Communist Party has made up its mind to give up the policy of lying low, which it adopted as a measure of self-protection in the face of the upsurge of anti-communist feeling in the wake of the Chinese aggression.³ An overall analysis of the Party's documents make it obvious that it was difficult to gauge the loyalty of the Communists.⁴ They were at bay to choose between international communism and Indian nationalism. The party was aware of the Congress Party's strong measures and wanted to prove itself a genuine rationalistic party by giving

1. Morris Jones, op. cit., p. 324.

2. Lok Sabha Debates, August 1963, Third Series, Vol. IXIX, No. 5, Fifth Session, col. 1234, statement by J.B.Kriplani over the motion of No-confidence in the Nehru Council of Ministers. Compare the whole-hearted support of the Opposition Party to Indira Government over the recent Bangla Desh issue.

3. Editorially, "Equivocal", The Times of India (New Delhi), 5-7-1973.

4. The Indian Communist Party Documents 1930-56 (1957), pp.47-48.

strong support to the government. The Party avoided statements that may go contrary to the government's avowed and declared views. The meetings and discussions of the Party reveal the differences of opinion within the party over the nature and genesis of border dispute. The Party was put in an unprecedented situation. Since the Party favoured friendly ties with the USSR and China, the Chinese aggression brought a schism in the Party. It was a bolt from the blue for the nation and the unity of the Party. The party equivocally refused to admit that China committed an act of aggression in defiance of international law.¹

The division resulted in the CPI following the Moscow-line and the CPI (M) following the Peking-line. The apparently widening Sino-Soviet rift, the Indian Government's desire to have Russian support, enabled the Indian Communists to support the Indian stand against China. Before 1964, when the official Communist split took place, the CPI constituted the largest Opposition group to Congress in Parliament but when the rift took place, it ceased to be the largest Opposition group in the Parliament and its place was taken over by the Swatantra Party.

1. T. A. Nizami, "The Communist Party and India's Foreign Policy", New Delhi, Associated Publishing House, 1971, p. 231. For the Marxist-Leninist basis of the approach see p. vii. Compare, the statement of the National Council in its eight day session on February 12, 1963, "It is not possible according to the principle of Marxism-Leninism for a Communist Party, specially a ruling party like that of China to raise a border dispute and push it to the point of an armed conflict with a country like India in non-aligned, peace-loving and democratic."

The CPI condemned the chauvinist and expansionist tendencies of China for world domination.¹ In a press conference in New Delhi, on December 16, 1961, the General Secretary of the CPI, Ajoy Ghosh, raised his voice against the Chinese allegation that Indian foreign policy was influenced by American imperialism. He added that the CPI did not agree with the Chinese leaders in their assessment of India's foreign policy and also their attitude towards India.²

In the wake of Chinese aggression, the National Council of the CPI met from October 31 to November 2, 1962, to discuss the situation. On November 1, 1962, a resolution was adopted by a majority vote which condemned China as an aggressor. Its resolution condemned the Chinese aggression and supported the Government of India's stand that negotiations on the border dispute would take place only on the basis of withdrawal of Chinese forces to the position they held before September 8, 1962. The resolution refuted the Chinese claim that the McMahon Line was illegal. It appealed to party units to support all moves taken by the

1. Resolutions of the Central Executive Committee of the CPI, Delhi, September 10-15, 1964, p. 12.

Compare the 1959 view of the Party, when the CPI believed that the "Socialist China can never commit aggression against India". New Age, 4-10-1959, p. 5. Also see, New Age, 22-11-1959, p. 7, where this view is reiterated at the Meerut Session of the National Council, "There is no question of a war between our country and China - A Socialist China - can never think in terms of war against India, just as free India can never think in terms of war against China." Also see New Age, 22-11-1959, p. 7, for the CPI allegation that the rest of the opposition parties along with the Congress are launching a campaign of hatred against China.

2. Times of India (New Delhi), 17-12-1961.

Government to bring about a peaceful settlement. Consistent with the dignity of the nation, the Council attached significance to Nehru's statement if the talks between India and China fail, the Government of India would be prepared to refer the border dispute to the Hague Court.¹ Even in late '61, Ajoy Ghosh declared that if the Chinese crossed the McMahon Line, the CPI would support the Government of India.² All the moves of the CPI in supporting the Government of India, almost unanimously, gave strength to the Government.³

The CPI welcomed Nehru's letter to Chou-En-Lai for easing tension as a step in the direction of negotiations and peaceful settlement. S. A. Dange made clear his party's position in the Lower House declaring that he supported the Prime Minister's letter because, "he sticks to the approach of peaceful negotiations which he has so ably expounded today ... Therefore the position which he has taken is consistent with the basic approach and policies in the matter of foreign relations as pursued by Prime Minister Nehru and the Government of India together."⁴ Despite the

1. Quoted in Nizami, op. cit., p. 231

2. The Times of India (New Delhi), 17-12-61. Also see Ajoy Ghosh, "Communist Answer to Pandit Nehru" New Age, 5-12-64, p. 1, where the party is declared to hail the Panchsheel Agreement as a "Significant landmark in the annals of Asia."

3. J. L. Nehru, We accept China's Challenge, Delhi, 1962, pp. 18-19, Nehru whole-heartedly welcomed this CPI support and decided to make most out of it in gaining unity to repel the Chinese aggression.

4. B.T.Ranadive, "India China Relations", New Age, December 1959, pp. 56-57.

party's support to the Colombo Proposals for their acceptance by the Government of India in toto, it did not believe that it was necessary that China should also do the same and further asked the Government not to make the acceptance of those proposals as the only basis of negotiations.¹ The CPI welcomed the Colombo Proposals and hoped that China would abide by them "without any reservation". It characterised the Communist Party of China as being, "dominated by dogmatist thinking"² The Central Executive of the CPI passed a resolution in Calcutta on September 25, 1959, urging friendly negotiations for the settlement of the Sino-India border dispute. It consumed considerable time of the party to reach at this final decision.³

In the beginning, the CPI members like Dange did not expect that there could be any invasion from the Chinese side.⁴ Later on the wing led by P.C.Joshi and S.A.Dange, supported Nehru's stand totally as opposed to the group led by B.T. Ranadive supporting China and denouncing India's stand in Tibet. As a result of this, the 101 member National Council of the CPI met in Meerut on November 10, 1959 supporting the

-
1. Lok Sabha Debates, 24 January 1963, Third Series, Vol. XII, No. 30, cols. 6248-54. Statement by Renu Chakravarti.
 2. Statesman (New Delhi), 13-2-1963.
 3. Statesman (New Delhi), 27-9-1959.
 4. Lok Sabha Debates, 12 September 1959, Vol. XXXIV, No. 31, VIII Session, cols. 8029-36.(S.A. Dange speaking over the "White Paper on Indo-Chinese Relations").

Government of India stand that the traditional border in Ladakh should be accepted by China.¹ Following the policy of peace, the CPI favoured negotiations to settle the border dispute after Ladakh incident.²

The Jan Sangh is another party in Parliament which gives vent to its reactions quite vehemently. The Sangh considered China as one of the two enemies of India,³ and is somewhat critical of the policy the Government of India followed in regard to China.⁴ But so far as the Colombo Proposals were concerned, the Jan Sangh totally supported the Parliament's resolution of November 14, 1963. It regreted the Government of India to have rejected the proposals.⁵ Bachhraj Vyas declared that the policy from the beginning has been unrealistic and based on appeasement. In one of the Resolutions the policy of the Government of India has been declared inappropriate. It also criticised the policy for keeping the Parliament in dark ; "by calculatedly keeping the Parliament and the people entirely in the dark in respect of China's misdeeds on the one hand,

1. News Item, The Statesman, (New Delhi), 15-11-1959. For the support the CPI gave to the Government from time to time, Also see, The Statesman (New Delhi), 18-1-1963, News Item, Times of India (New Delhi), 16-4-1963, accusing China of strengthening, "the very forces which do not desire a peaceful settlement". Also see, news item, The Statesman (New Delhi), 2-11-1962, which supported Nehru's stirring appeal for national unity in defence of the country".
2. Lok Sabha Debates, 15 February 1960, Second Series, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 6, cols. 1015-6. Also see, Vol. XXXII, No. 27-28, December 1959, Cols. 6670-1, (Statement by Hiren Mukerjee)
3. Principles and Policy of BJS adopted by the Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha of the Party at Vijayawada, January 25 & 26, 1965.
4. Bachhraj Vyas, Presidential address, at the Twelfth Plenary Session of the BJS, Vijayawada, January 23-24, 1965, p. 18.
5. Ibid., p. 19.

and, on the other, by allowing the people to be lulled into a false sense of security by chanting Panchsheel mantras, the Government has verily been guilty of a lapse, which in any other democratic country may have been objected India's China policy has been a complete and dismal failure".¹

To Sangh leadership, the idea of taking the border question to the International Court after India had declared China an aggressor, was ridiculous. The continuance of diplomatic ties was all the more irrelevant. To them the attitude of the Government of India likewise encouraged the enemy, confused the public mind and deprived our policies of clarity of purpose. To deal with the Chinese aggression, the Sangh formulated a 6-point programme.² The Sangh always disliked the efforts the Indian Government made to facilitate the admission of China in the UN.³

The main accusation that the Sangh has levelled against the Government is that it has failed to have helped Tibet in 1950, when the expansionist Peking-administration forcibly occupied it.⁴ India should have rather endeavoured to save Tibet from that undesirable and un-welcome 'rape'. The Sangh

1. Resolutions of the Eight Annual Session of the BJS, Nagpur, January 23-25, 1960.

2. For details see, Resolutions passed at the Tenth All-India Session of the BJS, Bhopal, December 20-31, 1962. Also see, News Item, The Statesman (New Delhi), 3-7-1967, when the Sangh has demanded disruption of diplomatic ties with China.

3. Editorially, Organiser, 19 (8), October 13, 1965, p. 3.

4. Raghuwira, Presidential Address, at the Tenth Annual Session of the BJS, Bhopal, December, 1962.

is also vehemently critical of the Government of India for having signed the Panchsheel, which to some was an immortal treaty.¹

The Sangh is also opposed to the acceptance of the Colombo-Proposals. The Working Committee of the Sangh regretted that the Colombo Conference bypassed the issue of aggression and tried to establish parity between the aggressor, China, and the aggressed, India.²

The Swatantra Party that gained momentum in 1959, was highly critical of the Government's policy. It wanted to 'rectify the unfortunate impression' created in the world that India had a 'bias in favour of Communist bloc'. It was against the policy of non-alignment and advocated an alliance with the West most vigorously since the Sino-India border conflict in October-November 1962. As. N. G. Ranga felt that non-alignment has weakened India and failed her to obtain foreign aid.³

The Swatantra Party arrived on political scene when the period of Sino-India friendship was over and relations had begun to deteriorate, the first foreign policy problem to be tackled by the party was the border conflict with China. The Party felt that China is a greater menace to India than

1. The Statesman (New Delhi), 1-7-1967, (Statement by S.C. Goyal). Also see, editorially, Organiser, October 10, 1965. Also see, Resolutions of the Eighth Annual Session of the BJS, op. cit.
2. Resolutions of the Emergent Working Committee of the BJS, Bhopal, January 19, & 20, 1963, BJS Central Office, Delhi.
3. The Statesman (New Delhi), 17-12-1964. The Party insisted that non-alignment is 'masterly inactivity' and 'splendid isolation' must be replaced by alignment with the West.

Pakistan and non-alignment should be given up as a reaction to the expansionist trend of Peking policy. The first National Convention of the party (March, 1960) adopted a resolution on Tibet, expressing the views of the party on the cruel fate that has befallen on a nation of peace-loving people at the hands of aggressive and imperialist communism,¹ and affirmed that a firm and vigilant policy should be followed to deal with the Chinese communist aggression against India.²

The Party's views on Tibet mirrored reactions of the Jan Sangh. In line with Tibet, it also felt that Tibet should not be treated as an internal affair of China. Its leaders felt that the Tibetan question should be raised in the UN.³

The Party denounced the talks between the Prime Minister of India and China, and demanded severance of diplomatic ties with China and stoppage of sponsoring China's admission to the UN.⁴

The Government's China policy was characterised as a policy of complacency and appeasement. The Party wanted the Government to follow a policy of firmness and determination.⁵

1. Swatantra Party, First National Convention, Patna, March, 1960, Bombay, 1960, p. 85.

2. Ibid., p. 62.

3. Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series, Vol. XLVII, No. 31, August 31, 1960, cols. 5995-64 Statement by N.G. Ranga, "The whole story of relations between China and Tibet and India proves that it cannot be treated as an internal problem of China. We should help Tibet to continue to remain free.")

4. Lok Sabha Debates, December 7, 1961, Third Series, Vol. 9, No. 20, col. 3879, M. R. Masani, the General Secretary of the Party, said "there can be no negotiation until foreign outposts which are an act of aggression, are first removed."

5. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. VI, No. 20,

After the Chinese invasion, the party got a golden opportunity to expose the so-called weakness of the Government's policy. The Parliamentary Board of the Party called for the adoption of a defence strategy by which the initiative might pass to Indian hands. In order to secure assistance from the world organisation, the Party stressed the need of taking the Sino-Indian dispute to the UN. Anyhow, the Board applauded the spontaneous, prompt and generous manner, in which the United States, Britain, Canada and other countries came to India's assistance.¹

The Party unequivocally blamed the Government for its military unpreparedness to defend its northern frontiers. It wanted that the Government should give a pro-Western orientation to foreign policy. Even since its formation, the Swatantra Party advocated alliance with the West. While all the other parties maintained that non-alignment be followed in the wake of Chinese aggression, the Swatantra alone wanted the Government to discard it. While speaking in the Parliament, Ranga expressed his resentment against the policy of non-alignment which failed to serve our purpose. He said, "the sooner we get rid of it, the better; the sooner we turn our back to it, the better."²

When the question of the Chinese cease-fire was being discussed, the Swatantra leaders sponsored a substitute motion

August 13, 1962, cols. 1497-1506, (statement by Shri P. K. Deo, the leader of the Party in the Lok Sabha).

1. "Call for change in Foreign Policy", Swarajya, 1711, 62, p. 10.
2. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. IX, No. 2, 8 November, 1962, col. 159.

in the Lower House, which favoured the refusal to negotiate till the Chinese communists withdrew from the Indian territory and secured massive military aid from all friendly countries.¹

The party felt that the Colombo-Proposals were the, "deceptive mirage to lure the Indian people from their high resolve, to counter the splendid solidarity and fortitude of this country and to dampen the spontaneous upsurge that has been seen in this country." The proposals were viewed as a, "treacherous trap to humiliate us".²

Since the Party wanted a complete rejection of the Colombo-Proposals, N. G. Ranga said, "I do not consider these proposals to be honourable or fair to us ... If we were to accept these Colombo-Proposals, we would be dishonouring, disfiguring, discrediting our country ... "³ On February 10, 1963, the General Council passed a resolution that these proposals were "contrary to the national interest and national self-respect and inconsistent with the solemn resolve unanimously announced by Parliament on 14th November, 1962". On the whole, the party's attitude towards China was more influenced by, "its attraction towards West than its opposition to Communism."⁴

-
1. Swatantra Party, General Secretary Report, Third National Convention, Bangalore, 1964, p. 26.
 2. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vols. X - XI, No. 25, December 10, 1962, cols. 5112-13. Sri P. K. Deo speaking.
 3. Swatantra Newsletter, op. cit., p. 4.
 4. K. Raman Pillai, India Foreign Policy : Basic Issues and Political Attitudes, Meerut, Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969, p. 145.

The PSP was basically soft on the Socialist China. It strove for friendship between the two countries of Asia and advocated the admission of Communist China to the UN. However, the Tibetan-episode brought a shift in its attitude. The National Executive of the party commented : "an attempt to justify the invasion of 8 Lakh square miles of territory on the basis of sovereign rights which are as doubtful and untenable as they are imperialists is an irony of which no modern Government should have been thought capable. The people of Tibet alone may decide in a free vote or plebiscite their form of government or of alliance with the outside world."¹

Acharya Kirpalani, the PSP leader, severely attacked Nehru's approach to the Tibetan question, "The plea is that China had the ancient right of suzerainty. This right was out of date, old and antiquated I consider this as much a colonial aggression on the part of China as any colonial aggression indulged in by Western nations China's occupation of Tibet is a deliberate act of aggression."² Consequently, the PSP considered the Panchsheel Agreement as a surrender of India's rights in Tibet.³ The Party's

-
1. Socialist Party of India, 'Himalayan Policy for India', Bombay, 1951, p. 20. The party urged the Indian people to assist the Tibetan people maintaining their independence and evolving a policy of socialism.
 2. Lok Sabha Debates, 21 May 1954, Vol. 5, part II, No. 5, col. 7548.
 3. Ibid., 19 August 1958, Vol. XVII, No. 22, col. 1676, Acharya Kripalani said, "This great doctrine (Panchsheel) was born in sin ... sin because it was enunciated to put seal of our approval upon the destruction of an ancient nation which was associated with us spiritually and culturally." Also see, "Red Imperialism in Tibet", Janata (New Delhi), 29 March 1959, p. 3. Statement of N.G. Goray, the General Secretary of the party. Also see, PSP Resolutions passed at the meeting of the National Executive

CONTD.

attitude towards the Tibetan issue was consistent with its ideal of 'freedom of nations'.

About the general policy that the Government of India followed with regard to China, the Party blamed it as one of 'appeasement' and proposed a 'tougher attitude'. Still the PSP extended its full support to the Government to meet the unhappy situation created by the Chinese aggression, though warning against following a weak-kneed policy. After the Chinese invasion, the party adopted a resolution which demanded that the Government should insist upon an immediate vacation of wrongly held Indian areas. The Party also had a strong faith in the validity of the McMahon Line as a border line and its acceptance by China as a prerequisite for negotiations with China.¹

The year 1962 marked a shift in the rather soft PSP attitude towards Communist China. It condemned China as guilty of deliberate unprovoked aggression against a loyal friend and gave full support to the efforts of the Government. Immediately after the massive aggression, the PSP leaders met Nehru on October 21, 1962 and discussed the border situation with him. They insisted that a special session of the Parliament be summoned. Consequently, the Parliament met before it was scheduled to meet. Ashoka Mehta, the

New Delhi, April 1959, Janata, 26-4-1959, which favour the Tibetan people's rights of self-determination.

1. News Item, Janata (New Delhi), 22 November 1959, p. 16.

PSP leader suggested to sink the party-wise differences and make a common cause with the Government to fight the Chinese menace.¹ H. V. Kamath, Deputy Leader of the Party in the Lok Sabha, said, "We want every inch of our territory should^{be}/cleared of the last Chinese soldier ... The Himalays are not today a physical barrier ... They are an ideological frontier between democracy and communism...."²

The PSP was totally against the Chinese Premier, Chou-En-Lai's visit to India in April 1960. The Party proposed rallies and demonstration in its bid, not to welcome Chou and demanded the vacation of aggression in Ladakh, Longju and recognition of the McMahon Line.³

Except the CPI, all the Opposition parties demanded firm action. Almost all the parties were unanimous that the vacation of territory should precede negotiations. This united demand of the Opposition, made it difficult for the Prime Minister to negotiate freely with the Chinese Premier in 1960.

The PSP whole-heartedly endorsed the Prime Minister's resolution, regarding the Proclamation of Emergency and aggression

1. Janata, 28-10-1962, p. 3

2. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. IX, No. 2, November 9, 1962, cols. 390-1.

3. Janata, 27 March 1960, p. 12. Also see, "M.Ps., caution on Frontier Discussion", Janata, 10 April 1960, p. 4, for the famous PSP demand in coalition with the other opposition parties, not to 'surrender' land. Also see, Pillai, op. cit., p. 135. In July 1962, the PSP members of Parliament in a letter to the Prime Minister Nehru requisitioned an emergency session of Parliament to discuss the deteriorating situation in Ladakh.

by China. The unilateral ceasefire by China and the so-called peace proposals, were only part of Chinese strategy to weaken and paralyse India's will to resist aggression.¹

The Party was clear about its belief in non-alignment, as the best policy. The aggression did not, for a moment affect their non-alignment policy.²

The Party refused to accept the Colombo-Proposals. Speaking in the Lok Sabha, S. N. Dwivedi said, "I feel the Colombo-proposals were dangerous in their implications and disastrous in their consequences for the country, politically and militarily, they were advantageous and favourable to our enemy."³

Consequently, February 10, 1963 was observed as 'Anti-Compromise Day'. The Resolution adopted by the National Executive said that the Colombo-Proposals were an effort in equating the aggressor with the victim of aggression whereas the aggressor is allowed to taste the fruits of aggression.⁴

1. Ashoka Mehta, 'Fraudulent Peace', Janata, 2 December 1962, p. 30, that "the Chinese proposals are not just tricky but fraudulent."
2. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. X, No. 2, December 10, 1962, col. 5134, (S. N. Dwivedi speaking).
3. Ibid., 23 January 1963, Vol. XII, No. 23, Third Series, cols. 6046-50, (S. N. Dwivedi speaking).
4. Resolution adopted by the National Executive, Janata, 10-2-1963, p. 11. The Resolution passed at the National Conference, Bhopal (1963) asked the Government to resign for its military unpreparedness.

While the Party strongly held the validity of non-alignment with the Power blocks, it made it clear in 1962 that the policy was not applicable, in the case of relations with China.¹ Non-alignment remained a sacred dogma with the PSP like the Congress.

Even the Andhra Pradesh PSP's Executive which met on February 25, 1962, declared that the Colombo-Proposals were unacceptable and dangerous. It said, "the Six nations that met at Colombo instead of condemning China for illegal occupation of Indian territory had indirectly lent their seal of approval to the aggression by asking India to allow it to retain large parts of Indian territory under its exclusive control and also to agree to have a joint civil administration over some of the other illegally occupied Indian areas."² In the same vein, Nath Pai asserted in Parliament - "if we are asked to succumb to such proposals that will mark the disintegration of this country and if India disintegrated, there may not really be such a thing in Asia. It will only be larger China."³

In India, after 1962, when the Congress started waning in influence, Nehru passed away, a few parties emerged with more strength and improved status, the role that the Opposition played, gained momentum. This period heralded an era of

1. Pillai, op. cit., p. 137.

2. Janata, March 10, 1963, p. 8. Also see Ibid., p. 2.

3. Janata, 31-3-1963, p. 6. Also see Ibid., Sri Hem Barua speaking in the Lok Sabha, "By our acceptance of the Colombo Proposals we have made a departed cease-fire line into a de jure line. This is defacto appeasement."

great political significance. It provided the acid test for the effectiveness of the ruling party and the effectiveness of the Opposition parties playing their role with caution and sagacity. During this period few significant political changes occurred :

1. The Opposition became more cautious and vigilant in the wake of unabashed Chinese aggression. The Opposition parties received it as a bolt from the blue and the ruling party lost faith in the unforeseen shallowness of the Panchsheel as a doctrine of mutual understanding between India and China.

2. The effect of the role which the Opposition can play was marred when the emergency was declared in 1962 and continued till 1968. It was accepted by the Opposition parties as a despotic measure by which the ruling party misused the political power.

3. The Congress suffered a set-back, when Nehru expired in May 1964 as there was no comparable leader to take his place. The Opposition had been weak and divided when Nehru was there at the helm of affairs. After his death the Opposition became more articulate and clamorous.

4. Anti-Congressism gained momentum in the country because of the failure of the Government of India to face the Chinese menace effectively. The structure of the political parties also changed. The CPI split was an obvious result of Chinese aggression. The two socialist parties merged into one Samyukta Socialist Party in 1964 only to part company in 1965.

5. The Swatantra Party now emerged as a formidable force. In the third General Elections it was next to CPI gaining 18 seats as against 29 of the CPI,¹ the most determined group in Parliament.

These factors and forces were, by no means, inconsequential and the political edifice of India, so laboriously built, was put to severe test. During 1962-67, the Opposition assumed a greater significance. Their criticism or condemnation of the broad policy orientations of the Government and their own ideology and policies were to act as a balancing factor to the programmes of the ruling Party. The Opposition is required to play its role more effectively during this period than ever before.

On the whole, the vigilance of an Opposition which sometimes, may be inconvenient to the Government, is essential for the survival of parliamentary life as such. The debate that was held during September 1964, is an outstanding instance how the Opposition in Parliament contributes to the integrity of public life and to the correction of Government.² The above mentioned motion ended in asserting confidence in the Government when 307 Members voted in favour of confidence and 50 voted for lack of confidence in Nehru's Council of Ministers.³

1. Sham Lal, op. cit., p. 837.

2. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. XXXIII, No. 9, Ninth Session, col. 2290, (concluding speech by V.K. Krishna Menon on the vote of no-confidence motion).

3. Ibid.

Hence the emergence of more mature Opposition after 1962 is a healthy sign for the success of parliamentary democracy. The responsibility of parliamentary process has to be shared by all participants. Speedy emergence of a mature, full-fledged Opposition in Parliament would indeed be an asset, not a hardship to the Government,¹ but it has not reached its peak. Even during ^{the} worst crisis in Britain, the Opposition has not been as vehemently critical of the Government as it has been in India during Sino-Indian border crisis. In India, occasionally, the criticism has been ludicrous.² When a vote of no-Confidence was adopted against the Government in 1963, Bhagwat Jha Azad cited a statement from the Statesman, while speaking in the Lok Sabha, "the Opposition parties could not select for their attack any single act of the Government or its policy. Instead, they presented a blank form of no-confidence, leaving each party to fill up the blank as it liked. That is how they have come to this House and to this country with a vote of no-confidence".³

To some extent the role of Indian Opposition did not reach upto the mark. Somehow, it failed to enable the Government to see reason where the Government failed and convince the Government to be on the right.⁴ If the

1. Editorially, "The Other Half", Tribune (Ambala), 19-5-1970.

2. Lok Sabha Debates, 17-9-1963, Third Series, Vol. XXI. Mo.26, Fifth Session, Col. 6570, (Srimati Gayatri Devi speaking).

3. Ibid., 21 August 1963, Third Series, Vol. XIX, No. 7, Fifth Session, cols. 1812-13.

4. Ibid., col. 1918. (Statement by the Finance Minister, Morarji Desai, while concluding the debate on the motion of no-confidence).

Opposition discharges its expected duties, it can embetter the functioning of the Government, establishing the practice of periodical appraisal of government policies under different ministries through a debate raised for the same.¹

The speeches of the Opposition, full of zeal and zest, helped in raising the morals of the people and the army.² But very often the Opposition itself has challenged its existence.³ Such stands affirm that the Opposition was not united and organised as is a prerequisite for a successful parliamentary democracy.

One cannot agree that the Opposition Parties did not play any role in influencing the Government. As expected, the party bosses were often found ready with their relevant suggestions. It depends on the flexibility of the Government how far it is sensitive to such proposals. Bishan Chandra Seth put forth a list of 9 suggestions as a guideline to the Ministry of External Affairs.⁴ It is desirable that the Government should remain sensitive to the points and arguments raised by Opposition.⁵

1. K. D. Kunta, op. cit.
2. Lok Sabha Debates, 24 January 1963, Third Series, Vol. XII, No. 30, Third Series, (C) V. (ed), col. 6304, (Speech by Tayagi).
3. Ibid., col. 6247. Statement by Smt. Renu Chakravarti. She further added, "What is the aim of such parties as the Swatantra, Jan Sangh and even the Praja Socialists. They try to demoralise India."
4. Lok Sabha Debates, 11 April 1964, Third Series, (C) V. (ed), Vol. XXIX, No. 48, cols. 10581-83. Bishan Chandra Seth speaking on the demands for Grants of the Ministry of External Affairs. Also see, Lok Sabha Debates, 16 September, 1964, Third Series, Vol. XXXIII, No. 8, Ninth Session, Cols 2025. (P. G. Menon's statement that the Opposition must be ready with alternatives and counter suggestions.
5. Ibid., 14 September, 1964, Third Series, Vol. XXXIII, No. 6, CONTD.

It is suggested, however, that Nehru did not have any regular practice of consultations with leaders of the Opposition. It was during the Chinese aggression, however, that this practice was introduced. He used to call for consultation about eight senior members of Opposition. In spite of the overwhelming dominance of the Congress Party, often a single effective speaker made a dent on Government policies. Thus during the crisis of Chinese aggression, the powerful opposition speeches did play a major role in securing expulsion of Menon as the Defence Minister. When Shastri became the Prime Minister, the Congress was somewhat in a better position in Parliament. Shastri was most particular about consulting the Opposition during the 1965 India-Pakistan war, he had a special genius for evolving a consensus even from the most desperate of political elements, both in Parliament and outside. His was a pragmatic approach, not overburdened with cliques and slogans of idealogue.¹ His approach was different on account of his realisation of his weakness as a leader to succeed indomitable Nehru.

When the period of Congress hegemony was over and split within the Congress took place, there appeared a 'visible trend towards the growth of a more complex political system in the country', the role that the Opposition can play has become more critical.² Consequently, the Congress split,

. . Ninth Session, col. 1535, (Harish Chandra Mathur speaking over the motion regarding No-confidence).

1. Frank Anthony, "Recent Changes in Our Parliamentary Scene", The Times of India (New Delhi), 26-1-1970.

2. Bandyopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 84.

however, represented inevitably an unprecedented political catalyst. The ruling party was now in a minority, while a formal coalition has not, so far, become imperative, inevitably there was a greater liaison between Government and certain Opposition groups within the Parliament.¹

Criticism of Nehru's China policy mounted after 1961. In this period Nehru appeared as a prisoner of his own critics. Mostly the Opposition parties followed a nationalist-line except the CPI, which only in the beginning was critical of his Tibet policy. Later on, only Swatantra proclaimed an alternative policy aimed at bringing India closer to the West.

However, it should not mean that there are no prospects for developing a strong democratic Opposition. The following measures may be conducive to give rise to effective Opposition in the Indian body-politik.

The Opposition Parties should reorganise their electoral system making it less expensive and more clear. They should publish their manifestoes and party mandates in all languages. They should develop a method through which corruption, red-tapism and indiscipline could be eradicated. They should set examples of sincerity of work, integrity of policy and honesty of purpose. The Opposition parties should increase their membership and produce more eligible leaders. The past General Elections indicate that the Opposition suffered

1. The Times of India (New Delhi), 26-1-1970.

owing to scarcity of members whereas there was an abundance of candidates for the Congress Candidature.

The parties should endeavour to bridge their differences so as to obtain an effective and close-knit electoral-alliance. They should avoid and curb the defection-tendencies and encourage dedication and responsibility. Such an amalgamation of Opposition is ^{one}/of the keys to the emergence of more mature and balanced Opposition.

The political parties which are organised on the basis of caste, religion, regional and linguistic affinities should be banned. The number of parties should be curtailed so as to give rise to a single organised Opposition party. In India, there are too many, ineffective and insignificant political parties who do not coalesce for the fear of losing their separate identity. A single, two or three Opposition parties should be accorded legal recognition. There ought to be more consultations between the Government (the party-in-power) and the Opposition Parties. The latter should remain ready with an alternate Government.

CHAPTER V

SINO-INDIA RELATIONS AND THE BORDER-DISPUTE

INTRODUCTION:

Communist China has emerged out of a cruel, armed and long drawn revolution.¹ India happened to be its adjacent neighbour. The two countries have got common border hence the dispute over the same. Nehru professed the policy of amicable settlement of disputes so he exhausted all means with regard to Sino-India border dispute. The Chinese mode of life, Mao's ideology and methods and open cloak and dagger diplomacy,² have provided ample evidence of their disregard of pacific measures. India and China have been friendly countries even before they emerged as sovereign countries.³ They had cultural contacts, trade-relations and commercial ties. India had complete faith in the Chinese proclamation of 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai',⁴ which proved hallow later on. The leaders of these

-
1. Romesh Thaper, 'The Problem.', The Seminar No. 45, May 1963, p. 10.
 2. S.L. Poplai, "Foreign Affairs Reports", New Delhi, Indian Council of World Affairs, Vol. XII, No. I, Jan. 1, 1963, p. 1.
 3. ".... the history of India is a long history of her relation with the other countries of Asia" and among them, "an important place should be assigned to China- one of the oldest of civilizations, though among the youngest of nations in the Western sense, and now a growing force..." The Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 17.7.60. Also see, Hindustan Standard, 24.4.60, article by Trilok Karni, "Sino-India Relations: An Analysis".
 4. Letter to the Editor, "Policy of Drift must stop", The Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 25.11.61 with this tactic, Peking kept India in the dark and misled by wishy-washy slogans of 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai'.

two countries used to go into raptures over the 5,000 years old Sino-India friendship. It was believed that the cultural ties that existed between these two countries ruled out the possibility of a major conflict between them but later it was realised that the much talked about, century-old Sino-India amity was nothing but a myth.¹ When the Communist China came into existence, India was the first country to recognise it on December 30, 1949, within three months of its establishment. Nehru, during his visit to Britain and America in 1949, pleaded both the governments to accord recognition to it. India had quite vociferously pleaded in the UN to give China, a permanent footing.²

India's policy of soft-paddling with China could not succeed. They claim to be a democratic people and society, whereas, they had no experience of democracy of any kind—the liberal-western, emerging-Eastern, limited-czarist, new or old Soviet.

The era of Sino-India friendship commences with the signing of the Treaty of 1954,³ through which both the states

-
1. R. Prabha, "Sino-Indian friendship a myth", Sunday Standard, (New Delhi), 12.5.1963
 2. The Seminar, op. cit., p. 10. In 1971, China is given seat in the U.N.O. Also see, in a letter to Nehru, Chau-en-lai, expressed his thanks to the Indian Government for its efforts at the 13th session of the United Nations General Assembly for restoring to China its rightful place in the United Nations, White Paper, No. I, p. 52.
 3. News item, The Guardian (Manchester), 2.6.62. In 1954, Chau-en-lai, the Chinese Premier and J.L. Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister signed the Sino-Indian Treaty on Trade with Tibet. The treaty outlined a set pattern of friendly

Contd...

pledged to live in peace, enlarge the area of peace and work on anti-colonial lines. In 1959, incursions, both minor and major started to occur, it was realised in the Indian Parliament that the Chinese assurances of their faith in the Panchsheel, lulled India into a false sense of security.¹ In 1961, these doctrines appeared sham and dead as dodo to the Chinese.² The Chinese admitted that the Panchsheel was a mere tool of foreign policy then. It did not constitute an abiding basis of their foreign policy. This was proclaimed openly in the episode relating to the dismissal of Chang-Weentain, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was denounced as the opportunist

(Continued from the previous page)

relations, the famous 5 principles, termed as Panch Sheel; "The Preamble of..... the Agreement declared...

1. Mutual respect for each others' territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Mutual non-aggression;
3. Mutual-non-interference in each others internal affairs;
4. Equality and mutual benefit;
5. Peaceful co-existence". The Panchsheel was to form the basis of India's policy not only towards China but also towards other countries.

1. Lok Sabha Debates, November 26, 1959, Vol. XXXV, No.9 Col. 1989. (statement by Karni Singhji).
2. Editorially, "Dead as a Dodo", The Indian Express (New Delhi), 2.12.61.

having propagated the erroneous view of peaceful co-existence in accordance with the Five Principles and Bandung as the basis of China's foreign policy.¹

Nehru is often criticised to have been led astray by the Chinese designs of cordiality. Openly, Nehru appeared to be misled by Chinese friendly gestures but he was apprehensive of malignancy. There was a gap between his public utterance and innermost feeling. He was dubious of their faith in co-existence. As early as in 1954, in an interview to Taya Zinkin, Nehru said, "Whether they believe in coexistence or not I cannot say. They pretend they do, and I must try to make them get more and more involved in acting as if they believed in it".² This was Nehru's innermost fear which he expressed privately, whereas in public Nehru never looked dubious of the Chinese policies.

THE MC MAHON LINE AND THE SIMLA CONFERENCE:

The north-eastern border of India that demarcates the territories of India and China, is traditionally known as the Mc Mahon Line. It was clearly drawn in 1913-14, with full cooperation and consent of India, China and Tibet. There was no doubt that the Mc Mahon Line (so called after Mc Mahon, the British representative at the conference) merely confirmed

-
1. M.L. Sondhi, "Indian Foreign Policy in a multi-polar world", The Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 2.12.61.
 2. Taya Zinkin, Reporting India, London, Chatto, 1962, p. 208.

the natural, traditional, ethnic and administrative boundary in the area.¹ No boundary in the world have been as free from dispute, so well established by tradition, so free from dispute and administration, as the India-China boundary.² But the Chinese have deliberately challenged the legality of border settlement through this customary line. The first attempt, by the Chinese to open the question of the delimitation of Sino-Indian boundary was made in a letter by Chou-En-lai, dated January 23, 1959, in response to Nehru's letter dated December 14, 1958. Chou-En-lai challenged that the boundary has never been delimited and also, "no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian boundary has ever been concluded."³ According to

-
1. Sino-Indian Border Problem, External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 26.2.1962, p. 1. Also see, Neville Maxwell, India's China War, Bombay, Jaico Publishing House, 1971, p.107, "The Mc Mahon Line, of course, has never been demarcated (whether the Anglo-Tibetan notes exchanged in 1914 amount to the legal delimitation (*italics*) is disputed between India and China, but that the line has never been demarcated-i.e. marked out on the ground is agreed by both parties)."
 2. K. Gopaldaswami, "India China Boundary Question". International Studies, Vol. V, July 63.- April 64, p.15
 3. White Paper, No. 1, p.52. "Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited". From 1954 to 1968, the Government of India and Peking published XIV, White Papers which contained the Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged between the two governments. It is said, "A wrangling exchange of notes between Delhi and Peking has brought the two governments only to unequivocal and barely civil restatements of their opposed and deadlocked positions", The Times (London), 8.8. 1961.

Chou, the entire unsettled border was negotiable. Chou-En-lai gave certain justifications to undo the already negotiated border. He said that the conditions for its settlement were not yet ripe then and the Chinese Government had no time to study the question. India reiterated its stand that the entire boundary was settled by custom and treaties.¹ The Indian Government, maintained that the Mc Mahon Line was absolute, clear and infragile, and even marginal incursions by the Chinese would not be resisted.² In fact, the entire length of this border had been, "either defined by treaty or recognised by customs or by both and until the present controversy, no Chinese Government had ever protested against the exercise of jurisdiction by the Government of India upto the customary border".³

In the meantime, the political situation in Tibet was fast deteriorating. On March 31, 1959, the Dalai Lama along with his party entered India and asked for political asylum, which was subsequently granted to him. This act of India was

-
1. "The traditional border has been known from centuries. It follows the geographical principle of the watershed which is in most places the crest of Himalayan mountains. Moreover, in most parts the boundary has the Sanction of specific international agreements". India-China Border Problem, op., cit., p. 1.
 2. Maxwell, op. cit., p. 301.
 3. India-China Border Problem, op., cit., p. 7.

perfectly in conformity with the rules of international-law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights- 1948.¹ This greatly enraged China and in retaliation, Chou in his letter of September 1959,² challenged the entire basis of the Mc Mahon Line.³ Chou argued that this matter was not on the agenda of the Simla-Conference of 1913-14. Though the official publications of the External Affairs Ministry, Government of India, it was maintained that, in the north-east, the traditional boundary was decided at a Tripartite Conference, held in Simla from October 1913 to July 1914, attended by the representatives of the governments of British India, Tibet and China.⁴ The correspondence between the British and Tibetan governments was kept confidential. In their Annexure to the Note of the Indian Government dated November 4, 1959, the Chinese government said, "the so called Mc Mahon Line was never discussed at the Simla Conference, but was determined by the British representative and the representative of the Tibet local authorities behind the back of the representative of the Chinese Central Government through an exchange of secret notes at Delhi on March 24, 1914, that is, prior to the signing of Simla Treaty". The note ended in a definite

1. Quoted in Indian Note of 26.4. 1959, White Paper No.1, p. 68.

2. The White Paper No.1, is often labelled as rather undiplomatic, Maxwell, op., cit., p. 106

3. Biswanath Singh, "Legality of the Mc Mahon Line", The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XXVIII, January- June 1967, No.1, p. 163.

4. The India-China Border Problem, op., cit., p. 1.

proclamation by Peking as to them, "The so called Mc Mahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China and has never been recognised by any Chinese Central Government and is decidedly illegal".¹ This stand of the Chinese Government was, however, regretted by Nehru in his letter to Chou, dated September 26, 1959. In the same letter the Government of India categorically held that, "the Mc Mahon Line was not an arbitrary imposition on a weak Tibet", and "It formalised the natural, traditional, ethnic and administrative boundary in the area."² Through a letter, Chou laid claims to large portions of Indian territory,³ but the Chinese logic in challenging the legality of the line was both factually incorrect and legally irrelevant.⁴ On August 28, 1961, the Executive Committee of the Afro-Asian Council strongly upheld the natural, historical and legal validity of the Indian position, with regard to her border dispute with China and hoped that the parties concerned would resort to negotiation as a pacific method to solve their dispute.⁵

1. White Paper, No.1, Vol. II, p. 29

2. Ibid., p. 38.

3. Biswanath Singh, op. cit., p. 163

4. Ibid., p. 164.

5. The National Herald (Lucknow), 30.8.1961.

In the Simla Conference of 1913-14, the relevant question of Indo-Tibetan boundary was discussed at large and at length. The decision was agreeable to Tibet also, which was participating as an independent member. China then had accepted the capacity of Tibet to conclude treaties with Britain and China,¹ on equal footing. The British and Tibetan plenipotenciaries exchanged notes regarding this line on March 24-25, 1914. The Indian Prime Minister Nehru, in one of his letters to the Chinese Premier, dated March 22, 1959, pointed out that this line was drawn after full discussion and confirmed subsequently by a formal exchange of letters. There was nothing to indicate the dissatisfaction of the Tibetan authorities with the agreed boundary.² The Chinese representative signed the document without any reservation.³ The British government described the Simla Conference as an attempt to mend relations between China and Tibet. The government explained it in the Parliament that Great Britain played the role of the honest broker.⁴ The Simla Conference was an intricate exercise in diplomacy, power-politics and espionage on the eve of World War I.⁵

1. White Paper, No. II, p. 38.

2. Ibid., No. I, p. 56.

3. Biswanth Singh, op. cit., p. 167

4. Maxwell, op. cit., p. 47

5. For details, see Aslastic Lamb, The Mc Mahon Line and Dorothy Woodman, Himalayan Frontiers, as cited in Maxwell, op. cit., p. 47

As a reaction to the Chinese attitude, the British government sent a note on June 25, 1914, asking China either to sign it or be devoid of the privileges of the above mentioned Tripartite Convention. The Mc Mahon Line was a matter between India and Tibet and both have signed and ratified it. It establishes the fact that the treaty between India and Tibet was not signed secretly. The Chinese claim of illegality of this Line is not justified because once a treaty, particularly a boundary treaty, is freely signed and ratified by the competent parties, it becomes binding and creates rights.¹

The Chinese government, however, made a host of allegations against the Mc Mahon Line and its legality. They called it the offspring of the expansionist policy of the then British government in India. Historically speaking, it is an unsound argument. In fact, the Mc Mahon Line did not create any new border but only clarified the historic and traditional boundary between India and Tibet, which had been well recognised and was beyond dispute for centuries. It ran mostly along the crest of Himalayan ranges. The 1914 convention only provided an additional sanction to an already existing traditional frontier.²

1. Biswanath Singh, op. cit., p. 167

2. Ibid., p.167. These facts are substantiated by relevant sources as Michells authoritative 'Report on the North East Frontier Of India' T.T. Coopers, The Mishnee Hills, London, 1873 and also from the map published by Peking University in 1929.

Moreover, the Postal Atlas of China, 1917 showed approximately the correct alignment of Indo-Tibet boundary, east of Bhutan. The International Law does not concede to the, "theory of pillars". The Mc Mahon Line was clearly delimited by Article 9 of the Simla convention, and runs along with the main watershed, as the analogy of the . quoted judgment of the International Court of Justice, its validity cannot be challenged on the basis of its not being marked on the ground by pillars.¹ The Note of the Government of India to the Chinese government on February 12, 1960 also enunciated the principle of International Law on this point.²

The main objection of China was between outer Tibet and inner Tibet and inner Tibet and China.³ The Mc Mahon Line was clearly shown in the map initialled by all the three representatives.⁴ It was not a secretly signed treaty, the Chinese Government, far from being in the dark about it was "aware" of it.⁵ The Chinese "plea of error" and "ignorance"

1. Ibid., p. 169

2. White Paper, No. III, p. 89 "... a watershed is the best of all possible natural boundaries. It is liable to no change and is readily recognizable.... the alignment of the northern boundary of India throughout follows the major watershed supports the fact that this became the boundary through custom and tradition".

3. White Paper, No. II, pp. 38-39.

4. News item, Guardian (Manchester), 13.2.1960 (News by Olaf Caroe, Foreign Secretary of India from 1939-45).

5. News item, The Times of India (Bombay), 15.2.1960.

was held void in the famous Preah Vihear case.¹ This case held that the ignorance of China was contributed by China herself and not by the other two parties to the case. In this case, it was held, "It is an established rule of law that the plea of error can not be allowed as an element vitiating consent if the party advancing it contributed by its own conduct to the error could have avoided it, or if the circumstances were such as to put the party on notice of the possible errors."²

The Aitchison Treaties Series, XIV, 1929, published this convention and the Mc Mahon Line was shown in the official maps published from 1937 onwards.³ Since China did not raise objections to it, it was inferred that China had accepted it.⁴ The Chinese maps from the 6th century A.D. to the present show that till the beginning of this century

-
1. International Court of Justice, Report of Judgment etc. Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, (Cambodia Vs. Thailand), Judgment of June 15, 1962. I.C.J. Reports, 1962, p.24.
 2. I.C.J. Reports, op. cit., p. 24.
 3. White Paper, Vol. II, p. 39.
 4. Biswanath Singh, op. cit., p.163. Also see, India China Border Problem, op. cit., p. 2, "... China neither protested against the boundary between India and Tibet nor did she seek modification of it after the Simla Convention".

Sinkiang never extended even as far South as the Suen Lun which at present delimits Kashmir's frontiers in the north. The map "Central Asien", published in Leipzig in 1880 by Joseph Chavan also confirmed it.¹ Even the official Chinese maps of 1893, 1917 and 1919 showed the boundary in this area as depicted in official Indian maps today.²

The Chinese government as late as in 1961-62, challenged the legal capacity of Tibet to enter into the boundary treaty of 1914.³ The present Chinese government is not legally entitled to repudiate the decision of its predecessor. She had ".....

1. Some facts about India-China boundary by K. Gopalachari, Historical Division, Ministry of External Affairs, The Hindu (Madras), 10.12.62. "In 1950 the Chinese Government expressed their gratification over the desire of the Government of India", to stabilise the Chinese-India border and the government of India replied that the recognised boundary between India and Tibet should remain inviolate. The Chinese Government questioned neither the location nor the recognition of this boundary and the Government of India saw no reason to assume that there was any doubt regarding the border. The only pretext for doubting the Chinese intention was the fact-different alignments were shown by different maps, India China Border Problem, op. cit., p. 4
2. India- China Border Problem, op. cit., p. 4
3. Biswanath Singh, op., cit., p. 172. The author owes this point to Krishna Rao.

completely overlooked the vital point that the then Government of China had agreed to the attendance of Tibet as a fully empowered third party to the Simla Conference".¹ The state boundaries were concerned with permanent interest hence beyond state succession or war.²

Even after the extinction of the legal personality, the Mc Mahon Line created by the 1914 Simla Conference cannot be rendered void. K. Krishna Rao congenitly argued "... the present boundary alignment had been established in how well before the People's Republic of China, came into existence. Consequently, as the People's Republic of China could not start out with rights than its predecessor possessed, it could not raise any fresh claim to Indian territory".³ In 1959, the International Commission of Jurists examined the Tibetan Treaties and concluded that Tibet was a fully sovereign state, independent of the Chinese control in fact and in law.⁴ The Chinese claims branding the Treaty as based on legal myths and legends were groundless. It was baseless to say that India, resorted to arbitrary argumentation,

1. News item, The Times of India, (New Delhi), 15.2.60

2. Mc Nair, Law of the Treaties, Oxford, 1938, p.542, as cited in Biswanath Singh's article, op. cit., p.173

3. Biswanath Singh, op. cit., p. 173.

4. Satyanarayan Sinha, China Strikes, London, Blandford, Press, 1964, p. 57.

distortion and slander in order to justify its pronouncements.¹ Communist China till 1958 behaved in a way that confirmed their acceptance of the Mc Mahon Line. India exercised legal control over the North East Frontier Agency. Nehru very confidently assured the Lok Sabha that the Mc Mahon Line was our boundary, map or no map. India would not allow any body to come across that boundary. In 1958, an official magazine published a map of China which included a large chunk of Indian territory in North East Frontier Agency, U.P. and Ladakh areas as parts of China.² Indian government, consequently enquired about this cartographical aggression and the Chinese Government put forth its lame excuse that the surveys were not undertaken by the Chinese Government.³ It was in the letter, dated January 23, 1959, that Chou-En-lai raised afresh the question of the entire India-Tibet boundary including the Mc Mahon Line and eventually laid claims to some 90,000 square kilo meter of the Indian territory. The Chinese diplomacy in regard to this dispute is marked by duplicity and inconsistency.⁴ Thus the India-China border is not a complicated issue left by history, but one definitely settled by history. The Indian alignment of 2,400 square miles

1. The Hindu (Madras), 30.4. 1962

2. India-China Border Problem, op. cit., p. 6.

3. White Paper, I, p. 47

4. Biswanath Singh, op. cit., p. 175.

boundary, the longest in the world, had been determined by geography, confirmed by tradition and custom, sanctified by treaties and reinforced by continuous exercise through centuries of administrative jurisdiction, appropriate to the areas concerned. It turned along the major and majestic water shed ranges, such as the Aglul, Musta, the Kun Lun, the Kailash, the Zaskar and the crest of Himalayas which constitute a geological and geographical unity.¹ W.H. Johnson showed Aksai Chin, together with broad territory in the north of the Karakoram Pass, within Kashmir in a map he drew on the basis of his journey to Khotan.² The following can therefore be logically summed up:

- "(a) India's traditional frontier with China is well-known, being based on treaty, agreement and custom. Till recently, no Chinese Government has ever challenged it.
- "(b) The present controversy over the frontier arose because the Chinese government for the first time laid claims to extensive areas of Indian territory in Premier Chou-En-lai's letter of 8th September 1959.
- "(c) The tension on the India-China border has increased in the last three years because Chinese forces have been pushing forward to assert their claims.

1. K. Gopalaswami, "The India China Boundary Question", International Studies, Vol. V, Nos. 1-2, July-April 1963-64, p. 33.

2. Maxwell, op. cit., p. 27.

"(d) The Government of India have stated that inspite of Chinese provocations they will always explore the possibility of peaceful settlement..... Negotiations on this basis are unacceptable to the Government of India. But they are prepared to discuss with the Chinese Government existing disputes and such minor ratifications of the frontier as may be considered necessary by agreement".¹

TIBETAN REVOLT:

The years between 1957-60 were marked by the eruption of the Tibetan revolt, the arrival of the Dalai Lama and the first incidents that occurred along the Sino-Indian border.² On January 1, 1950, Mao-Tse-Tung proclaimed the 'Liberation of three million Tibetans from imperialist aggression', as the basic task of the People's Liberation Army of China. The same year the Chinese troops entered Tibet. In May, 1951, Tibetan representatives in Peking signed a Seventeen Point Agreement which provided for Chinese occupation of Tibet. But the Chinese violated its provisions. Jaya Prakash Narayan said that Nehru's talk of the two thousand year-old ties between China and India untarnished by the armed conflict, created political myopia³

1. India China Border Problem, op. cit., pp. 13-14

2. W. Ven Eckelen, India's Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China, The Hague, Martinus-Nijhoff, II ed, 1970, p. 1.

3. Satyanarayan Sinha, op. cit., p. 61.

as the Indian government remained blind to this rape of Tibet.¹ Since the Tibetan revolt in March 1959, leading to the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, and the border incidents at Longju in the North East Frontier Agency in August and in Ladakh in October, India China relations which had been played upon both sides as being based on Panchsheel, steadily deteriorated, a deterioration climaxed into a massive invasion of the Indian territory in October 1962.² The peaceful policy objectives with China were upset because of the Tibetan imbroglio, which constituted for India, the first tough knot in its relations with China. Since then, the analysis of India's policy towards China became an analysis of India's policy towards Tibet.³ The preliminary phase of the boundary dispute with China terminated with Chou-En-lai's meeting with Nehru in 1959. It provided a sever testing ground for Panchsheel-- the five principles of Peaceful co-existence which India advocated as an original Asian contribution to international relations. The conflict that emerged between India and China happened to be the first conflict between a communist power and a non-aligned state.⁴ Even during the Tibetan revolt, there was a

1. Ibid., p. 57.

2. Karunakar Gupta, "India China Relations", The Seminar No.50, October 63, p. 13.

3. Nareshwar Dayal Seth, "India's Policy Towards China", in Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XXIX, No. 1 January- March, 1968, pp. 144-45.

4. Eckelen, op. cit., p.V.

hope that China may limit her "expansionist aims"¹ and settle down to a policy of peace, but China did not abandon its policy of expansionism. The boundary dispute with China arose from the Tibetan question. If China was not allowed to overturn Tibet, there would have been negligible common boundary between India and China.^{The} Tibetan question proved to be the genesis of conflict. The efforts of the Indian Government to settle the Tibetan question were repudiated by haughty rebuffs.² China maintained that the question of Tibet was China's domestic problem and no foreign influence would be tolerated.³ In the wake of Tibetan episode, India wanted to play the role of an "honest peace broker"⁴ but China scuttled every such efforts, consequently India tolerated Chinese conquest of Tibet in 1950.⁵ On the eve of the Chinese annexation of Tibet, Nehru declared that India would not touch the soil of Tibet. This annexation of Tibet by China transformed the military balance of power. By the treaty of April 22, 1954, India officially recognised Tibet as the Tibet-region of China⁶ and set its seal of approval

1. Nareshwar Dayal Seth, op. cit., p. 146. Also see Lok Sabha Debates, No.15, Vol. XXXIV, Ninth Session, Cols. 3808-9. (Speech by Ranga).

2. Ibid., p. 147

3. P.C. Chakravarti, India's China Policy, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1968, pp. 12-14.

4. Mahendra Kumar, op. cit., p. 104.

5. Ibid., p. 105

6. White Paper, No. 1, p. 48

over the conquest of Tibet. There was no longer a buffer state between China and India. The Chinese expansionist designs were clear but India overlooked it.¹ Apart from the brief episode about Tibet there was no point of serious dispute between India and China until the end of Korean war in July 1953. China emerged as a new powerful country with formidable power, able to face the American challenge in Asia. India was to play second fiddle in the new balance of power.²

THE DISPUTE DEVELOPS:

The change in Sino-Indian relations since 1959, resulting from the Chinese suppression of the revolt in Tibet and the Chinese moves along India's Himalayan frontiers, the reactions of India to these moves had been a source of greater concern and absorption to India than any other developments in the External Affairs.³ The Sino-Indian border, covering 12,200 square miles, was generally unguarded. The area was remote and inaccessible to both New Delhi and Peking. In 1959 this situation was transformed by the revelation of the communist Chinese claims to the areas. Nehru described them to be over

1. Sinha, op.cit., pp. 61-62

2. Karunakar Gupta, "India China Relations", Seminar, No.50, October 1963, p. 15.

3. Norman D. Palmer, "India's Foreign Policy", The Political Quarterly, Vol. 33, London, 1962, pp.391-92.

50,000 square miles which had been an integral part of India since many decades and centuries. The Chinese claimed large areas in the NEFA, several small pockets of territory West of Nepal, and Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh. These areas were referred to as Eastern, Middle and Western Sectors respectively. China claimed that only a customary and traditional border line¹ existed and the border had never been defined by treaty or negotiations, India maintained that a frontier existed which had been established by custom, tradition and treaty. The Mc Mahon Line settled the Sino-India boundary on paper otherwise it was a fact that the Sino-Indian boundary had not been formally delimited.² A Policy of peace and friendship based on negotiations and discussions, as instruments of pacific settlement was often mistaken for a forward policy by some foreign writers like Neville Maxwell.³ The traditional line as recognised by China, differed from the frontiers claimed by India. It was the area between these two lines which was in dispute.⁴

-
1. "The Sino-Indian Border Dispute", Current Notes on International Affairs, January-February, 1963, Department of External Affairs, Vol. XXXIV, Nos. 1-2, p. 37
 2. White Paper, No. 1, p. 52
 3. Maxwell, op.cit., p.199. Also see, pp.201,205. In a crucial meeting on November 2, 1961, in which Nehru, Menon, J.Desai, Gen. Thappar, and B.N. Kaul were present new directives of forward policy emerged pp. 221, 223, 224, 233, 291, 303 and 346.
 4. Current Notes on International Affairs, op. cit., p.38

The Chinese incursions into India began in June 1954 when their armed forces entered into the Barahoti area. In 1956 also, the Chinese armed personnel entered the Nilong-Jadhang area and Shipkila. In 1959, a Chinese armed detachment entered the Spanggur area. In August, 1959, the armed Chinese patrols crossed the Thagla Ridge. The Indian government was taken aback by these incursions between 1954-59. In retrospect, these incursions proved to be a smoke-screen to their major aggressive designs in the Aksai Chin area.¹ In 1958 it was noticed that the Chinese had constructed a 100-mile road, connecting Sinkiang with Tibet.² The difference between the Indian and Chinese approach to the border problem was that India was certain and clear as to how and where the border line ran. She proclaimed her possession in unmistakable language and also showed her published maps to the world, unchanged throughout these years. However, the Chinese had been ambiguous, reticent and self-assertive. The stand of the Chinese government with regard to

-
1. Satyanarayan Sinha, op. cit., p. 72. Aksai Chin's literal meaning is the "desert of White Stones". This land of frozen adventure was the backbone of Sino-India border dispute. Ibid., p. 69
 2. K. Gopalachari, "The India-China Boundary Dispute", International Studies, V, Nos.1-2, July-April, 1963-64, p.38. Also see, "Mr. Laxman Singh from U.P. was the first person in 1954 to inform the Government about the building of the Aksai Chin Road. As our Trade Representative, he used to visit Tibet every year.... he met some labourers who had worked on building the road". Kuldip Nayar, Between the Lines, New Delhi, 1970, p. 171.

the border line was unconfounded as India's proposition about the Simla Conference of 1914 was held equally valid and legal in foreign press.¹

THE THREE SECTORS:

In the Eastern Sector India claimed its areas in NEFA on the basis of the Mc Mahon Line, established in 1914 by the Indian and Tibetan and Chinese. The border of eastern Tibet was defined by this convention adjacent to Tibet. The line terminated in the East where the borders of Bhutan, Tibet and India meet and continued in the East as the Sino-Burmese border. China refused to ratify this treaty and also branded it illegal and as the one imposed on Tibet by Britain and declared that Tibet was not an independent nation to enter into a treaty of this sort. There were also differences of opinion between the Chinese and Indians with regard to drawing of the Mc Mahon Line/^{over}Dhola (called Chedong by the Chinese) and Longju areas. The Chinese claimed that both these areas were north of the Line, whereas the Indian government claimed that they were south of it. The Chinese government contented that even if the Indian claims to the Mc Mahon Line were conceded, China had a right to these small areas.²

1. Editorially, The National Herald. (Lucknow), 11.6.62.

2. "Sino-Indian Border Dispute, "Current Notes on International Affairs", January- February 1963, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, Vol. XXXIV, Nos. 1-2, p. 38

In the Middle Sector the places in dispute between the two cover the area of 2,0000 square kilometre. In 1957, these areas were showed as parts of China, for the first time.

In the Western Sector, the traditional boundaries of Ladakh were recognised in a Treaty of 1842 between the British authorities and the Raja of Jammu. In this case also, China claimed that the treaty was invalid since China was not a party to it. The Indian claim extended to the north of Himalayan watershed while the Chinese claim extended south of it. This did not include south of the karakoram Range which was recognised by China and Pakistan as the boundary between Sinkiang and Pakistan held Kashmir The Chinese since 1953, started showing this area in China and also established their outposts.¹

Coming to the Climax of border dispute one is urged to analyse the nature of Chinese diplomacy and the relations with India since the two emerged as independent nations. The first phase of their relations, beginning with China's recognition by India upto 1951 was the phase of contempt and hostility.² Despite the Chinese being hostile, India presented a picture of good relations with the Chinese people and government in cultural and political fields. Tagore visited China

1. Ibid., pp. 39-40

2. Mahendra Kumar, "Sino-India Relations" The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XXIV, No. I January-December, 1961, p. 103.

in 1924, Nehru in 1939 and Chiang and his wife visited India in 1942. China was invited at the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 in New Delhi. However, the Chinese did not fail to label Nehru as the "running dog of imperialism". This period presented relations of unique character. On Korean question the Sino-Indian relations were governed by India's desire to mediate between China and the West. In 1950-53, India played a significant role of a mediator for achieving truce in Korea. In 1954, India performed a commendable job in Geneva negotiations on Indo-China. India fully cooperated with China in solving the Korean crisis. India's mediation in Korea and surrender of interests in Tibet contributed a great deal in relaxation of initial tension between China and India, with the result that China started soft paddling with India. This dispelled the impression that Sino-India relations were not always based on ideological differences and differences of approach. This appeared to be an era of mutual intimacy and cordial ties which, beginning in 1951, climaxed in the signing of 1954-Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade with Tibet. This marked the end of second phase. The third phase ended in November-December 1956 when Chou-En-lai visited India. With the signing of 1954 Treaty containing the Panchsheel doctrines, started the honeymoon period of Sino-India relations. In 1956, Chou made a long visit to India. The relations were further strengthened by the ratification of Sino-India Agreement on Tibet on June 3, 1954,

the signing of the Protocol at Lhasa on April 1, 1955, handing over of the exchange of various cultural missions. China supported Indian action in Goa. Both India and China reacted strongly to South-East Asian Treaty Organisation and other U.S., sponsored security alliances. The goodwill during this period was reciprocal. The next phase marked the beginning of Sino-India differences. Now commenced the cartographical aggression and the Chinese game of mapsmanship. The Chinese government was not ready to abide by the KMT commitments and expressed the desire to revise the maps published by the Nationalists. These maps in 1953, started showing large parts of Indian territory within China¹ (NEFA, Bhutan and Ladakh etc.). In the same year Chou, though doubtful of the legality of Mc Mahon Line, told Nehru that in view of the present Sino-Indian relations he was prepared to recognise the Line. In 1954, China lodged a complaint that Indian troops have entered Barohoti. In 1956-57, three times the Chinese troops were found on Indian side of Ship-ki-la and only then, it was first noticed that the Chinese have started building a road connecting Sinkiang to Tibet.² Indian government got aware of it in 1958. However, Nehru and Chou agreed to settle minor

1. White Paper, No. I, p. 3

2. Mahendra Kumar, op. cit., p. 110.

differences through negotiations. This period, during which India and China seemed to have patched up their differences and consolidated their friendship, also contained seeds of future trouble. During 1957, the range of Sino-Indian conflicts widened. The minor border incidents started to take place, the map controversy, Nehru's objections and Chou's evasive answers, culminated to boil at the slightest pretext. The next phase starting from 1957, continued till 1958. It was free from "minor clashes". Indian public opinion was adverse to the West and not to China. This was the period of lull and animated tension.¹

The next phase, which started from July 1958 to March 1959, caused concern as the clashes renewed at Barahoti, for which the two agreed to keep demilitarised. Despite the Indian government's demand to change the maps, published by China² in 1957, the Chinese government refused to do so on the ground that she had not as yet conducted the survey.³ This period was responsible for the emergence of strains in Sino-Indian relations. There were rare gestures of goodwill but

1. Ibid., pp. 111-112. Also see, Notes Memorandum letters exchanged between the Government of India and China contained in "White Papers" published by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi.

2. China Pictorial, 15.2. 1962

3. White Paper, No. 23, November 3, 1958, p.47

reciprocal charges of attack and counter attack. Nehru wrote a letter on December 14, 1958, to Chou regretting the Chinese claims, to which Chou replied that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been delimited.¹ In March 1959, demonstrations broke out in Lhasa, the Tibetan Cabinet declared independence of Tibet, the Seventeen Point-Agreement between China and Tibet-1951, was declared ultra vires,² and Dalai Lama was given political asylum in India. It was the period of deterioration in relations when the Chinese were reported to have crossed at Khinzemanne, NEFA, Migyitun and Longju. In the wake of 1959, India was reminded of the 2000 years old friendship and the Chinese were in a mood to attack.³ The preliminary phase of border aggression can be categorised in three stages. During the first phase, the aim of the Communist Chinese diplomacy was, to win India's friendship and get Chinese claims approved over Tibet. During the second phase, the Chinese established their military posts⁴ in the unguarded Indian territory, taking undue advantage of India's faith in peaceful northern borders. In

1. White Paper, No. I, op. cit., p.52

2. Ibid.

3. Satyanarayan Sinha, op. cit., p.63.

4. Ibid., p. 75.

the third phase, the Chinese levelled violent accusations against India and occupied Ladakh.¹ Their first conquest enhanced their territorial appetite.² The Chinese were establishing their strong-hold over Daulat Beg Oldi, Aksai Chin and Qizil Jilga. Their aggressive designs had extended upto Chip Chap river at the Pangong Lake area in Ladakh. On May 14, 1962, Nehru, reiterated the demand for the Chinese withdrawal in Ladakh, creating a no man's land of approximately 11,300 square miles. It was later on noticed that the Galwan Valley incident proved to be the turning point in the history of the Sino-Indian conflict in Ladakh. Nehru, in one of the Notes sent to the Chinese government mentioned their two intensions to consolidate the Chinese position in the territory occupied by them. Its evidence was the building of a new road through the territory, the setting up of a new post and the general tempo of activity in the area. Secondly, they attempted to take advantage of the differences between India and Pakistan and between India, Bhutan and Sikkim. Till 1962, in Indian perception, China was seeking to utilise a new deliberate intrusion across the eastern boundary to bring the Mc Mahon Line within the scope of talks that would lead to

-
1. News item, The Times of India(New Delhi), 10.6. 1962
 2. Sinha, op. cit., p.76. The National Herald (Lucknow) 10.7.1962. Also see the Times of India(New Delhi), 8.5.62, "Like a snake, the Chinese, having swallowed half of Ladakh, are determined to gorge up the rest".

general negotiations. The crux of the Indian interpretation was the resolve that the Mc Mahon Line should not be open for renegotiation. Dissatisfaction was mounting in India with regard to the Indian government's delay in fulfilling its promise to hold the Line inviolate. The Opposition openly declared that any meeting with the Chinese would be labelled as 'appeasement'. The Indian government's reaction, through her note of October 6, 1962, extricated the government from the awkward dilemma into which it had been put in August 1962.¹ Even on March 21, 1962, while addressing a news conference at New Delhi, Nehru did not rule out Arbitration as a method to solve the Sino-India border dispute.²

CHINA INVADES INDIA

The relations between India and China had deteriorated since the rebellion in Tibet.³ The Chinese refusal to recognise the Mc Mahon Line and Indian government's granting of political asylum to the Dalai Lama added fuel to the fire.⁴ Three years

1. Maxwell, op. cit., pp. 327-28

2. The Pakistan Times (Karachi), 22.3.1962

3. Eekelen, op. cit., p. 93.

4. Editorially "Sino-Indian Relations", The National Herald (Lucknow), 22.6.1967. The Sino-Indian Relations have been under strains of varying severity from the time the Dalai Lama with his fellows escaped and sought refuge in India.

after the Chinese attack on the Kongka Pass in Ladakh, they launched a massive attack in the North East Frontier Agency on October 20, 1962. When the aggression occurred, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation supported the aggressed, India. In one of their communiques, the Foreign and Defence Minister of the alliance, expressed grave concern over "the implications of such a Chinese action in Asia."¹ The Home Minister, Y.B. Chavan held an enquiry into the aggression and later on declared that there were three fold motives of the Chinese aggression against India, it wanted to show the world its military might, it wanted to force India to give up its posture of non-alignment and rush to western powers for assistance, giving up its friendship with the Soviet Union, and thirdly, it wanted to place a heavy burden on defence expenditure on India....."²

India and China did not agree about each others

1. News item, The Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 16.12.62. Also see Editorially, Parliamentary Studies, Vol.XII, No.9, September 1968, p. 1., "That the intention may be to demonstrate the superior might of China to the smaller countries of Asian continent, to upset the apple-cart of India's planned economy, to discredit the non-communist path to socialism that India was following".
2. News Item, The Times of India (New Delhi), 24.1.67.

versions of attack. India strongly labelled China as the aggressor and China did the vice-versa.¹ However, the initial success of the Chinese troops suggest that they were the ones who managed to attack first with the advantage of surprise.² On February 6, 1960, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union emphatically declared, "One cannot possibly seriously think that such a state as India, which is militarily and economically weaker than China would really launch a military attack on China"³

However, the Chinese managed to occupy Dhola and openly declared that they were not restrained by the McMahon Line. In the Western sector also, the Chinese penetrated 15 miles. Many of the Indian outposts were captured by them.⁴ The Indians had diverse views about China—as a giant power awakened from centuries of sleep, as a country teeming with blue ants, as an ancient civilization, as a spearhead of

1. Sinha, op. cit., p.77. Also see, Maxwell, op. cit., p. 423, where India is held as the aggressor.

2. Editorially, The New York Times, (New York), 22.10.62
Also see, The Tehran Journal, (Tehran), 24.10. 1962
where China is outrightly condemned as an aggressor.

3. The Peking Review, (Peking), 8.11.1963

4. Current Notes on International Affairs, op. cit., p.41.

international communism, as a totalitarianism reproducing the tyranny of the Manchus and also as a menace to the neighbouring countries.¹ As a result of the Chinese aggressive designs, the Indian government declared that "the Panchsheel doctrine is extinct."² The White Paper No.II, manifested how the Chinese government had flouted the Five-Principles and the Declaration of the Bandung-Conference.³ In Parliament also, there was vehement criticism of India's defence preparedness and defence and foreign policies. The Opposition demanded that the Chinese expansionism, should be curbed. In the wake of this aggression, India had military aid from all quarters.⁴ It was a dividend of India's non-alignment policy. China followed the policy of peaceful coexistence in the past as a garb to foster goodwill in Asia and accelerate the pace of its economic development. In order to isolate India, China befriended Pakistan and Burma.⁵ In 1960, China

1. Editorially, The National Herald, (Lucknow), 30.10.62.

2. The Hindu (Madras), 7.10. 1962

3. White Paper No.II, p.22.

4. Eekelen, op. cit., p.116.

5. Sinha, op. cit., pp. 89, 90 and 91. This Sino-Pakistan bail was confirmed by a Pact, signed on March 2, 1963. However, at the time of aggression, Pakistan's support was with China.

carried the principles of co-existence to an agreement on the Sino-Burmese border, to prove that India's recalcitrant attitude provided no accommodation.¹ For their break-through in the North East Frontier Agency, the Chinese adopted the skilful techniques of deployment and initiative.² The hate-India and Nehru of 1961 in China was essentially directed towards creating an impression among the countries of Asia and Africa that India was the main hurdle in the path of Asian-African solidarity.³ Till November 18, 1962, the Chinese launched their three-pronged drive on the Sela Bomdila and Chakoo sectors. They had their stronghold at Nathula, the centre of pan⁸ama as the decisive Sino-India war was fought there. Nathula had strategic importance as it also formed the gateway between India and Tibet. Before the hot war broke out between India and China, an avalanche of correspondence seeking peaceful settlement of borders took place in form of White Paper. When the war was taking place, the never-ending war of protest notes was occurring simultaneously.⁴ On

1. Basant Mitra, "Diplomatic Technique," Seminar, No.50, October 1963, pp. 44-45.

2. Sinha, op. cit., p. 77.

3. The Times of India (New Delhi), 12.12.1961

4. The New York Times, 16.7. 1962.

October 27, 1962, Nehru demanded China to withdraw at least to the position held on September 8, 1962. The restoration of September 8, position was not the apple of discord, it was expected to create a situation in which talks might occur. India's proposal was in response to the "three-point proposal",¹ made by China on October 24, 1962, for the cessation of hostilities, by which both the sides were to withdraw 20 kilometers from the 'line of actual control'. The Chinese government explained that for the purpose of 20 kilometers withdrawal, they were prepared to regard the Mc Mahon Line as the line of actual control.² The October 24, 1962 contained phrases like, "Sino-India friendship", "Asian-African solidarity" and "Asian Peace."³ In the international quarters, the Chinese "undeclared war"⁴ caused much concern. The Australian government commented that India was now "paying the price of its insistent support of co-existence". The U.S.S.R., initially took a neutral stand, and promised military help to India and more MIGs,

1. Kuldip Nayar, op. cit., p.180. Also see White Papers, No.VIII, p. 1.

2. Current Notes on International Affairs, op. cit., pp.41-42.

3. Kuldip Nayar, op. cit., p.180

4. The Hindu (Madras), 21.10. 1962.

which were likely to sharpen "the existing tension between Moscow and Peking".¹ Among the non-aligned countries, the U.A.R. was most active in finding some way to end the hostilities.² In Tehran also, there was condemnation of the Chinese aggression and the failure of the non-alignment policy. However, when India was facing the Chinese menace, Nehru was not willing to abandon non-alignment.³ In one Press Conference, he openly declared, that one of the shocks ought to be the unquestioning satisfaction with the policy of non-alignment. The U.S.A., Great Britain, West Germany and Malaya supported India and applauded non-alignment. The U.A.R. had suggested the Afro-Asian mediation. The U.S.S.R. expressed deep concern over the grave situation and urged for an urgent cease-fire. Thus, the international public opinion sided with the Indian government's stand. The Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who was labelled as the neo-imperialist stooge by India, favoured India over this dispute. Nehru was not prepared to part with the avowed foreign policy of India. He categorically stated, "Nothing can change the fundamentals of Indian policy,

1. The Statesman (New Delhi), 22.8.1962.

2. Kuldip Nayer, op. cit., p. 198

3. The National Herald (Lucknow), 23.10.62

not even China's aggression..... India will accept unconditional aid from whatever quarters she will get.... there will be no giving up of non-alignment."¹ In Tehran, it was stated that this aggression proved that neutrality can be ruled out by international circumstances.² The non-alignment was to continue as India's official policy, it was realised that it was not expedient. India's faith in non-alignment for future was conditioned by the following factors:-

- (1) Not to be very vocal while supporting a country.
The Chinese aggression was received as a shock.
- (2) Most of the support and aid that India received came from the committed and aligned nations, on the contrary the non-aligned nations were less vociferous in supporting India.
- (3) The government grew more sensitive to the charges of Opposition. The Opposition repeatedly clamoured, "where were the recognised friends and their support" like Indonesia, Ghana, Egypt and Yugoslavia.
- (4) India's attitude softened towards the West as the whole-hearted support that came from the western

1. The Indian Express (New Delhi), 25.10. 1962

2. The Tehran Journal, op. cit.

bloc drastically affected the policy framers to relax and revise her policy towards the West. The stand of the U.S.S.R. was ambiguous.

In consonance with the need of the hour, the state of emergency was proclaimed in India.¹ The Opposition asked the government to revise the policy in general. On the basis of past experience, the government had to evolve a policy as may succeed in curbing hostility of any kind. Both the Congress and the Opposition unanimously resolved to disrupt diplomatic ties with China. However, the fundamental defect in India's China policy stemmed from India's weakness in gauging Peking's long term aims.²

After an ominous lull at Ladakh and NEFA, on November 22, 1962, the Chinese government offered a cease-fire proposal to India.³ It followed, as a consequence of which, the 33 days war came to an end.⁴ There was ample controversy over the Line of Actual-Control, which was September 8, 1962 position by India and November 7, 1959 position by China.⁵ Till November 25,

1. The Times (London), 25.10. 1962.

2. Chakravarty, op. cit., p. 151.

3. The Times (London), 20.10. 1962.

4. The New York Times (New York), 23.11. 1962.

5. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 26.11. 1962

the Ministry of External Affairs, government of India did not accept the Chinese cease-fire proposal, as the acceptance of such a proposal by India would include acceptance of Chinese control over large chunks of Indian territory in Ladakh and key positions in NEFA, such as Khingemane, Dhola, Walong and Kibitoo.¹

THE COLOMBO PROPOSALS:

The need to bring the two contending parties to negotiating tables was realised many a time. The first concerted effort was made by the six Colombo Powers on the initiative of the Ceylonese Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandarnaike.² It was considered to be very significant in international quarters.³ On the eve of the Colombo Conference, December 10, 1962, the Chinese Government again enquired of India if she was ready to abide by their cease-fire proposal. India, however, replied in the negative. The six non-aligned Powers intended to negotiate only because they presupposed that the dispute constituted a threat to, "the concept of Afro-Asian Unity," and also, "for the countries with policies of neutrality and non-alignment". So these six non-aligned countries- U.A.R., Ghana, Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia and Ceylon - held their meeting

1. 'Sunday Standard' (New Delhi), 25.11. 1962.

2. Kuldip Nayar, op. cit., p. 224.

3. Guardian (Manchester), 27.3. 1963.

at Colombo to consider the Chinese proposal of cease-fire.¹ The Colombo-Powers were reluctant to offend China by a categorical statement in support of India. There were two points on which the Chinese disagreed with the Colombo Proposals. One was that both India and China may establish civilian posts in the no-man's land in Ladakh and the other was that the Indian army may move up to the Mc Mahon Line.² In January 1963, it was clarified by the then Ceylonese Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike, that the government of India was prepared to accept the proposals subject to have parliamentary approval. On January 25, 1963, the Prime Minister, Nehru placed before the Lok Sabha the full text of the proposals together with certain clarifications of the Neutral powers' intentions, received from the Ceylonese Prime Minister. In fact, "The Colombo-Proposals were used to lure and lull India into the belief that it was possible to ward off the Chinese menace through negotiations with Peking".³

In the spring of 1963, Peking outrightly refused to agree to the Colombo Proposals whereas India had accepted them without any reservations.⁴ Moreover, the Chinese government

1. White Paper, No. VIII, pp. 31 and 35.

2. Ibid.

3. Sinha, op. cit., p. 93.

4. Ibid., p. 92.

rejected the reference of the border dispute with India to the International Court of Justice. They were not in favour of arbitration and finally had rejected the Colombo proposals.¹ Nehru insisted that there would be no talks until the Chinese Government accepted them in toto. It was suggested that the acceptance of the Proposals was in favour of India's security interests.²

Later in 1964, Chou is reported to be ready for opening up the "direct negotiations", between India and China, "on the basis of the Colombo Conference proposals". He further added, ".... relaxation of the Sino-Indian boundary question is entirely possible provided India agrees to return to the conference table without preconditions". Chou's statement was contained in the Chinese text of an interview he gave in Dacca to a correspondent of Associated Press of Pakistan.³

The prospects of the Colombo-negotiations were reduced to four alternatives;

- " 1. Address private state communication to the two contending powers- India and China- appealing to them to come to a settlement;

1. The National Herald, (Lucknow), 8.3. 1963

2. Iqbal Singh, "India and China where do we go from here" (Part II), The National Herald (Lucknow), 9.6. 1963.

3. The Times of India (New Delhi), 28.2. 1964.

- "2. Postpone the conference to an alternative venue with expanded membership;
- "3. Pass resolution in general terms propounding the philosophy of non-alignment and peace; and
- "4. To adopt a resolution incorporating the stand points of Ghana and the U.A.R.¹

Colombo Proposals died a lingering death as neither India nor China had accepted them for reasons of their own.

After some time, normalcy was restored at the borders. Since 1962 to 1969, India and China had a state of relations comparable to the cold-war. The 1973-74 trend in both the quarters is to revise their friendly ties shattered through the direct confrontation of 1962. What-ever may be the genesis and consequences of the Sino-India border dispute, it led to an enormous number of debates and discussions in the annals of Parliament.

1. The Indian Express(New Delhi), 12.12. 1962. For full text of the Document see The Hindu (Madras), 14.5. 1963.

CHAPTER VIDEBATES -1962 - A CASE STUDYINTRODUCTION

The Sino-India border dispute has been discussed in the Parliament right from ^{the}very beginning. The columns of the Parliamentary Debates, almost every year are found replete with references regarding this immensely important dispute. From 1952-59 the session represented a quieter scene and the criticisms and objections, raised by the Opposition, appeared less enquiring and less penetrating. The general leaning or tendency was towards favouring the stand or postures adopted by Nehru and the Members generally endorsed his views and convictions. The blind and unquestioning support and applause gave way to doubts and questions in 1959, when the news about the construction of Aksai Chin road was formally disclosed to Parliament. The Members of Parliament grew more and more concerned with and particular about the secrecy with which the whole issue and its handling had been so far surrounded, on the usual pretext that publicity was not in the public interest. The number of questions raised, the fear of incursions, the demand for reorientation of the entire foreign policy structure, the desire for more clear-cut and pertinent statements and the number of no-confidence motions sharply increased during this period. The year 1962 witnessed the massive Chinese invasion. In the history of the Parliamentary Debates, specially the Lok Sabha, it was a year of special import. The scrutiny of

the debates of both the Houses, gives an impression that the Debates in the Popular House were more comprehensive, lively and informing than that of the Rajya Sabha. This Chapter aims at providing a detailed examination of the 1962 Parliamentary Debates regarding the Sino-India border dispute, which illustrates the actual use made of the instruments and the parliamentary control already described in the Chapter III.

In parliamentary life, the year 1962, saw the resignation of V.K. Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister. Nehru took over the Defence portfolio. Menon was a man of outstanding merit, vast energy, drive and purpose, in a sense, a dedicated person as was his successor. His brinkmanship was for more agile and astute than that of late John Foster Dulles.¹ He was quite well versed in foreign affairs. The overall consideration of the issue in the Rajya Sabha happens to look like a repeated performance of what has been said and done in the Lok Sabha. The Rajya Sabha paid appreciable attention to it in 1959, through independent Motions.

The first parliamentary process is the Presidential Address, delivered at the opening joint-session of the Parliament. In 1962, it peeped into the issue afresh. The President said,

1. Frank Moraes, 'Peking Plans and India's Mistake', The Indian Express, (New Delhi), 11.2. 1961. Also see Wellas Hangen, After Nehru Who, London, Hart Davis, 1963.

"India's uneasy relations with China remain unsolved. The Officials' Report, which was placed by the Government before Parliament in 1961 has not yet been published in China". He also referred the Indo-Tibetan Agreement of 1954, which was to expire on June 2, 1962. The Parliament was informed that the Government of China had offered to negotiate a new agreement to replace it. The Government of India was believed to have rejected the latest Chinese plea for consideration of the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement and the Indo-Tibetan Trade Treaty separately from the boundary dispute.¹ The Indian Government asked for a reversal of the aggressive policies pursued by China and for the restoration of a climate of peace on the basis of the strict observance of the Five Principles.² The reference was, however, scanty, if not perfunctory and foresaw no significant or spectacular developments in the near future. As usual the discussion followed on the Address by the President, during which Nehru disclosed to the House that so far as the situation on the border was concerned, since October 1961, there had been no material change. This House often learnt about India's protest to China and about what they have done. They did not

1. The Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 15.4. 1962.

2. Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series, Vol.LXI, No. 1, March 12, 1962 XVith Session, Cols. 20-21.

often receive the large number of protests that the Government received from China, about what they thought we did on the borders. He also admitted the inability of the Government to answer all the questions that were raised on the floor, for the reason that they could be a help to the contending party, China. He, however, affirmed that it was not his desire to conceal things from the House, "In fact, we have given practically everything. But, as it has so happened that the information we give in the floor of the House has been used against us by the Chinese government, so it was necessary not to disclose every detail in the House".¹

QUESTIONS IN THE 1962 LOK SABHA:

The questions are the most brisk and important mode of securing information by the Parliament and thus the analysis of questions is desirable and pertinent. During the 14 days opening Session of the XIVth session of the Lok Sabha in 1962, the number of questions asked was as follows:²

1. Starred	...	324
2. Unstarred	...	513
3. Short Notice	.	6 ³

-
1. Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. II, No. 13, May 2, 1962, Cols. 2072-73.
 2. Resume, II Series, Vol. LXII, No. 14, March 30, 1962 Col. 2800.
 3. For details see Appendix-I, showing the position of questions raised in general and on the boundary question in particular.

The total time consumed in all activities was 78.34 hours. out of this multitude of questions asked in the Lok Sabha only 5 questions were related to the meeting of the two Prime Ministers and Air Space violations and the minor incursions relating to the border dispute. In the Rajya Sabha three questions were asked with regard to the Chinese nationals' evacuation from India, wrong news leaking out of Aksai Chin to China and the Sino-Indian correspondence. Out of 6 short notice questions, none was with regard to it.

The most important question which happened to be the second question in the session of 1962, was with regard to the possibility of incursions. This oral question No.2, raised in collaboration by 5 members, asked the Prime Minister to state the pace of further Chinese incursions. Nehru told the House that since his last Statement in 1962, there had been one incursion of a Chinese border-patrol, 12 miles from the Chinese Check-Post on the Chip Chap river, about which India had protested to the Chinese on October 31, 1961. The Government had asked them to abandon such incursions on the Indian soil. During the same question P.C. Deb, enquired/Nehru if the Chinese had captured Longju. Nehru replied in negative. Brij Raj Singh added if India had vacated the possession of Longju, Nehru said, "so far as I know, I am not quite sure, it has not been taken possession of by us".¹

1. Lok Sabha Debates, II Series, Vol. LXI, No.20, March 13, 1962, Cols. 50-52.

However, the House seemed to be at ease when Nath Pai, with an air of relief, said that it was the first opening session since long, in which they were not told of fresh incursions. The Parliament welcomed it. He doubted if it was the result of the fact that the Chinese had captured all the land they claimed or due to the firm policy of the Indian Government. Nehru reaffirmed that the Chinese had not occupied all they claimed in Ladakh or the Northern Sector. They claimed large chunks of territory in the NEFA area, which had not been so far captured by them. It was obvious that the policy that the Government of India had followed so far, indicated no reversal of the policy approved by the Parliament. This question and its answer covering the seven columns of the debate, mirrored the attention that the Members of Parliament have paid to this issue of national importance. It also confirmed that the Members clamour for more information if they are less informed.

During the I Session from April 19, 1962 to June 22, 1962, 1637 oral and written starred questions were raised, 3845 were Unstarred and 24 were Short Notice Questions. On May 21, 1962, Mrs. L. Menon, Minister of State for the Ministry of External Affairs, had to face an, "angry opposition" in the Lok Sabha while answering interpellations on the anti-India propaganda being carried on by the Chinese Embassy through

its Journal China Today. The Speaker, Hukum Singh quietened the angry Members of the Lok Sabha by proposing an early solution through the Government. Hem Barua, "agitatedly remarked", that the Government did not take notice of what appeared in China Today, "unless its attention is drawn in this House, it does not work, it does not function". Mrs. Menon, ~~passified~~ them by promising the earliest action.¹ During this period "angry scenes"² and "strong feeling of resentment"³ against the delay on the part of Government were a regular feature of the House proceedings. The Times also reported that the "Angry opposition members, called on the Government in the Lok Sabha..... to take immediate action".⁴ The Debate on the Chinese Embassy Journal, China Today was "brief though exciting".⁵ It led to "... an almost hysterical excitement of an internecine warfare (of words) between the Government and the PSP Opposition in the Lok Sabha today (May 23, 1962). There was half an hour "full throated vitriolic exchange".⁶

1. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 22.5. 1962

2. The Indian Express, (New Delhi), 22.5. 1962

3. The Hindu (Madras), 22.5. 1962

4. The Times(London), 22.5. 1962

5. The Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 24.5. 1962

6. The Indian Express, (New Delhi), 24.5. 1962

On the whole, 17 questions were related to the border dispute. Out of these questions, mostly were with regard to the movement of troops, the Chinese claim on an area of Pak-held Kashmir, figures of Indian and Chinese casualties, Techno-Economic-Survey, Hospitals on border, construction of roads in NEFA,¹ the Chinese note dated May 31, 1962, and the settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute. The oral question No. 1325, raised on June 6, 1962, was, however, pertinent and detailed, raised by Hem Barua and P.C. Barooah, with regard to the Chinese protest against alleged Indian intrusion into Longju. Nehru replied in the negative about the prospects of war by China.² Speaking at a News Conference a little later Nehru said, "That is a question of opinion Sir, I do not think any total war is^a prospect in view".³ On June 11, 1962, Nehru said that diplomatic ties would stay. He also analysed the nature of war as a "war of nerves".⁴

There appears to be a sharp contrast of opinion expressed publicly on the floor of the House and expressed privately as a genuine feeling. To keep the morale of the public high, Nehru negated that any aggression by the Chinese side is

-
1. For details see, Appendix-2, enclosed therewith.
 2. Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. IV, No.39, June 6, 1962
Cols. 9100-06.
 3. The Statesman (New Delhi), 12.6. 1962.
 4. The Hindu. (Madras), 12.6. 1962

imminent whereas, in reply to an interview held as early as 1954, Nehru gauged the Chinese intentions. He stated, "..... say in twenty years time, when they are strong and modern, then the picture would be quite different and they will probably be a menace...."¹ On the contrary, on June 22, 1962, the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, affirmed the chances of imminent clashes between India and China. He was speaking in response to an oral question No.1637, raised jointly by Bhakt Darshan and P.C. Barooah. On the part of the Government of India it was a clear cut acceptance of the ups and downs of relations. Dinesh Singh categorically admitted that aggression was imminent². The question therefore arises why the Government was not prepared to face aggression which it had anticipated? The Rajya Sabha's First Session continued from 14-6-1962 to 11-5-1962, where 9 questions in general figure dealing with the Trade Agreement, Discussion on Indians in the National People's Republic of China, the Chinese suggestion for common vigilance over Air-Space regarding publication of certain objectionable articles in the China Today. The questions raised and answered shed no direct light on the border dispute.

-
1. Taya Zinkin, Reporting India, (London), Chatto and Windus, 1962, pp. 208-9.
 2. Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. V, No.51, June 22, 1962 Cols. 12427-31. Also see The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 6.8. 1960, where Nehru assured the Parliament of a major conflict if the Chinese made further encroachments.

In 1962 there was a tendency to furnish the Lok Sabha with day to day information. In a reply to a written question number 747 raised by Rishang Keishing, Nehru said that in NEFA, 317 miles 4 furlongs of all weather and fair weather motorable roads were constructed.¹ The reply showed a sharp contrast to the concealment of information about the construction of the Aksai Chin road.

During the II Session of III Lok Sabha which was held from August 6 to September 7, 1962, 25 meetings were held, the number of questions admitted was as follows:²

1. Starred ... 869
2. Unstarred - including starred questions converted into unstarred questions -2508
3. Short Notice Questions - 14

The preceding Tables bear a testimony to the lack of interest or adequate appreciation of the gravity of the border dispute by the Members of the Lok Sabha during the mid 1962 debates. There were lesser interruptions during this 25 working-days session from August 6 to September 7, 1962. Out of a total of 2548 unstarred questions 862 fell in oral category. However, only ⁷ questions pertained to the Sino-Indian

1. Resume, Third Series, Vol. VIII, No.25, September 7, 1962 Col. 6939.

2. Ibid., Col. 5254.

border dispute. Within its perview fell the topics like—the Chinese attitude towards Indian Traders in Tibet, nature of dispute, the number of minor clashes between the forces of the two Governments, the police withheld by the Chinese on the border and the photographs of Indian border being taken by the Chinese. The period presented a dull picture of a lulled Lok Sabha. The situation on the border both diplomatically as well as militarily was fast deteriorating but there was not a single short Notice Question in Lok Sabha during this period, whereas on various subjects 14 Short Notice Questions were raised, replied and recorded.¹

Side by side, in the Rajya Sabha, the next session commenced on 14.6. 1962 and ended on 26.6.1962. The record of questions raised in the Rajya Sabha indicated considerable interest with regard to China. There were 9 questions, but the questions hardly bore any relation to the border dispute. The highest number of questions in the Rajya Sabha was recorded during the following session of the Rajya Sabha falling from 6.8.1962 to 7.9. 1962. The questions ranged from anti-Indian propaganda in the Chinese newspapers to Indian students in China. There were eleven questions in all.

1. For details see Appendix- 3.

When the aggression took place a special Session of Lok Sabha was held but there was no alarming rise of questions during the next Session between November 8 and December 11, 1962. However, not a single question pin-pointed the border dispute.¹ 5 questions which were with regard to relations as such were related to the Chinese espionage-activities, Indian POWs in China, the Chinese propaganda, injured Jawans in the hospitals and Afro-Asian solidarity in Colombo, resulting in the Colombo-Proposals. The official record of questions raised and admitted was as follows:²

1. Starred ... 359
2. Unstarred including Starred Questions converted as Unstarred 853
3. Short Notice Questions 15

The Rajya Sabha's official record also presents no better picture of interest, shown by its Members during the last session of the year between 8.11.62 and 12.12.1962.

During the end of III Session, on November 22, 1962, Vishnu Kamath raised a question with regard to the cease-fire on the Sino-India border. He vigorously asked for a discussion

1. For details see Appendix-IV.

2. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. XI, No. 26, December 11, 1962, Col. 5394.

on the Chinese Government's latest note of November 20, 1962. But no discussion took place on that note and Kamath appeared satisfied with his expressed opinion in the House.¹ Nehru again limited the scope of parliamentary intervention by plainly telling that a detailed discussion on such matters would not occur as only fundamentals were to be decided in the House, which is the forum to urge views and make suggestions. The Government he added, drew its path through the light shed by the Parliament. Bagri reacted to it and suggested that during sessions all matters should be first discussed in the House. This would also give satisfaction to the masses that on the boundary issue, the House had thoroughly guided the Government. However, this demand to hold public-discussions on the boundary problem went unheeded and the Speaker, Hukum Singh, concluded the question by refusing to welcome any subsequent question or suggestion.² The next day, on November 23, 1962, Vishnu Kamath with greater vigour asserted that the Parliament should lay down the policy and principles, "It is all the more necessary in this context that Parliament should consider how far even a hypothetical

-
1. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. X, No.12, Nov.22 1962, Third Session, Cols. 2922-23, "... before the House adjourns will the House have opportunity of, if not discussing at least, expressing its views on the Chinese Government's note".
 2. Ibid., The Third Series, Vol. X, No.12, No.22, 1962, Third Session, Cols. 2922-26. Letter exchanged between the Prime Minister of India and China is placed in the Library. See No. LT-573/62.

acceptance of the proposal would mean or entail a serious departure from the policy laid down in Resolution..... adopted unanimously by the House.¹

DEMAND FOR GRANTS:

The general discussion of policy and assessment of the work of respective Ministries is also made through the motion on Demands for Grants. Such a discussion takes place only in the Lok Sabha. The Rajya Sabha is constitutionally denied the right to originate or discuss such a motion. On May 12, 1962, the Demands of Grants for the Ministry of External Affairs were raised and discussed and the proceedings occupied no less than 255 columns of the printed debates (Cols- 4035-4280) wherein the Opposition tried to pull the leg of the Government on the Sino-India border dispute. Nehru was vociferous in condemning Frank Anthony's demand to denounce non-alignment. He said "heatedly" that India would be damned and doomed if she changed this policy. "Amidst thunderous applause", he declared "The whole idea is horrible, intolerable..."² The suggestion of Frank Anthony to make an outright rejection of non-alignment "surprised" Nehru.³ All

1. Ibid., Third Series, Vol. X, No. 13, November 23, 1962, Third Session, Col. 3181.

2. The Times of India, (New Delhi), 15.5. 1962

3. The Hindu (Madras), 15.5. 1962.

the members expressed their grave concern over the Sino-India relations and demanded for an amelioration of relations. They urged the Government to make an early settlement of the border dispute, the Government in response reassured the House to resolve the dispute at their earliest. "What added to the excitement of the House", was Nehru's remark in Parliament that some Indian posts were established by the side of the Chinese posts.¹ On May 13, 1962, this motion was not discussed, however, on May 14, 1962, the Demands for Grants were approved without any cut. "In Lok Sabha today several members voiced their criticism against the Chinese Government's attitude to the border dispute. During this debate, the members pleaded for suitable action."² This Demands for Grants Debate was charged with emotions. There was considerable stir in the House and the Opposition parties were divided in their attitude towards the trend of the Chinese diplomacy and the policy of the Government of India in relation to it. The focal point of the speech of Nehru was a pleading for or defence of the policy of non-alignment. "The border conflict, however, occupied only a small portion of Mr. Nehru's attention and that too towards the close of his

1. K. Rangaswami, "Chinese Bang the Door" Ibid.

2. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), May 14, 1962.

reply to the debate on the Demands for Grants. Thus "What occasioned a mild excitement was the open advocacy of retaliatory action against China."¹ In short, the Demands for Grants Debate was a "spirited defence of Government's policy of non-alignment" in which a "detailed reference"² was made to the border dispute.

PAPERS LAID ON THE TABLE

All important documents, letters, notes and memoranda are laid on the Table of the Lok Sabha and consequently placed in the Library. It is one of the parliamentary processes to bring the administration to book and lime-light. However, this method does not bear any direct or indirect influence over the issue, as no formal discussion takes place over such papers. White papers were also laid on the Table on March 16, 1962, covering the official correspondence between the Governments of India and China from December 3, 1961 to February 13, 1962.³ During the Opening Session the White Papers were the only documents to be laid on the Table.⁴

THE DEBATES ON MOTIONS.

The Lok Sabha happens to be not only a committee to

1. Ibid., 20.5. 1962

2. Ibid., 15.5. 1962

3. Lok Sabha Debates, II Series, Vol.XLI, No.5, March 16, 1962 Col.691.

4. See Appendix -V

ventilate public grievances or the watch-dog of the overall complex network of the administrative set-up but also a debating society. The floor of this public forum was occupied by the elongated debates on the Sino-Indian border dispute in the later half of 1962. However, the first half of 1962 presented a quiet scene. The concern that the Members of the Parliament showed to the dispute was more evidenced by other parliamentary modes such as questions, demands for grants and ministerial statements. The specific motions were not designed to focus attention directly on the border dispute. During the opening session of the Lok Sabha from March 12 to 30, 1962 and the First session from April 9 to June 22, 1962, no separate motion was moved to discuss the situation on the Sino-Indian borders. Though there were reported minor incursions, espionage activities, propaganda against the Governments of India and China, secret movement of troops and police-patrolling across the border, the debates of the Lok Sabha did not pay adequate attention to it. On July 18, 1962, while speaking at a meeting of the Punjab Civil Secretariat Employees Union, the Defence Minister, Menon, admitted that the Chinese were at better and advantageous position at present, "He declared amidst cheers that on the northern border there are no parts of our area where Chinese encroachments still existed".¹ After the aggression in Ladakh

1. The Times of India (New Delhi), 19.7. 1962.

region, Nehru moved a Special Resolution in the Lok Sabha on August 13, 1962, over which a long discussion occurred from August 13 to 14, 1962, covering 143 columns of the printed debate. It was a heated and emphatic discussion analysing the ups and downs of relations, tracing the past history of incursions. It was the first annual assessment of the border situation made in 1962.¹ The House presented an uproarious scene specially over with-holding information from the Parliament and not taking it into confidence. There were repeated interruptions and the speeches of all the 23 Members, who participated in the debate on August 13, 1962, were marked by the volley of questions, regarding the latest situation on the border and want of confidence in the House. The Opposition hurled criticism over the non-alignment policy and asked for a more strict stand with regard to China. However, the policy of the Government of India with regard to the border dispute was accepted and adopted the next day. Nehru realised the need to reassure the House of the utility of its confidence. He emphasised the need of informing and consulting the Parliament. In a vigorous tone, Nehru said, "... first of all nothing can happen without this House being informed...."² Two substitute

1. Ibid., Third Series, Vol. VI, No.6, August 13, 1962
Cols. 1477-1630.

2. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. VI, No.7
August 14, 1962, Cols. 1778.

motions were moved and negatived and two more amendments remained unconsidered. The purpose behind this particular debate was such to create more faith in Nehruite policy. The speaker, Hukum Singh, concluded the debate by expressing staunch faith in Nehru that everybody in the House dittoed and supported everything that had been expressed by Nehru.¹

After August 14, 1962 till the massive invasion occurred the Lok Sabha did not move or discuss any new motion regarding the border situation. The Cabinet as the Chief Executive, handled the problem and the Members of Parliament remained busy with 'legislation' and other domestic issues. In the wake of the Chinese aggression there was a general feeling that it, "may be necessary to convene Parliament earlier than the scheduled time, though it is not too early to talk of a national government. Parliament will reflect the unanimous resolve of the representatives of the people to repel Chinese aggression, making it clear that it is futile for her to seek friends in India".² However, on October 20, 1962, when the aggression was launched no special session of the Parliament was convened, no debate was held, perhaps such general debates during an aggresssion would have been fruitless. On October

1. Ibid., Col. 1782

2. Editorially, 'The Chinese Aggressors, The National Herald (Lucknow) 23.10. 1962.

26, 1962, the President proclaimed the Emergency under clause (1) of article 352 of the Constitution. On November 8, 1962, a separate motion was moved and the House approved of the Proclamation of Emergency. "There was a long burst of applause as Mr. Nehru warmly praised the courage and endurance of the soldiers on the battle front".¹ A long and passionate discussion took place lasting for 6 days in which 166 Members participated covering a total of 1108 columns of the printed debate.

In the month of November	No. of members spoken	Time consumed (Hours)	Cols. covered	Resolutions adopted
(1) 8	10	12.25-17.01	106-218	2 resolutions moved by Nehru. ²
(2) 9	14	12.53-17.36	386-500	Not concluded. ³
(3) 10	25	12.11-19.25	633-830	Not concluded. ⁴
(4) 12	40	12.12-20.16	916-1134	Not Concluded. ⁵
(5) 13	44	12.30-20.23	1253-1452	Not concluded. ⁶
(6) 14	33	12.01-17.39	1532-1680	Concluded. 19 Amendments negated and unanimously adopted. ⁷
6	166	36.09	1108	Unanimously adopted

1. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 9.11. 1962

2. Ibid., III Series, Vol. IX, No.1, November 8, 1962

3. Ibid., No. II, November 9, 1962.

4. Ibid., No. III, November 10, 1962.

5. Ibid., No. IV, November 12, 1962.

6. Ibid., No. V, November 13, 1962.

7. Ibid., No. VI, November 14, 1962.

"The discussion that followed was not calculated to emphasise the gravity of the occasion. Interruption as during Mr. Nehru's speech also took away some of the seriousness that tried to invest the debate....".¹

The first resolution "amidst" thunderous applause"² adopted the Proclamation of Emergency and the other one regretted the Chinese aggression on the Indian soil, appreciated the valour of the soldiers and resolved to drive out the enemy. These resolutions, however, did not approve the policy of the Government of India. "... amid cheers from all parties", Nehru said that India would meet the challenge with unflinching determination. His utterance was greeted with applause, the "Opposition shouted" as well as expressed its sense of appreciation. The Opposition also availed itself of every opportunity at this critical juncture and showed their reaction and resentment by tabling a no-confidence motion on account of Government's "inactive and unprincipled foreign and defence policy". Due to certain procedural details the motion got abandoned. Under the pressure of public opinion Menon resigned on November 1, 1962.³ During the Proclamation of Emergency Debate, the Members used

1. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 9.11. 1962.

2. The Indian Express(New Delhi), 9.11. 1962.

3. Ibid., III Series, Vol. IX, No.II, November 9, 1962
Cols. 385-500.

abusive language against the Chinese people like Maurya said that the Chinese were⁸ bloody race, opiumites and sons of Changez Khan. However, the Speaker, Hukum Singh, requested the members to be calculated while delivering speeches and not to use abusive and unparliamentary language.¹ Side by side, there were "uproarious scenes" and occasional "laughters" in the House though a grave issue was under consideration.² The beginning of the debate was passionate, speeches were heated and off and on interruptions were there. However, when the debate was on the verge of conclusion, less interruptions were noticed and the noisy atmosphere of the House was replaced by calm and moderate speeches by the Senior Members. The policy of the Government of India so far pursued was approved on December 10, 1962, through a separate motion regarding the border situation, resulting from the invasion.³

Date	No. of speakers	Time	Columns covered	Motions moved and adopted
10.12.62	21	12.15 $\frac{1}{2}$ to 17.48 hours	5088-5228	Moved by Nehru, concluded and adopted the same day. 10 amendments were proposed. ⁴

1. Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. IX, No. III, November 10, 1962, col. 801.
2. Ibid., Col. 642, (Shrimati Renu Chakravarti's Statement invited laughter in the House).
3. For details see, Appendices.
4. Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. XI, No. 25, December 10, 1962, "This House having considered the border situation resulting from the invasion of India by China approves of the measures and policy adopted by the Government to meet it."

Nehru reviewed in the House, the situation of aggression at Sela and Walong, future of Colombo-proposals and date-wise assessment of the cease-fire. He narrated the contents of the letters sent by him to the Chinese Government, which till December 10, 1962 had rejected the proposal for September 8, Status quo ante. After the cease-fire was declared, there were three major questions to be considered by the Government of India (1) To agree to the cease-fire, (2) to withdraw 20 kilometers each from the November 7, 1957 line of actual-control and (3) to negotiate the issue.

Nehru, in full put forth the past history of incursions. Before September 8, 1962, there was no active aggression in NEFA except in Longju. The Chinese Government repeatedly assured the Indian Government not to cross the Mc Mahon Line. When after the October invasion, the Chinese suggested unilaterally to cease-fire, India agreed to it. However, India desisted from reliance on Chinese verdicts and endeavoured to curb their expansionist-designs/^{Nehru} reiterated India's regard for non-alignment and faith in pacific methods. Hirendra Nath Mukerjee praised Nehru and categorically supported non-alignment. P.K. Deo considered October 20, 1962, as the turning point of Indian history, ending the chapter of disillusion. He did not support the Indian Government's September 8, 1962 stand. He proposed reappraisal of non-alignment and suggested that India should be aligned with either bloc. U.N. Dhebar, Surendra Nath

Diwedi, A.P. Jain, Yajnik and Desappa, supported the Government policy. Surendra Nath further stressed the desirability of building a better military position. Almost all the speakers harped on the same strings. Frank Anthony thought that the ceasefire was a calculated piece of Chinese diplomacy. Nehru was at his wits end with regard to implications in the spate of correspondence in the garb of the White Papers. The Lok Sabha would have been of immense importance had it discussed the White Papers at least in this crucial year. But these letters, notes and memoranda, exchanged between the two Governments, were never debated and discussed in separate motions. There was no demand as such to discuss them. On the Defence of India Rules Bill debate, a motion was moved by A.K. Sen on which an elongated debate occurred. Members of the Opposition, like H.N. Mukerjee, D.C. Sharma, U.G. Chaudhry, A.C. Guha, H. Barua and R.D. Pande, with genuine interest referred to the cease-fire proposal of the Chinese Government for consideration by the House.

The Debate that took place during 1962, had shed ample light on the nature and scope of interest which the Lok Sabha took in the border dispute. The debates and discussions were long enough to consume enormous time of the House but their standard was not low. They would have been more worthwhile

if they had been held frequently as the crisis was developing and had been more concerned with failure and failings of the Government and suggestions for meetings both militarily and diplomatically, the Chinese aggression that was in the offing. The debates were in the nature of a post-mortem on what had happened and of course had no magic power to undo the decision of the Government. However, these debates were useful in the sense that they led Nehru to become more realistic in his idealistic diplomacy with regard to China and other disputes. The debates also pressurised Nehru to confirm the desirability of confiding more in Parliament, consult it more occasionally and furnish it with timely information.

The Rajya Sabha debates during this period were less detailed. The longest debate occurred on 23.9.1962, where the Sino-India border dispute was referred occasionally. Most of the points were mere repetition of the Lok Sabha debate.¹ On November 9, 1962, Nehru responded, as always, to the calmer atmosphere of the Upper House. As compared to November 8 debate in the Lok Sabha, Nehru was more restrained in the Rajya Sabha in both voice and metaphor.²

CALLING ATTENTION MOTIONS:

The Parliament utilizes the mode of calling attention motion to draw the attention of the Government to any neglected

-
1. Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, Official Record, Vol. XXXIX, No. 9, September 23, 1963, Cols. 1624-1791.
 2. The Times (London), 10.11.1962.

matter of urgent public importance. In response to such a Motion, the Government had to express its clarifications and justifications. This mode pinpoints an issue and focusses the interest of the members of Parliament to it. In the opening session of the Lok Sabha from March 12 to 30, 1962, however, no such motion was passed. In the first session from April 19 to June 22, Hem Barua asked for such a motion pressurising Nehru to make a statement upon the reported decision of Pakistan and China to negotiate alignment of boundary between Kashmir and the Chinese Sinkiang. In response to such a motion, Nehru stated that the Chinese claimed that the borders between India and China were never demarcated. It was a false Chinese claim. Narayan Das asked Nehru if the whole boundary had been discussed. Nehru replied that he could not exactly say. The Members of Parliament indicated more interest by raising a number of supplementary questions to the motion under discussion. However, the Speaker, Hukum Singh, asked the Members not to raise more questions. The time of the session was already allotted to discuss all the matters on the agenda. He had told the members that no more questions would be welcomed.¹ P.K. Deo, tabled another motion on May 22 against the alleged entry of some of the Chinese into Indian territory. Smt. L. Menon, made a

1. Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. II, No. 16, May 7 1962, Cols. 2872-2870.

statement thereon. And also, "Prime Minister Nehru assured anxious Members of Lok Sabha that there has not been any attempt for incursion by the Chinese along the Mc Mahon Line on NEFA except for a minor one at NEFA.¹ In response to this calling attention notice by Rama Chandra Vilhat Bare, the SSP Members were intervening off and on. Hem Barua drew the attention of the House to the reported intrusion into Gorakhpur and Basti. On June 13, 1962, P.C. Barooah called attention of the Defence Minister to the reported move of the Chinese tanks and armoured vehicles, Indian air attacks in North Ladakh and the Chinese convoys of military vehicles in southern Sinkiang to Qizil Jilga in occupied Aksai Chin.² This was a critical juncture when the "stormy scenes" were witnessed in the Lok Sabha. The P.S.P. member, S.N. Dwivedi remarked that the Prime Minister was surrendering the country to the Chinese to which Nehru contended that the questions asked by some Members with regard to the borders, did not help building up the morale of the country. This "led to stormy scenes in Lok Sabha today marked by sharp and heated exchanges". "In a voice quivering with indignation", Nehru asked if it was proper to say that he was surrendering the nation to the Chinese". "Tempers were frayed on both sides for nearly 15 minutes", when the P.S.P. Members demanded Nehru to withdraw

1. The Hindu (Madras), 23.6. 1962

2. Ibid., Vol. V, No.44, June 13, 1962, Cols, 10563-10576.

his Statement that questions on border would let down the country's morale. The Congress Members were equally agitated over Dwivedi's observation that the Prime Minister was surrendering the country to the Chinese. "Despite the Speaker's repeated appeals for maintaining decorum, sharp exchanges continued for some time".¹ When Nehru said that the Members were not helping in building morale, the "remark provoked loud protests from Mr. Dwivedi and other P.S.P. members". "While there were cheers from the Congress benches P.S.P. members stood en bloc angrily gesticulating at the treasury benches". "As the noise subsided, Nath Pai resented that we are not interested in breaking public morale". He said, "we are here to exercise our legitimate and elementary duty which justifies our presence in the House. Whenever we ask for a simple information, the charge is levelled that we are interested in breaking the morale". Some Congress members tried to "shout down" Nath Pai. "It was a matter of great regret that the Prime Minister lost his temper whenever certain matters seemed to them legitimate were raised in the House".² On June 16, 1962, there was furore over India's China policy. "In tumult that broke out in the Lok Sabha this week on the calling attention motions members from the treasury

1. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 14.6. 1962.

2. Ibid.

benches glared balefully at their opponents". It was the first frontal P.S.P. attack. The uproar was during reply to a motion on the reported movement of Chinese vehicles in the Chinese occupied territory in NEFA and Ladakh.¹

On June 22, Bare called the attention of the Prime Minister to the reported occupation by China of Indian territory in NEFA.² Nehru explained in the House, "In NEFA area there has been ^{not} a single incursion etc., except for the fact that two years ago or three years ago there was this Longju incident and except for the fact that two officers—not a force—came down half a mile to that village Rai.... He was sure that there had been no other incursion on the Mc Mahon Line."³

HALF-AN- HOUR DISCUSSION:

The matters of urgent public importance are also discussed under this head in the Parliament. However, the Sino-Indian border dispute was never discussed through this process. In the opening session, no such discussion occurred.

1. Ibid., 17.6. 1962

2. Ibid., III Series, Vol. V, No.51, June 22, 1962
Cols. 12494-12498.

3. Ibid., Col. 12498.

During the First Session, nine such discussions took place but none of them had any relation to the problem under study.¹ During the second session also, there was no discussion on the border problem though there were five half-an-hour discussions.² The half-an-hour discussion process was, thus, not utilised as a means to focus attention on the Sino-India border problem.

ADJOURNMENT MOTIONS:

Attention of the Government is also drawn to a particular problem through a motion to adjourn the House. These motions are the best mode of ventilating public grievances. It is a point of significance that two adjournment motions were given notice by Nath Pai and Yogendra Jha and five calling attention notices by Nath Pai, Barooah, Krishna Pal Singh, R.V. Bade, Mrs. Maimoona Sultan-- regarding the Chinese ultimatum, demanding the withdrawal of the Indian patrols from the two check posts, were taken together.³ During the first half of the Lok Sabha Debates, the language of the newspapers appears to be mild and less comments are traceable. On May 10, 1962, the Opposition in the Lok Sabha

-
1. Resume, Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. V, No.51, June 22, 1962, Col. 12647.
 2. Ibid., Vo. VIII, No.25, September 7, 1962, Col. 6937.
 3. Ibid., III Series, Vol. II, No.16, May 3, 1962, Cols. 2457-60.

presented such a motion in resentment against the failure of the Government to place before the House, the Note of the Chinese Embassy, of the same month. However, the Speaker dispelled such a motion. The House and the Members quelled themselves by showing their "resentment"¹ against the anti-social activities, attributed to the Chinese missions in India. Nehru replied to these motions seeking to know about the nature of the latest note of May from China. Nehru told "a cheering Lok Sabha" that whatever may be the Chinese threats, India would hold on its posts in Ladakh and elsewhere.² During the opening session thirty three motions were received and 12 were brought before the House.³ During the first session from April 16 to June 22, 1962, ten such notices were brought before the House. One was admitted but leave was not granted by the House. One was ruled out of order; for ten consent was withdrawn by the Speaker.⁴ For five minutes Hem Barua called for such a motion regarding reported Chinese incursion into Indian territory. The members of the Parliament expressed gratitude

1. The Statesman (New Delhi), 11.5. 1962

2. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 4.5. 1962. Contra. The Hindu, (Madras), 4.5. 1962. "Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha yesterday has been generally reported without any comment".

3. Resume, II Series, Vol. LXII, No. 14, March 30, 1962, Col. 2800.

4. Resume, Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. V, No. 51, June 22, 1962, Col. 12648.

over the adjournment motion called by Hem Barua which furnished required and relevant information to the House about the improved border situation.¹ During the II session, the situation obtained as follows:²

1. Brought before the House	... 15
2. Admitted but leave not granted 1
3. Ruled out of order	... None
4. Consent withheld by the Speaker	... 14

However, on June 20, the Speaker withheld his consent to such an adjournment motion.³

MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS:

In the opening session from 12.3. 1962 to 30.3. 1962, no Statement on the Sino-Indian border dispute is to be noticed. Though 37 notices were received as statements made under Rule 197, calling attention to matters of Urgent Public Importance, 8 statements were made by the Ministers,⁴ where no statement was on the border dispute. First statement was made by the Prime Minister, in response to a Calling Attention Motion on May 7, 1962, regarding the border alignment by China

-
1. Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. V, No. 46, June 20, 1962, Cols. 11934-37.
 2. Resume, Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. VIII, No. 25 Col. 6939.
 3. Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. V, No. 49, June 20, 1962, Cols. 11934-36.
 4. Resume, Lok Sabha Debates, II Series, Vol. LXII, No. 14 March 30, 1962, Cols. 2799.

and Sinkiang border on May 11, 1962. Nehru made a statement regarding the firing on an Indian Policeman from the Chinese Trade Agency in Kalimpong on March 22, 1962.¹

In the first session, a spectacular rise is to be noticed in the number of statements when 600 notices were received and 65 statements were made by the Minister.² In the Rajya Sabha, from April 17, 1962 - May 11, 1962, one statement of no significance was made. During the second session, 358 notices received for it but only 23 were made.³ On September 3, 1962, Mrs. L. Menon made a significant statement regarding the establishment of 30 new posts in the Ladakh region by the Chinese troops.⁴ However, in the Rajya Sabha, no ministerial statement was made. On November 11, 1962, during the III Session, Nehru made a short statement in the Lok Sabha regarding the reported Chinese offer to ceasefire. He regretfully traced the development that had occurred. China offered a unilateral cease-fire on November 21/22 and the forces were to withdraw on December 12, 1962. The offer was in the air but so far no official confirmation

1. Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. II, No. 22, May 11, 1962, Cols. 3941-62.

2. Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. V, No. 51, June 22, 1962 Col. 12648.

3. Ibid., Vol. VIII, No. 25, September 7, 1962, Col. 6937

4. Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. VIII, No. 22, September 3, 1962, Cols. 5530-38.

was received. India's demand was to restore the September 8, 1962, position. This statement by Nehru was evaluated by Hari Vishnu Kamath who, on a demand of clarification and information suggested that the Parliament should remain in session till the emergency lasted. He said, "The Chinese Government seems to be adept at their game of fraud and deception and when the situation could be so fluid, I would request you, the leader of the House will agree, ... thatⁱⁿ/this parliamentary democratic set up, the **Parliament of** the Nation must continue to be in session and have the privilege of advising and guiding the Government in this emergency."¹

Reminding the House of the statement made by Nehru, Vishnu Kamath reiterated that India would not negotiate until the land was cleared of the invaders, "and Parliament has had the privilege of endorsing whole heartedly that declaration and I hope that he will today give a categorical assurance to Parliament, to the nation that he will stand firm, by the policy which has been clearly enunciated by the Government and endorsed by the Parliament of the nation and there will be no departure from that policy."² The continuous interest showed by the members

1. Ibid., III Series, Vol. X, No. 11, November 21, 1962, Third Session, Col. 2689-2702. Also see, Ibid., Statement by Shri Ranga and Ram Sevak Yadav in Cols. 2968 and 2695 respectively.

2. Ibid., Col. 2691.

encouraged the government.¹ Moreover, they urged the Government to take all aspects of the problems into consideration vis-a-vis the confidence of the House.² Nehru, though desirous to stand by the Parliament and guided by the general principles discussed in the House, was sceptical about the advisability of discussing the communications between the two Governments in the House.³ The general practice is not to discuss such communications as the White Papers, ^{and} Protest Notes in the House. During this particular statement period, one fact was noticed that the Speaker was not allowing the Members to express themselves beyond certain limits. He said, "I would ask hon. members to give only their reactions or any suggestion and not to press the Prime Minister to make any statement at this time. That is what I would advise hon. members that they should also restrain themselves."⁴ The members demanded to hold a secret session and desirability of more parliamentary consultations,⁵ to which no attention was paid.

In the second session there were 4 Statements on the border dispute regarding the situation in Ladakh, India's absence from the San Fransisco Peace-Conference and the

1. Ibid., Col. 2693 "We all would like to know, and everyone of us is interested in knowing what will come off of these things" (statement by Tyagi).

2. Ibid., Col. 2693 (statement by Hem Barua).

3. Ibid., Col. 2701.

4. Ibid., Col. 2692.

5. Ibid., Col. 2698 (statement by H.N. Mukerjee).

re-establishment of 30 new posts in Ladakh by the Chinese troops. P.K. Deo made a statement regarding inaccuracy in the Prime Minister's speech on the border situation made on August 14, 1962. On November 20, Nehru made a very pertinent statement regarding the situation in NEFA and Ladakh. He regretfully informed the House of the fall of Bomdila and Chushul.¹ Through statements also, Nehru emphasised the oft repeated plea of secrecy in foreign policy. He said that despite the desire to make every thing clear to the House and keeping the Lok Sabha specially informed of all developments, the Government had to adopt a policy of secrecy as disclosure is not a regular practice, for foreign policy issues. It is neither advisable nor fruitful but perilous. The Speaker agreed to it and asked the Prime Minister to reply only those questions as did not jeopardise the interest of the Nation.² In fact, the policy of secrecy is one of the most important factor which restrict the role of Parliament in foreign policy matters.

The very next day, as a matter of information, Nehru made another statement regarding the development in respect of the Chinese aggression.³ Within 28 minutes he informed the

1. Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. IX, No.10, November 20, 1962, Cols. 2453-68.

2. Ibid., Cols. 2453-68

3. Ibid., Vol. X, No. 11, November 21, 1962, Cols.2689-2702.

House of the Chinese Radio broadcast to cease-fire from mid-night of November 21/22, 1962. The ceasefire proposal, both inside and outside the Parliament, had been underrated in unflattering terms. Some labelled it as the ultimatum, some called it a perfidious strategem, a Trojan horse sent into our midst to scatter our reason, weaken our defences and a vicious trap.¹ The withdrawal was to occur on December 1, to which no official confirmation had yet been received. The last statement of this period was made on December 7, 1962, by Nehru about his visit to Assam and "other matters" from 12.11. hours to 12.54 hours. There was a volley of questions on this statement on border situation,² Obviously the term "other matters" referred to border dispute. In order to keep it confidential, ambiguous term was used. Hem Barua, in response to Nehru's statement regarding situation in Ladakh and NEFA said, "I agree completely with you that there are certain matters of strategy that must not be disclosed in this House, but at the same time, there are certain matters that do not have any bearing directly on matters of strategy. Those things are to be disclosed here because the country is anxious to know about them. The purpose of this Parliament is to

1. Notes on Comments, "Ceasefire", Parliamentary Studies, Vol. VI, No.12, December 1962, p. 6.

2. Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol.XI, No.23, December 7, 1962, Cols. 4737-4758.

voice the opinion of the country and to enlighten the country also in matters that do not directly affect the strategy or defence preparations...¹

The overall objective analysis of 1962 Parliamentary Debates leads to certain conclusions. The Parliament devoted enormous time to discuss the border problem. However, in the light of its gravity and being the very first dispute to be tackled by the Government of India, the time allotted to the issue was not sufficient. The Debates were not designed to set the guide lines for the foreign policy. Mere discussion over a fait accompli leads us nowhere. Long Debates presented a boring picture of the House where members dozed or hurled criticisms (and even chairs) at each other. The debates merely attempted the dispute in the general assessment of historical perspective, criticised certain failures of the Government. Throughout the year, however, only one specific motion was discussed otherwise the reference to the dispute was made here and there whenever the resolution regarding the international situation and the policy of the Government of India in regard thereto was discussed. There were occasional interruptions and laughter. However, these debates and criticisms of withholding all relevant information from

1. Ibid., Vol. X, No. 20, 1962, Cols. 2458.

Parliament received significant attention of Nehru. Before 1962, Nehru was never so emphatic in assuring the House to take Parliament into confidence. The discussions and pinpointed answers to questions were more informative and valuable than the day-long review of the entire international scene. Thus, in general foreign policy debates, the reference to the dispute was rather disappointing since the subject matter of a foreign policy motion was general. What one member said had little or no relation to the preceding speeches. They appeared to be a mess of disconnected discourses. There were only a few noteworthy speakers, like Minoo Masani, Hiren Mukerjee, Nath Pai, Kriplani, Asoka Mehta and Menon whose speeches sparkled with wit and wisdom. Their criticisms were often pertinent and constructive and focussed attention on the weaknesses of the minor or major policy decisions. Most of the speakers were divided in their opinions. There was no organised and unanimous Opposition to the Government's policy. The 6-day-discussion over the President's order of Proclamation of Emergency was of no avail. What is needed is to ask the Members to be brief and to the point, thereby curbing the futile length of their speeches. They should put forth certain concrete suggestions and guidelines to the Government.

One of the factors which limit the role of the Lok Sabha in this dispute was the failure on the part of the Members of Parliament to hold discussion on the papers laid on the Table

with regard to the dispute. Had the Members paid due attention to and showed more interest in the dispute, side by side held discussion over the White Papers, their contribution could have been lucrative and pertinent. However, occasional references were made to them in abundance but no separate Motion was proposed to discuss them.

Nehru had been at the height of his power and popularity until the Chinese aggression showed of nothing else than the 'gentle colossus' had feet of clay, and, though he was spared, his close confidant and colleague, Krishna Menon had to leave the Cabinet. The 1962 debacle caused a severe blow to his prestige and health and he could not be the same person again. His declining health and popularity enabled the Opposition to give both credibility and respectability in the period before the Fourth General Elections. Incidentally the Parliament also gained in stature as the focal point of Indian political system. Nehru was more than usual on the defensive and deferential in his attitude towards the Parliament. But the Parliament could not overcome the in-built limitations of a parliamentary system. Besides, the charismatic personality of Nehru was too towering and dominating to be damaged or tarnished by those who were elected as his votaries.

CHAPTER - VIIROLE OF PARLIAMENTCONSTITUTIONAL POSITION:

The Parliament, the Union Legislature under the Indian Constitution is constituted on the basis of bicameralism. Since the Constitution establishes a federal Government, the framers of the Constitution were unanimous for achieving a balance between the direct representatives of the people and the states as the units of federation.

The Lok Sabha (or the Lower House of the Parliament) is directly elected by the people whereas the Rajya Sabha (the Upper House), is indirectly elected. The Constitution provides comprehensive study of its structure.¹ The President is an integral part of the Parliament which includes the above mentioned two Houses. It is in conformity with the parliamentary

-
1. This elaborate description in the Constitution is vigorously criticised and commented upon by the Members of the Constituent Assembly and others like Sir Ivor Jennings in some Characteristics of Indian Constitution, 1952. Those who wanted to save the Constitution makers from this slur, justify it on the ground of containing articles on state Legislatures also. Ambedkar said that Indian democracy was, "only a top dressing soil which is essentially undemocratic", and the "Constitutional morality" of which Grote spoke, was not yet effectively diffused through the people, it required an elaborate constitution, Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, Col. 38.

system. It lays stress on the intimate relationship and interdependence of the Executive and the Parliament. The Cabinet functions as the grand Committee of the Lower House. The Parliament legislates, controls and directs internal administration and also controls the purse. Sovereignty of Parliament is a political myth which is derived from the political theory of Government, voting money.¹

Though the foreign policy-making and execution, as a rule, is regarded the prerogative of the Executive,² a measure of parliamentary supervision and control exists. The foreign policy making is an organised function of the Secretaries, the Ministry of External Affairs, Divisional Officers, Committees and Sub-committees of the Parliament and the Ministry of External Affairs. It is annually disclosed and discussed in the Parliament's opening-sessions by the Presidential-Address. This discussion and laying down the broad outlines of policy in the House is in conformity with the operation of the parliamentary system. The principle of Separation of Powers does not exist in India hence the Parliament is not 'excluded' from

1. N.N. Mullaya, "Parliamentary Surveillance of Administration The Role of Committees, Parliamentary Financial Committees" Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, Vol. I, No. 3, July-September, 1967, p. 15.

2. Parliaments, Inter Parliamentary Union, London, Cassel 1966, p. 285.

sharing the responsibilities of the Executive and the Vice-Versa. The Council of Ministers and the Cabinet, en bloc is collectively responsible to the Lower House of the Parliament.¹ The formulation and initiation of foreign policy is conducted by the Executive. In form of Resolutions or Motions it is put forth the Parliament for approval. The Government has a free hand in implementing the approved policy and the Parliament has the privilege of scrutinising this policy at all stages.

Article 246 of the Indian Constitution empowers the Parliament to legislate on all aspects of foreign affairs. Item No.10 of Article 246 in the Seventh Schedule says that the Parliament would legislate on "Foreign Affairs; all matters which bring the Union into relation with any foreign country".² This list also includes the paraphernalia of foreign affairs such as Defence, Naval, Military and Air-Force works, diplomatic consular and trade representations to the UNO and other international conferences, security of India, war and peace, foreign jurisdiction, citizenship emigration etc.

-
1. The Constitution of India, op. cit., p. 20, "The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People". Article 75.
 2. Article 246(1) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I of the Seventh Schedule". The Constitution of India, 1957

Since the parliamentary supervision and control of all executive enactments is inevitable, the Parliament can exercise the two way control. Firstly, by conducting a detailed examination of governmental activities either through preliminary intervention i.e. before the policy is proposed or adopted secondly, an expost facto supervision.¹ In the context of foreign policy, it exercises the latter kind of supervision.

MEASURES OF INFLUENCE:

As described in the Chapter III the first measure of influence is the Question-Hour. It can be quite effective if it is flexible enough. This procedure was introduced in France, specially and precisely to facilitate the supervision of foreign policy. It was realised that the general debates would be dangerous due to their public character and extempore nature of many statements. The procedure of Question-Hour can lead to enquiries and enlarge area of information, it can not lead to debates. Pin-pointed questions relating to foreign affairs and policy can be useful enough. Sometimes the questions miss the important issue. They enable the Ministers to keep in touch with the public opinion. Questions, if they repeatedly

1. S.L. Shankdher, "Administrative Accountability to Parliament" Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. XII, No. 3, July-September 1966, p.356.

hammer at a particular problem can act as catalyst and force the government to frame a definite policy. The procedure of Short Notice Questions and Supplementary Questions facilitates the process. The Question-Hour is the most practical way through which the Parliament gets the opportunity to scrutinise the Executive decisions.

Debates on Motions and Resolutions regarding foreign policy are the next mode of parliamentary enquiry and discussion. The 1959 session debates confirmed that there was unanimity over non-alignment. Ministerial Statements keep the House informed of the latest developments in international relations. These statements enable the Government to discuss the trends in Opposition. They also enable the Ministers to answer criticism and register parliamentary support to them. There is also scope for voluntary communique, publishing reports and summaries, on which fruitful discussion occurs. However, in India, the interpellation system is not in vogue. It is some sort of initiative of Parliament itself which is quite effective, as it gives rise to a general debate. It culminates in motions approving the action of the Government.¹ Ministerial statements serve a variety of purposes. When the Parliament is in session these statements enable it to be kept informed of the latest international developments. They provide publicity

1. Parliaments, op. cit, p. 287.

for explanations, elaboration of Ministerial policy and create a focus of scrutiny for Ministerial action. It enables the Ministers to face criticisms. There is one more "constitutional right" in the hands of the Member of Parliament. During 1966, the trend of Lok Sabha has shown that the House has successfully established the right that till the No-Confidence Motion is disposed off, no substantial policy be admitted and debated in the House. During the debate on such a motion the Members at large enjoy the right to question policy or any action of the Government.¹

Demands for Grants is an indirect kind of control. If a Motion regarding reduction of Grants and funds, token or total is approved, it would amount to a Vote of Censure and necessitate Cabinet resignation. It is a device, which the Members of Parliament use to oblige the Foreign Minister to give explanation on specific points. Budget Debate also brings the implications of foreign policy to book. It is confined to the financial implications of foreign policy carried out by the Government. Thus in regard to such debates, the role of the Indian Parliament becomes paramount. It provides opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny over the Governments conduct of foreign affairs through its essential power over the foreign affairs by obliging the Ministers to seek approval of their

1. Shankdher, op. cit., p.366

estimates. The record of Demands for Grants does not show any cut in grants. A Want of Confidence Motion or a No-Confidence Motion is a direct method of launching an attack on the Government. The Parliament can also exercise its supervision through its fact finding enquiry-Commissions and Committees. A detailed account of the utilization of all these parliamentary processes has been dealt in the other chapter.

PARLIAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES:

Treaties are the formal expression of the relationship established between or among the states. It is, in fact, the concrete embodiment of their foreign policies. In most Constitutions, the Treaty-making is a prerogative of the Sovereign body, Legislature. Without any prejudice to this constitutional common place, each country seems to have evolved its own way for the ratification of treaties, agreements and pacts. There is ^{one} no/system of ratification. On the basis of the seat of the actual treaty-making power, the treaty-making can be categorised into the following three types:

- (i) The Chief of the State may draw up and ratify treaties, largely unchecked by other branches;
- (ii) The power is divided between the Executive and the Legislature; in general, the approval of the latter being necessary for ratification of treaties.
- (iii) A compromise, by which, limitation is placed on the Chief of the State in making certain types of treaties.¹

1. A special correspondent, "Parliament and International Treaties", Parliamentary Studies, Vol. XII, No.4, April 1968, p.14.

Article 253 of the Constitution stipulates, "... Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any Treaty, Agreement or Convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other body".¹ Moreover, under Article 246, the Parliament is empowered exclusively, to legislate upon "Entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing of treaties, agreements and convention with foreign countries."² Since independence, India has entered into countless treaties, agreements, conventions and declarations. The procedure of treaty-making starts with the Executive initiating the negotiations, through appropriate diplomatic channels and when the negotiations mature, the agreement is finalised and is duly signed by the Chief of the Executive or its subordinate officer. Such an agreement is then placed on the table of both the Houses and the Members are allowed to raise questions. The procedure of formal ratification does not operate here.³ This is also a British convention in origin. In India, the silence of Parliament on a treaty signifies approbation. To the extent it has been so, it has been the result of the happy experience of legislature-executive

1. The Constitution of India, op. cit., p.71

2. Ibid., p. 140;

3. A special correspondent, Parliamentary Studies, op., cit. p.12.

relationship. On the basis of the majority that the Government commands in the Parliament, it makes all its decisions acceptable to the Parliament. Barring a few instances, the Parliament in India has remained informed of the conditions leading to fresh agreements. It has also enjoyed the power of discussion over a treaty. The treaty-making process saves the time of the Parliament, as the Parliament only partakes discussions but does not initiate, ratify or decide. There is an appreciable number of minor agreements over which Parliament could not form a judgment except by going into the details of the provision of a treaty. This is an important factor that an agreement, once signed by the Executive, can not practically wait for Parliament's approval, which may cause unnecessary delay. It has often been questioned how the Indian Constitution, under which all matters bringing the Union into relations with any foreign country are subjected to complete and exclusive authority of Parliament, leaves the initiation of treaty-making as an Executive-prerogative.

THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES AND THEIR ROLE:

The Parliamentary Committees also function as controlling and supervisory agents of Parliament. They are a medium of direct contact of administration with Parliament. G. Mavalankar made a speech before the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament on April 10, 1950, wherein he explained that in a set-up of freedom where the Government had to be responsible to the

Parliament, the Committees have four main objectives:

- "(i) to associate with and train as large a number of members as possible, not only in the ways in which the administration is carried out but also to make them conversant with the various problems that Government have to meet from day to day;
- (ii) to exercise control on the executive so that they do not become oppressive^{or}/arbitrary;
- (iii) to influence the policies of Government; and
- (iv) to act as a liaison between the Government and the general public".¹

Parliamentary Committees are maniaature of Parliament. On the working of the Parliamentary Committees no one would suggest that it should question a policy laid down by Parliament. The Committees are not made to do so, neither have they done it. They serve only as instruments of Parliament. What they examine and question is the Government policies. The Government lays down the policy and the task of the Committees is to peep into policies, criticise, analyse and advocate alternative policies if desirable.

CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE:

After independence, the system of Standing Committee was done away with² and the informal Consultative Committees were

1. Hiren Mukerjee, India and Parliament, (New Delhi), People's Publishing House, 1962, pp. 140-1.

2. S.S. More, Practice and Procedure of Indian Parliament, Bombay, 1960, p.514. For details of Indian Committee system also see, W.H. Morris Jones, Parliament in India, (London), Longmans, 1957, pp. 308-315.

set up in different Ministries and the major Departments of the Government. Before such a Committee was formed, there was a group of 25 Members of Parliament with whom Nehru used to have periodical meetings to consider foreign policy. In June 1969, this innovation was attempted. The word 'informal' was dropped and the Consultative Committees were created for all Ministries.

ORGANISATION:

The Consultative Committee of the Ministry of External Affairs is constituted in such a manner that the entire political mosaic of Parliament is represented in it. There are 20 members on the Consultative Committee, attached to the Ministry of External Affairs, 11 from the Lok Sabha and 9 from the Rajya Sabha. With regard to its functions Para II of the 'Guide Lines' lays down, "Members of Parliament are free to discuss any matter which can appropriately be discussed in Parliament". Efforts have been made to curb its powers and influence, to the extent that it does not become more powerful than the Cabinet and the Executive itself. A lot of care has been taken to prevent the Committee from becoming more effective than what the Executive considers necessary and desirable.¹

1. K.P. Misra, "Foreign Policy-Planning Efforts in India The Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis Journal, Vol. II, No. 4, April 1970, pp. 397-399.

The Committee includes people from all shades of opinion, belonging to different political parties, in proportion to their strength in the Parliament. The Foreign Minister is the ex-officio Chairman of the Committee. The 1970 Committee has got 32 members from both the Houses of Parliament, including the Minister of External Affairs and the Minister of State for the same. The Deputy Chief Whip is the incharge of the Committee and at the beginning of every Parliament, he calls their meeting twice during each session, to advise the External Ministry on foreign policy problems. It is an extra-constitutional and purely conventional organisation. Other similar Committees, having some connection with foreign policy are the Consultative Committee for the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and the Ministry of Atomic Energy. The Consultative Committee of the Parliament for the Ministry of External Affairs in India, is a transmission belt between the Foreign Ministry and Parliament. It conveys the Government Official policy from one centre to another. Its Members receive detailed explanations about the policy. They are privileged to have significant say with regard to the same. In the functioning of this Committee, a new trend has developed. Though expected to meet twice during every session, it met twice between the summoning of Parliament after the Fourth General Elections, that is on October 27, 1969 and February 10, 1970. During its first meeting, the agenda

consisted of problems relating to Nepal and South-East Asia but with an uproar, it dealt with the Rabat-Fiasco. Even in its next meeting, excluding the agenda, it discussed India's nuclear policy vis-a-vis Chinese stance. It reduced it "playing a relatively effective agitational, if not consultative role, in the making of India's Foreign Policy". There were other active Consultative Committees. Most notable is the Committee for the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the meeting of which was held on July 6, 1969. The Committee put forth various suggestions, with regard to export promotion. Further, the Consultative Committee for the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, met on March 3, 1970 and expressed resentment against the massive propaganda carried on by foreign missions in India. In the same manner, the Consultative Committee of the Ministry of Atomic Energy in its meeting of March 31, 1970 made the Government enquire into and prepare a report on the cost of developing nuclear weapons. This pressure exerted by it, supports the view that the role of Committees can only make a marginal difference to the generally less effective role played by our Parliament in this regard. In the words of Chagla, the Committee is, "more of an agency for getting the policies accepted and meeting criticism than for influencing foreign policy".¹ In the 1970 Committee, the Members showed

1. Bandyopadhyaya, op. cit., pp. 135-6

balanced outlook. They were neither rash in youthfulness nor timid on account of their age. In exceptional situations also, the Members expressed their mature and well informed opinion in the realm of foreign policy. Their educational qualifications were encouraging as the 90% of the Members had the opportunity to have University education. The Members had a high parliamentary experience, the majority of them consisted of those who had seen the foreign policy from close quarters and were well aware of the Parliamentary Procedure and the working of its committee.

TABLE I

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Under 40 years.	5	17
Between 40 and 60 years.	17	57
Over 60 years.	8	27

TABLE II

Without University Education	3	10
With University Education	27	90
Studied abroad.	8	27

TABLE III¹Parliamentary Experience:

One term.	5	17
More than one term	25	83

1. K.P. Misra, op. cit., pp. 400-1.

FINANCIAL CONTROL OF POLICY THROUGH COMMITTEES:

There are three different Committees of the Government.

1. Standing Finance Committee.
2. Estimates Committee.
3. Public Accounts Committee.

These Committees are inter-related. The First one has given a go-by due to which there is a serious lacuna in the Parliament. Supplementary Demands for Grants are often presented to the Estimates Committee. The Public Accounts Committee makes a post mortem scrutiny. In the absence of the Standing Committee, such demands escape the examination, the Constitution wishes them to undergo. The work in the Committees is more concentrated and effective than the work in the House. There is more solidarity and substance in the work of Committees.

FACTORS ECLIPSING THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT:

The above mentioned ways of control and supervision of foreign policy by the Parliament are subject to certain limitations. The Parliament functions under lobbies and pressures from within and without. Nehru had his own 'personality-cult' and enjoyed the confidence of the masses. He was all in all while arriving at decisions. There was a dis-jointed and disorganised Opposition in working. The Parliament is not a body that plans things in isolated tranquillity. The Members are not free or independent to decide the policy or initiate it at any stage. Their freedom is impeded by their party-

affiliations. The discussions of the Members are influenced by the Members' contact with each other.¹ The extent of the influence of the organised pressures within Parliament depends upon how important the Parliament is within the system of Government it operates and what position does the Parliament occupy collaterally in relation to the Executive or Cabinet. In India, the Parliamentary system in practice has established the Cabinet as an institution, weilding more power than Parliament. It is not Parliament which controls the Cabinet but it is the latter which is more influential. For the Congress-Cabinet, it was easier to overpower the Parliament, due to its thumping majority. Secondly, Nehru's universally accepted charismatic personality, his habit of taking decisions himself and the absence of strong Pressure Groups became more pronounced with regard to the Executive, which was the real decision-maker. Parliament is like a debating society and public forum. The Cabinet in India is relatively strong in position but it is also sensitive to parliamentary pressures and accountability. Parliament can be more effective, if there is strong Opposition with multi-party system. In India, despite the multi-party system, a single Party dominated the political scene and the Cabinet made the Parliament subservient to its policies. The Parliament is less emphatic in affecting foreign policy

1. K.C. Wheare, op. cit., p. 64.

as it sits intermittently and its personnel keeps on changing. The Cabinet also changes but the inner circle of the experts and secretaries as well as the members of various Committees and their sub-divisions, form the permanent Executive. The task of making and implementing foreign policy is left to the Executive and Parliament approves of the proposed policy as a rubber-stamp, after discussing it at length. It is too clumsy and large a body to be convened during emergencies. Secrecy in foreign policy matters is the next factor that imposes a limitation on the Parliament's influence.¹ The policy framers escape to disclose it even to their party members in the Parliament. Public discussion of the delicate international issues and confidential negotiations will lead to harmful consequences. Hence, mostly detailed and timely information is withheld from the Members of the Parliament, on the ground of secrecy and public-interest. Thus the Parliament is utterly impotent if the Government makes secret agreements.²

The Members of Parliament allocate less time to the study of foreign affairs and policy. To most of them the problems affecting their constituencies are more important. There is lesser pressure from the constituencies to concentrate on international issues. It leads one to believe that as compared to domestic issues, the foreign policy attracts lesser attention and time of the Members of Parliament.

1. Peter G. Richards, Parliament And Foreign Affairs, London, Allen and Unwin, 1967, p.163.

The hall mark of foreign policy and diplomacy is, negotiation rather than legislation, the chief function of the Parliament. Negotiation and diplomacy hardly involve legislation. The Members have rather a very limited scope for initiation and playing a decisive role in foreign policy-making. Over-participation on the part of Parliament in this regard tends to hinder diplomacy. International events occur so suddenly that the policy decisions require immediate actions in response to events abroad. Immediate and urgent decisions cannot be taken by or in Parliament as it is a gigantic body, consisting of people of diverse interests and opinions. Parliament finds itself at a disadvantage when it tries to deal with international problems. It is more pertinent and desirable that the Cabinet Ministers, who are the spokesmen of the National Government decide the policy. A smaller body is more fit to take measures of this sort. The force of Parliament behind them, facilitates the quick approval of their proposed decisions and approved policies. The Indian Constitution has empowered Parliament to legislate on foreign policy matters and foreign affairs, but it fails to provide it any opportunity to give directives or guide-lines in foreign policy. The power to legislate leaves little scope to control foreign policy. There has been a demand that Parliament should prescribe the objectives and guidelines of policy.¹

1. Frank Moraes, "The Duty of Parliament". The Indian Express (New Delhi), 13.4. 1964.

Often the criticism of the Members of Parliament, appears vain and for the sake of criticism of a policy they themselves endorse. Speaking over an election gathering, on February 17, 1962, V.K. Krishna Menon expressed his concern over the useless foreign policy criticism. "He said that years after years, Parliament had discussed the policy and endorsed it. He told critics of policy that they were attacking not only peace in the world, but also the very decision they had taken in Parliament".¹

The efficiency of parliamentary measures of control is often questioned. While the debates on foreign policy occur, the Members of Parliament keep them restrained and their difference of opinion is expressed with less zeal and zest. Their opinion carries negligible value for election purposes. These measures are hardly calculated to hamper the freedom of action of the Government, which is left completely independent except for a few such checks and limitations, as arise out of its political accountability in general.

Foreign affairs give rise to relatively small amount of legislation, the greater amount of time is devoted to this subject is spent on general foreign policy debates, questions, Ministerial-statements and calling attention notices and motions.

1. National Herald (Lucknow), 19.2. 1962.

Choosing, sending and instructing the delegates to be sent to attend any international conference falls within the Executive domain only. Such cases are beyond the Parliamentary control. Attempts are made to include the Members of the Parliament in such delegations which can lead to constructive collaboration or Parliament-Executive liaison.

For efficiency in administering foreign policy and unity of command and decision, it is more desirable that the Executive takes immediate decision but on grave national issues, discussions should be taken after proper parliamentary consultation. Certain people suggest that control of foreign policy by Parliament which democratises it, is not feasible. The control of foreign policy by the Council of Ministers, in a word "Executive" is equally democratic. Barring the area where the Constitution stipulates the necessity of parliamentary legislation and control, it is more practicable that the Executive forms and drafts the policy, on which the Parliament puts its seal of approval.

Taking into consideration the role of Parliament vis-a-vis treaty-making, we find that it is neither legally nor practically possible for Parliament to take part in negotiations leading to treaties. It is simply the expost facto enquiry that the Parliament does into the contents of a treaty. It is often objected on the democratic grounds that there is no provision for the ratification of treaties by Parliament. In Czechoslovakia,

Denmark, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, parliamentary authorisation is a must before ratification process. The Presidential system that operates in the U.S.A., facilitates the best example of the intervention by a parliamentary body.¹ Treaties represent only a small proportion of the diplomatic measures, agreements and declarations. Most of them are beyond the parliamentary authorisation.² Under the Indian federal system, the Units or states can not enter into any treaties with the foreign countries.

It is also noticed that the treaties and agreements are subject to less detailed scrutiny and survey by Parliament than other domestic affairs and legislation. The extent to which the treaty-making in India has been insulated from the parliamentary influence is evidenced by the fact that not a single agreement or treaty including those with China, Nepal, Sikkim and Pakistan, political or economic, had been originally discussed and debated in Parliament in advance. Important information about its contents has been withheld from Parliament on the ground of not being in the public interest. The Panchsheel Agreement of 1954, was not placed before the Parliament in broad outlines. The Chinese skirmishes started shortly

1. Parliaments, op. cit., pp. 289, 90-91.

2. Ibid., p. 292.

after this Treaty of Trade was formally signed but Parliament remained oblivious of them till 1959.

With regard to the functioning of the Parliamentary Committees, it is suggested that the Members do not meet in a spirit of discussion and understanding, which can be helpful in evolving sound national consensus on the main lines of policy. The whole idea of having a Consultative Committee gets defeated. Its Members can be more instrumental in the policy-planning process by developing more understanding of all problems. The limited success that it attained is due to the fact that its Members discussed some specific matters. They had the occasion to extract a little more information than was hitherto available and the Government got the opportunity of educating Members on some issues. On the political level such a Committee can play a useful role in the process of foreign policy-planning. The Relations Committee of the Senate and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives in the United States of America are perhaps the most influential and effective Parliamentary Committees of the world. Such a Committee-system cannot be transplanted in Indian Parliamentary -system.

In order to expedite the business of such Committees, their structure and functioning should be improved. Its membership should be evaluated and analysed. The ceremonial sessions of the Parliament should be decreased as it is an

essential condition to ameliorate Committee work. The Committees should be patterned subject-wise and the scope of their work should also develop on an extensive scale. Ad hoc and sub-committees should also be formed to deal with specific issues to which considerable attention may be given.

It is at the instance of the Executive that the parliamentary policy is evolved and given final shape. There is an intimate relationship between the Government and the Parliament because of which, it is the Government's policy with some minor changes here and there that is approved of. In the process of arriving at decisions, the Cabinet and Parliament help one another and it is at this time that Parliament influences foreign policy. There is an obligation over the Cabinet to be alive to Parliament's opinion, to anticipate its views and to be sensitive to its moods. The equilibrium in foreign policy is maintained through the delicate balance between the Cabinet and Parliament.

The first requisite to the effective supervision of the Executive by Parliament is to furnish it with timely information regarding the foreign policy decisions. The Parliament has got a right to obtain all relevant information on the activities of the Government. However, if the information can be of help to the enemy country, it is bound to be secret. In order to expedite parliamentary control over policies, it is also essential that all policies approved by Parliament should be stated in

clear terms. As a matter of principle, Parliament has not defined as to what our foreign policy should be. Almost in every session, Parliament debates it, expresses its views, criticises certain actions and reactions of the Government, with regard to policy matters, but no definite resolution, specifically giving details of our policy and setting the guidelines to the Executive, has ever been passed. It had so far debated and approved the policy, chalked out by the Government. In order to make Parliament more effective, it is pertinent that it sets certain principles, which may form an essential ingredient of the policy, defined and proposed by the Executive. In an era when the Executive 'dictatorship' is gaining momentum and the convention of delegated legislation is widening the scope of Executive influence, Parliament and its functioning needs a thorough enquiry to strengthen its hands, in dealing with foreign policy. The increased control of foreign policy by the Parliament would be in conformity with democratic supervision. The rules of procedure under which the Parliament functions should be revised so as to give more opportunity to parliamentary control. On the plea of general public interest, it is often suggested that the public debate of international affairs and foreign policy during wars is not advisable. With the result, the Executive becomes correspondingly more powerful and the influence of Parliament

suffers a decline; India till now faced many blows to its foreign policy- during the Sino-Indian border dispute and the Chinese invasion, India-Pakistan war over Kashmir in 1965 and the war over Kutch in 1968 and the recent-Bangla Desh war in 1971. During the war periods Parliament receded into background. In 1958, when the Indian Parliament was in the recess and the world was on the brink of another war, the Cabinet and the Prime Minister took important decisions. In order to give a measure of extraordinary control to Parliament, emergency session should be held. It would democratise our foreign policy and encourage the 'national direction' and control of the same. During the Chinese invasion also, it was pertinent to enlarge the scope of parliamentary control.

In the Inter-Parliamentary symposium at Geneva in November 1965, the participants analysed the role of Parliament under different categories namely, as the supreme legislative body, controller of purse and as a body controlling foreign affairs and policy. An extensive discussion took place. On the one hand, there were arguments presenting a theoretical and unrealistic picture of a Parliament, closely associated with the conduct of foreign policy. The other section of people emphasised that Parliament should be invested with more power, other than

approving or rejecting the most important political treaties or conventions, implying the implementation of new internal legislation, exercising control through all the parliamentary measures of control.¹

PARLIAMENT AND PRESS:

In the Parliamentary life the Press also plays a noteworthy role. Parliament enjoys much prestige in public due to the Press. It is through public-opinion that Parliament keeps the Executive within reasonable limits. The Press is often labelled as an extension of Parliament and it is the Press which struggles to unearth the administrative failings. Official high-handedness, Government's lapses and shortcomings and public grievances are brought out by the Press. Due to the force of public-opinion, the Government tends to identify itself with the general-will. It is through the media of Press that effective, favourable or ineffective public-opinion is formed, about Parliament and the Government. Much ado can be raised about minor and petty misgivings and carelessness on the part of the Government. "Most of the raw-material, for parliamentary questions, motions, debates and discussions comes from the daily press and this is an important instrument on which a Member relies."² The Press keeps the rank and file informed

1. Christian Deminice, "Parliament's Role and Mission", Parliamentary Studies, Vol. X, No. 9, September 1966, p.14.

2. Shankdher, op. cit., p. 368.

of what is happening inside Parliament. This is a two-way traffic which enables the press to maintain an important as well as strong link between the Public and the Parliament. The administration is always sensitive to public opinion. The Press is an indirect mode of control. It does not hold any legal authority but it can help to educate and arouse public opinion.

PARLIAMENT AND THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE:

Despite the extensive debates over the Sino-Indian border dispute in Parliament, the role of Parliament has not reached upto the mark. Its role is limited by the information available to it from the Government sources. It can influence the Government or direct it only on the basis of the information fed to it from the Parliament. Places in Ladakh, Longju, Barahoti, Bomdila, Chusul and Aksai Chin, where the major war occurred, were mostly unknown and their location is difficult to identify. Parliament's contribution is limited to temporary excitement when India loses territory or the enemy crosses the borders. The information can be elicited to them to a very limited extent for the obvious reason of secrecy in such matters on the plea of public interest. In the Consultative Committee, the Opposition Members tried to seek information but they have to contend themselves with whatever Nehru reported to them. Though the Opposition often regretted the lack of timely information, the feeling among them was 'Pandit Ji knows best'. The Members of

Parliament, generally speaking, took very little interest in the intensive study of border problems, hence the absence of any spirited and exclusive debates over the White Papers which were occasionally placed in the Library or laid on the Table. Had the members taken more interest in analysing the border problem in detail, their contribution would have been genuine and significant. It is also due to lack of political education of the electorate and the Members of Parliament in general. On most of the criticisms, the Opposition was divided in itself. The political parties do not have a programme of educating their constituents on the issue of relations of India with the outside world.

Parliament was a ~~stooge~~ of Congress in the light of its thumping majority during the Sino-India border dispute. Moreover, in the presence of Nehru, nobody could dare exert greater control and influence. The foreign policy was ^asingleman's policy. He was not prone to consultations, either of the Members of Parliament or his Cabinet colleagues. Moreover, the Sino-India border dispute was the first major foreign policy issue to be confronted by the Parliament and Government. The role of Parliament was negligible so far as the border dispute was concerned but it paved the way for more parliamentary indulgence.

INFLUENCE OF PARLIAMENT:

From the discussion of various instruments of parliamentary control, the role of various Committees of Parliament and the Ministry of External Affairs, it can conveniently be concluded

that the very nature of foreign policy-making leaves little scope for the Parliament to exercise control. Parliament is more of a talking-shop, which is basically constituted to legislate. Due to its numerous strength it is not suited to make policy. Though, Parliament retains considerable power which no Government can afford to overlook, the expost facto nature of enquiry conducted by Parliament makes it effective to a limited extent. In a variety of ways, the Parliament remains concerned with foreign policy discussion. Lengthy debates occur during the debates on the Presidential Address, Grants of the Ministry of External Affairs, general and specific motions on foreign policy or separate disputes. Apart from them the Members are free to raise foreign policy issues through various kinds of other opportunities. Till 1962 when Nehru's sway over Parliament was unparalleled, Parliament's role and influence was not of much significance in addition to its being indirect. Views were vividly expressed on the floor of the House but they did not serve the cause of characterising public-opinion, which can consequently influence the Government. After the Chinese attack Parliament grew more sensitive and critical of foreign policy decisions, defence preparedness and more cautious to the blows to India's status. Parliamentary consultations subsequently increased. Shastri grew more equivocal in consulting and informing the Members of Parliament on significant issues. The Congress showed signs of weakness after ^{the} 1969 split till Mrs. Indira Gandhi consolidated her leadership and consequently the influence of Parliament began declining. To what extent Parliament would be an effective instrument of control, depends

on the stature of leadership. The gigantic personality of Nehru set forth a precedent in the realm of foreign policy. The role of President in this regard is negligible. In short, the Parliament exercises its influence on the Government through all the above mentioned means. Its primary business is to supervise rather than to initiate, to legislate rather than to negotiate, to set up guidelines rather than to register them and to approve of the Governmental policy rather than to make it.

C O N C L U S I O N

- - - - -

India has followed the Westminster parliamentary model, the essence of which is the supremacy of Parliament. In the field of foreign policy-making and implementation, the supremacy of Parliament is maintained to a considerable extent. The role that the Parliament is destined to play is conditioned by certain limitations and inhibiting factors. This mammoth forum of discussion is preoccupied with matters concerning domestic affairs. The role of Parliament is largely shaped by the party in Power. Foreign policy-making is constitutionally an executive concern and it is too much to expect from the Government to place all details concerning foreign policy issues before an assembly consisting of numerous persons. Disclosure of information may open pandora's box and place the state in doldrums. Untimely leakage of information can never be in the broad national interest that a government is supposed to serve. Secrecy is the hall-mark of diplomacy. Members of Parliament are repeatedly found clamouring for more and more information but they are deliberately kept in the dark on the usual plea of not being in the public interest. In our country, if the Parliament and its Committees want to participate fully in international matters, affecting our position and using their influence and constitutional power continuously, they should insist on altering the Rules of Procedure

in such a way and to such an extent that no policy is considered worthy of implementation if it does not register the general approval of Parliament. Our political system cannot claim to be Parliamentary, if the Parliament does not assert itself on important domestic and crucial international issues. The oft-repeated plea of 'national interest' as a ground for secrecy is hackneyed and it should not be made an excuse for withholding necessary information from the Parliament.

For the successful working of the Parliamentary system, the existence of stable Opposition is a necessary ingredient. The representatives of the majority and the minority parties together constitute the Parliament. The Government and the Opposition function as the contending blocs with a tacit agreement that the majority is to govern and the minority is to serve as a watch-dog to check the high-handedness of the ruling party. Absence of unified Opposition in India has made the confusion worse confounded.

The word Opposition is used here to indicate those Members of smaller parties who do not belong to ^{the} party in power. During the period under study, the role of the Opposition was quite negligible owing to factions and cliques within themselves which paved the way for the Congress to enjoy un-interrupted political hegemony for two decades. Nehru's dynamism and charismatic leadership mainly contributed to the cohesiveness and popularity of the Congress. During the first decade of his rule,

there was hardly any Opposition to his policies. Despite the resentment in the Opposition about Nehru's domination over foreign policy matters, no one tried to make him realise the supremacy of Parliament. Nehru was not in the habit of consulting either the Opposition or the leaders of his own party which caused irritation among both the quarters. The inability on the part of the Opposition to provide alternate programme, absence of electoral alliances at the national level and mounting differences within themselves including clash of personalities, further added to the confusion. In 1958, the Opposition alleged that the Government, on more than one occasion treated it shabbily, particularly on questions dealing with foreign policy.

Limitations apart, the members in Opposition had reflected their genius and calibre through their speeches, relating to foreign policy and border issue, that helped to keep the Government on its toes. The contribution of veterans like H. N. Mukherjee, M. R. Nasani, Nath Pai, J. B. Kriplani, H. N. Kunzru and others, cannot be easily underestimated. Undoubtedly many a time there were noisy and uproarious scenes in the House but there were calm and calculated scenes also. An objective study of the Parliamentary debates confirms that our Parliamentarians were blessed with the gift of the gab. There were many people in Opposition, who wasted the precious time of the House for the sake of Opposition. They gave unnecessary details while describing the international scenes, leg-pulling of other speakers, more often beating about the

bush or playing to the gallery. Besides, there was also a category of those who happened to be 'publicity-hunting-politicians,' evoking popular sentiment to remain in the limelight.

The Sino-India Border Dispute was the first important matter considered in the history of India's Parliament. The Parliament could not play a very effective role in this regard. It has been inhibited by certain factors which relegated it to a less important position over the Dispute. Most relevant being the oft-repeated fact that the foreign policy is an executive concern. All major or minor decisions are taken by the Government. This is a constitutional limitation upon the Parliament and its role. The details of the dispute were kept as secret as the activities of the CBI. The decisions were taken, neither through public debates nor through open discussions in the House, but en camera through a complicated net-work of administrative set-up involving the cabinet, Prime Minister, Minister of External Affairs, Secretariat staff and Consultative Committee. The Cabinet was fully under Nehru's control, who had the decisive voice. Its members were often critical of lack of consultation with them. Participation of the Cabinet in the process of consultation would have created a new precedent. He was personally disposed to negotiate on the Boarder dispute. He believed that the Opposition to the fundamentals of state policy amounted to opposition to India's independent status. So far as the question of involvement of the Ministry of External Affairs as a whole was concerned, Nehru's custom was to

inform them rather than consult them. The sub-Committee on Foreign Affairs seldom met. It often acted as a rubber-stamp which was generally informed than consulted. Regarding the Sino-India Dispute, Nehru firmly believed in not opening his mind too wide.

The Sino-India border dispute was an acid test on which the Members of Parliament showed sharp reactions and raised harsh criticism, taking the Government to task. It settled into establishing the precedent of receiving timely information on all developments. During emergency, the power of Parliament declined. The Rules of Procedure are such that they impose a limit on the scope of parliamentary indulgence. Discussing the border dispute, the Parliament came across many such critical moments. The speaker, Sardar Hukum Singh had to check the members repeatedly.

The Dispute was tackled more through the exchange of letters, Protest Notes and Memoranda in the form of White Papers, negotiations and diplomacy for which a debating society like Parliament is not suitable. Such an open public forum as the Parliament, it is most pertinent to legislate on issues which have hardly got anything to do with a matter of such significance as the border dispute or other intricate issues of foreign policy.

The entire Sino-India border dispute was considered in the Parliament under Nehru's protective umbrella. Till 1959, Nehru was less particular in disclosing things to Parliament and seeking the seal of its approval. In 1959, the Parliament for the first time resented the lack of

information about the minor incursions across the border, secrecy regarding the construction of the Aksai-Chin road and the illegal occupation of Indian territory in NEFA, Longju and Ladakh. In almost all the debates that followed, Nehru grew more particular about the formality of informing the Parliament well in time. The occasional uproar in the House over this concealment was sufficient to change the regular practice. Nehru's unquestioned sway over Parliament was not challenged so far, leaving aside the eclipsed position that followed the Chinese invasion, he had his gala time in the Parliament. The grandeur of the Parliament and the other Parliamentaries was enhanced by his presence. His speeches, after 1959 and more particularly after the invasion, bore a clear-cut reference to his intention of securing the approval of the Parliament. He sang devotional enlogies in praise of Parliament and the validity of its ultimate approval. His speeches also bore an impression that for the Government, it is not desirable and practicable to come and seek the vote of approval on all the details of the dispute. He believed and impressed upon the Parliament that the Government can take further decisions in accordance with the generally accepted policy as generals do in the battle-fields when they move without consulting the Government. The influence of Parliament gets paralysed during crises and emergency. This Dispute invited a mass of critical remarks over India's cardinal policy of non-alignment. Nehru accepted on the floor of Parliament that we were living in a world of idealism and

that the Chinese aggression has awakened us to reality. Ashoka Mehta had once remarked that he was not against the policy of non-alignment as such, but was unhappy over the conduct of Government's policy in the most vital part of our foreign relations namely the Sino-India border dispute of 1962. After the 1962 debacle, in the agonising reappraisal both of foreign and domestic policies, there was a general disposition to seek a scape-goat for the apparent failure of the policy of non-alignment in promoting national security.

None of the Presidential Addresses provided a direct discussion of our policy with regard to China. From 1952 to 1956, this reference, if at all there was, was scant and negligible. Since 1956 when the Government started getting information of minor incidents across the borders, the Addresses included a slight reference to the nature of relations. During 1957-63, the Addresses abounded in such references, when the trend of relations deteriorated and ultimately resulted in the massive invasion of 1962. From 1963 to 1967, India and China were positively and openly hostile to each other and both indulged vociferously in hostile propaganda against each other. In 1968, India's attitude turned towards detente. The recent phase of relations is moving towards cordiality and our policy-makers are hoping against hope that our relations will improve in the near future. Barring a few examples when the dispute was considered in separate Motions, it figured in the general foreign policy Resolutions and Motions. In general foreign policy Motions, the

international situation was assessed and the foreign policy was mentioned only by courtesy. The irony of all these Motions was that they all ended in the approval of the foreign policy. However vociferous the criticism of the Opposition had been against the Government's policy, these motions could never be negatived. It also created an impression that the Motions were debated to approve of the policy and not to disapprove it. It is desirable to make the vague foreign policy resolution more concrete and definite. Parliamentary control over the executive must be more effective. There have been no specific resolutions indicating our relationship with other nations. Parliament has not exactly and precisely defined as to what our foreign policy was or ought to be in the light of past experience. The trends of policy had to be gathered from the diversified speeches of various Ministers made here and there without sufficient preparation. These speeches were not to the point and precise but emanated from them as vague arguments, personal opinions, unclear intentions and justifications. At the conclusion of a foreign policy debate, the Parliament passed omnibus motions that 'the international situation is taken into consideration and the policy of Government of India in that regard is approved. It is also due to imprecise and ambiguous wording of the Government Resolutions that the Parliament had been less effective in enforcing what it wanted to enforce. The Substitute Amendment Motions spell out the intention of the Member of Parliament quite clearly but due to the thumping majority of the Congress, they always got negatived. After heated debates and prolonged discussions in the House,

the policies of the Government have always been approved.

Question-House facilitated the receipt of abundant information of the up-to-date developments of the border situation. However, the total number of questions raised in connection with the dispute was not alarming. Sometimes there were unnecessary repetition of questions seeking information already supplied through Debates, Adjournment and Calling-Attention Motions and Ministerial Statements. The reason for this lack of information may conveniently be that either the particular Member was absent or absent-minded and slept over the matter. During the debate on the Proclamation of Emergency in 1963, the speaker drew attention to this error.

A cursory glance at 1957-59 debates, mirrored the inherent resentment of the Members of Parliament regarding a number of crucial decisions having been taken by the Government, without referring the matter to the Parliament. The glaring example was the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954, which was signed before the Indo-Tibetan Treaty could be ratified by the Parliament. Another instance being Nehru's approval to accept the Colombo Proposals of 1962 in toto without any reference to Parliament. The discussion to consider the proposals followed the same month over the fact that was already decided. It is difficult to say as to what difference had it made if the Parliament had got a chance to discuss the Colombo Proposals after the Government had already discussed it ? Some of the Members of Parliament made further suggestions but to no avail.

Nehru, however kept on assuring the House that the Government would do whatever the Parliament had decided. He did not put any such Motion that the Proposals of the Colombo Conference be pass-ed nor he placed any circumstances leading to it before the House. It approved of the Government's decisions ultimately due to the majority that the Congress enjoyed. The opposition viewed it to be the very antithesis of democracy and travesty of parliamentary responsibility. During its crucial debate, Nehru declared that he did not want to create a precedent that every matter be voted upon by Parliament. Broad orientation and acceptance of policy by Parliament should suffice. He further made it clear to the House that the matter of accepting them in total was justified in the light of delay from the Chinese side. In fact, during emergencies it is enevitable for the Government to take decisions and conduct secret discussions without any prior reference to Parliament. The reasons of urgency, complication, continuity of work and secrecy demand it. But during normalcy, the role of Parliament should not be glossed over and the practice should develop to establish a proper liaison between the Parliament and Government over such important matters.

The dispute was discussed in the Parliament as a formality. During the elongated debates over it, the Members resented the concealment policy. In 1964, P.K.Deo observed that it was a tribute to Indian democracy that the Parliament was referred to at every critical juncture relating to the dispute. These deliberations should create guidelines for the Government. But, the Government asked them to put

their seal of approval on fait accompli. The Parliament was simply asked to endorse that policy as was acceptable to the Government.

On the whole, the role of Parliament vis-a-vis the Border Dispute was not decisive. Nevertheless it has made the Parliament more vigilant in matters of foreign policy decisions. Undoubtedly through the various criticisms levelled against the Government on the border issue, the Parliament has quite successfully drawn the attention of the Government to many relevant problems and highlighted them. Nobody expected the Parliament to dictate foreign policy. The Parliament existed only to hold the Government accountable to it. The task of the Government was to defend it in the House. The Parliament proved to be the best forum reflecting public opinion which happened to be the life-blood of our democratic and parliamentary set up. The public opinion was largely shaped and modelled in the light of the tone of criticism in the House. The national public opinion has asserted itself quite unambiguously over the Government's stand, but it has little effect on the moves adopted by the Government. Despite all the hue and cry of the public and the Opposition, the proposed meeting of Nehru and Chou in April 1960 could not be prevented.

At the same time the supremacy of Parliament cannot be ignored. The genius of the Government lies in striking out a just balance between the supremacy of Parliament and safeguarding national interest. The Indian Parliament could play a less significant part because of the overwork with which it was burdened. It allowed itself lesser time and opportunity

to indulge in foreign affairs. Despite the fact that the Parliament tried sometimes to intervene in foreign policy matters, the centre of its attention was confined to legislation and supervision of the enormous net-work of administrative matters. It has become customary to conceal the gravity of case while reporting it to the Parliament for the fear of public morale going down. Parliament is a public forum and to give point-blank information about aggressions and wars would adversely affect the public mind. Nehru, for example, while replying to a question in August 1962 about the possibility of any Chinese invasion clearly said that such an invasion was not imminent merely to boost up public morale. But in the hearts of his heart he thought quite differently. In his private interview with Taya Zinkin, as early as in 1954, Nehru prophetically observed, 'you must remember that they have a lot of work to do in China proper. But in say twenty years time, when they are strong and modern, then the picture would be quite different and they will probably be a menace'.

It is also noteworthy that the Members of Parliament took less pronounced interest in foreign affairs. They were more actively involved in domestic issues. What interested them most were the problems of their own constituencies, the solution of which would help them in the next elections. This trend might have been either due to their ignorance of foreign policy matters or lack of interest in it. Another reason was that they usually gave preference to associate themselves more with the domestic affairs to improve the prospects of leadership in their respective constituencies.

Foreign affairs were considered by most of them as the preserve of the Prime Minister or the Government to be dealt with skillfully by experts under the overall guidance of Nehru.

There are examples when deliberate and concrete efforts were made in our parliamentary system to strengthen its hands in controlling the purse and the influence of our Parliament over administration, but negligible efforts were made to improve its position regarding foreign policy. It is essential in this regard that Parliament's ceremonial sessions be reduced to the minimum and the work of various Committees be speeded up and galvanised, encouraging different sections of Parliament to express their views and take active part, instead of leaving every thing to the Government. A code of conduct should be prescribed vigorously for the parliamentarians to avert cynical misbehaviour in House, which had increased manifold since the death of Nehru. Some of the Opposition Members like Hiren Mukerjee had also lamented over this pitiable state of degeneration. On the other hand, Opposition for the sake of Opposition should be discouraged. Foreign Affairs planning Committee had already been formed which takes into account all aspect of the policy, before finally approving it. A team of specialists should be set up to study and evaluate our China policy and to overcome the appalling lack of information to the House. The Members of Parliament, who debate on foreign policy matters should be trained men who know their job and do not waste the precious time of the House in longwinded purposeless speeches. The intricacies of the foreign policy are the most

sensitive area of Government and should be tackled by the 'expertise' and not the 'generalist', both in the Government and the Parliament. A sound foreign policy requires the continuous appraisal of the world around us, concentrated homework and a mastery over the art of diplomacy. Consequently, the Parliament will have to depend on the guide lines offered by the Cabinet and the lead given by the foreign Minister, under the over all direction and supervision of the Prime Minister. The foreign policy of a country can, in the ultimate analysis, be sound and purposeful only if there is a mastery over foreign affairs and a proper appraisal of foreign relations. The Members of parliament, in general, do not possess this essential prerequisite and therefore have to remain docile and cooperative. The initiative and final decision has to remain in the hands of policy-makers.

APPENDIX - I

Questions raised during the Opening Session of the XVth Session of
Lok Sabha regarding Sino-India Border Dispute -Period 12.3.62 to 30.3.1962.

Date of Session	<u>Starred-Questions</u>		<u>Unstarred Questions</u>	<u>Short Notice Questions</u>	<u>Questions on Sino-India Border Dispute</u>
	<u>Oral</u>	<u>Written</u>			
<u>MARCH</u>					
12	xx	xx	xx	xx	xxx
13	15	3	16	xx	One Oral Question no. 2 regarding incursions in Cols. 50-56.
14	34	3	54	xx	xxx
15	58	7	86	xx	One Oral Question No. 36, on Air-Space Violation in cols. 405-8
16	73	5	121	1	One Oral Question no. 63, on Air-Space Violation in cols. 629-32
17	102	7	148	2	xxx
20	127	13	196	xx	xxx
23	150	15	240	xx	xxx
24	180	13	258	xx	xxx
26	219	19	335	xx	xxx
27	236	12	376	xx	xxx
28	267	9	454	xx	xxx
29	297	14	496(a)	3, 4	xxx
30.	315(a)	9	520	5, 6	One Oral Question no. 312 (a) regarding the meeting the Chinese and Indian Prime Ministers in cols. 2595-6.

APPENDIX - II

Questions raised during the I Session of the III Lok Sabha
from April 19 to June 22, 1962.

Date of Session	Starred-Questions		Unstarred Questions (Written)	Short Notice Questions	Questions on the Border Dispute
	Oral	Written			
<u>APRIL</u>					
19	13	28	19	1	xxx
21	59	21	66	x	xxx
23	94	37	126	x	xxx
24	147	14	140	2	xxx
25	177	22	182	x	xxx
26	210	24	222	x	xxx
27	253	17	249	x	xxx
30	290	11	362	x	xxx
<u>MAY</u>					
1	319	23	451	x	xxx
2	353	28	523	x	xxx
3	398	22	637	3	xxx
4	433	20	721	4	xxx
7	467	31	772	x	One Written Unstarred Question on the construction of roads in NEFA.
8	514	33	923	5	xxx
9	558	52	1026	6	xxx
10	632	17	1077	x	xxx
11	663	30	1187	7	xxx
12	x	x	x	x	xxx
14	716	25	1283	8	xxx
16	760	33	1362	x	xxx
17	760	30	1502	9	xxx
18	814	24	1601	x	xxx
21	901	20	1659	x	3 Questions with regard to NEFA, Techno-Economic Survey and Hospitals.
22	944	9	1779	x	xxx
23	968	30	1888	x	Unstarred Question no. 1780, on Sino-India border dispute Col. 6081, raised by Vidya Charan about the correct figures of casualties of the Chinese and Indian personnel.
24	1020	25	1938	x	xxx
25	1058	16	2025	11	xxx
26	x	x	x	x	xxx
28	1093	27	2115	x	xxx

CONTD.

29	1135	33	2167	12
30	1184	17	2315	x
31	1215	8	2378	13

1. Oral Question no. 1129, regarding the march of troops into Ladakh, cols. 7414-16.
 2. Oral Question no. 1122, regarding NEFA - Funds.
 xxx
 xxx

JUNE

1	1215	7	2414	x
4	1216	11	2510	x
5	1286	23	2634	x
6	1321	4	2705	14

xxx
 xxx
 xxx

Oral Question no. 1325 - The Chinese protest alleging Indian intrusion into Longju, cols. 9100-06 jointly raised by Hem Barua and P. C. Barooah, where Hem Barua's doubts about imminent Chinese war were answered in the negative in col. 9106.

7	1348	8	2786	x
8	1373	4	2935	x
11	1401	13	2943	x

xxx
 xxx

Two Oral Questions nos. 1399 and 1401, regarding Chinese News Agency's charge against India and the settlement of Sino-India Border Dispute in cols. 9920-22 and 9924-27 respectively. An important question disclosing the latest state of affairs.

12	1428	8	3043	14-16
13	1449	19	3144	17
15	1480	10	3213	x
16	1509	4	3293	x
18	1523	15	3422	18
19	1552	10	3501	19(a)

xxx
 xxx
 xxx
 xxx
 xxx

Unstarred Question no. 3462, regarding alleged intrusion in NEFA in col. 11650.

20	1575	15	3636(A-C)	20-21
21	1605	16	3767(A-C)	x

xxx

Roads in Scheduled areas and NEFA in col. 12185. One Written Question no. 1620, violation of Chinese Air Space in cols. 12152-3.

22	1637	7	3845	22-23
----	------	---	------	-------

One Oral Question no. 1636 regarding settlement of Sino-Indian border dispute in cols. 12426-7. One Oral Question no. 1630 - regarding China's note dated 31.5.62, in cols. 12407-12. One Oral Question no. 1637 - Chinese threat of Border clashes in cols. 12427-31.

The last question was about the possibility of negotiations with the Chinese Government.

APPENDIX III

Questions raised during the II Session of Lok Sabha from 6.8.62 to 7.9.1962.

Date of Session	Starred-Questions		Unstarred Written Questions	Short Notice	Questions on the Border Dispute
	Oral	Written			
<u>AUGUST</u>					
6	13	34	76	x	One Oral Question no. 9 in cols. 22-27.
7	87	34	214	1	
8	102	41	345	Supplementaries on No. 1	xxx
9.	164	8	422		xxx
10	182	31	538	x	xxx
11	231	39	645	x	xxx
				2	One Written Question no. 311 about the Chinese attitude towards Indian-Traders in Tibet.
14	288	27	725	x	xxx
16	328	26	839	x	xxx
17	377	35	939	3	xxx
18	420	17	1089	4	Written Question no. 412 on Sino-Indian border dispute in cols. 2479.
20	449	26	1253	x	xxx
21	488	30	1426	x	xxx
22	531	16	1510	5	xxx
24	567	11	1626	6	xxx
26	590	22	1733	x	xxx
27	626	17	1803	x	xxx
28	657	9	1896	7	xxx
29	681	15	2100	x	One Unstarred Written Question no. 1942 in cols. 4733-34 regarding the number of military posts erected by the Chinese of Indian Soil.
30	710	8	2072	x	xxx
31	734	9	2143	8	xxx

CONTD.

SEPTEMBER

3	762	5	2209	9-10	xxx
4	785	10	2261	11 & 12	xxx
5	805	18	2371(A-J)	x	xxx
6	837	12	2463	x	Unstarred Question no. 2414, regarding Indian border Police held by Chinese in cols. 6412.
7.	862	15	2548	13, 14	One Starred Question no. 872, on Sino-Indian border dispute in cols. 6701-02 and one Unstarred Question no. 2547 regarding photographs of Indian border taken by the Chinese in cols. 6654-55.

N.B. The starred written questions are exclusively written ones however the rising number of the oral questions includes all starred questions including oral and written.

APPENDIX - IV

Questions raised on Sino-India Issue during III Session from
November 8, - December 11, 1962

Dates	<u>Starred Questions</u>		<u>Unstarred written Questions</u>	<u>Short Notice Questions</u>	<u>Questions regarding the border dispute</u>
	<u>Oral</u>	<u>Written</u>			
<u>NOVEMBER</u>					
8	19	15	65	x	One Starred Written Question no. 26, regarding counter Chinese propaganda in cols. 45-6.
9	48	35	164	x	xxx
10.	107	16	264	x	xxx
12	142	11	298	x	xxx
13	173	6	363	x	xxx
14	174	11	424	x	xxx
15	216	4	469	x	xxx
16	234	8	526	x	xxx
19	260	9	561	x	xxx
20	288	5	641	x	xxx
21	308	12	697	x	One Unstarred Question no. 689, regarding espionage activities of the Chinese, col. 2684.
22	338	5	771	x	xxx
23	363	xx	xxx	x	xxx
27	1	xx	857	1	xxx
28	xxx	xx	xxx	xxx	Indian POWS to be released by the Chinese in Cols. 366!
29	xxx	xx	xxx	3	xxx
30	xxx	xx	xxx	x	xxx
<u>DECEMBER</u>					
3	xxx	xx	xxx	x	xxx
4	xxx	xx	xxx	4 & 5	xxx
5	xxx	xx	xxx	x	xxx
6	xxx	xxx	xxx	x	xxx
7	xxx	xx	xxx	x	xxx
8	xxx	xx	xxx	8 & 9	xxx
10	xxx	xx	xxx	10 - 11	xxx
11	xxx	xx	872	12-13-15	One Unstarred Question no. 870 regarding the Afro-Asian solidarity and injured Jawans in Hospitals. (The Session continues on January 21, 1963).

RECORD OF PAPERS LAID ON THE TABLE
(Lok Sabha-1962)

A copy of each of the following papers was laid on the Table on June 19, 1962.

1. The Government of India's protest dated 10.5.1962 regarding Sino-Pakistan border negotiations.
2. The Chinese protest dated 30.4.62 alleging fresh Indian intrusions.
3. India's reply dated 14.5.62.
4. The Chinese protest dated 20.3.62 alleging fresh intrusion by the Indian personnel.
5. India's reply dated 21.5.62.
6. The Chinese protest dated 11.5.62, alleging intrusion by Indian personnel in Spanggur region.
7. India's reply dated 21.5.62 and counter protest against a new Chinese post in Spanggur.
8. The Chinese note dated 26.4.62, alleging Indian intrusions in Uri region of China.
9. India's reply dated 26.5.62.
10. The Chinese protest dated 19.5.62, alleging Indian intrusion in Longju area.
11. India's reply dated 28.5.62.
12. The Chinese note dated 20.11.62, regarding tri-junction of borders of India-China and Burma and the Sino-Burmese boundary Treaty.
13. India's reply dated 31.5.62.
14. The Chinese note dated 21.4.62, alleging Indian intrusions.
15. India's reply dated 6.6.62.
16. India's note dated 27.4.62 regarding Chinese post at SUMDO.

17. India's reply dated 6.6.62 and 3 more notes thus brining the number to XXI.
18. A note on publicity in connection with the Chinese aggression.
19. The Chinese Government's note of 3.12.61, regarding renewal of 1954 agreement, between India and China on trade between the Tibet region of China and Tibet.
20. The Government of India's reply of 15.12.61.
21. The Government protest note to Chinese Government dated Jan. 25, 1962 regarding Violation of air space.
22. The Chinese government's protest, dated 24.1.62 regarding violations.
23. The Government of India's reply dated 26.2.62.
24. The Government of India's reply to the Chinese Government's note 30.11.61, regarding violation of Indian territory.
25. The Government of India's protest note dated 9.3.62, regarding violations.
26. The Government of India's protest dated 10.3.62 regarding violation.
27. Protest of Chinese Government dated 4.1.62, regarding violations.
28. The Government of India's reply 10.3.62, regarding violation.
- 29, The Chinese Government note dated 26.2.62.
30. The Government of India's reply dated 13.3.62.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Activities of Third Lok Sabha (Statistics and Charts), October 1967, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi.

Background of India's Foreign Policy (Resolutions of the Indian National Congress), ed., N.V.Rajkumar, AICC, New Delhi, 1967.

Constituent Assembly Debates: Official Records, New Delhi, 1947-1950.

Constitution of India, 1950 (as modified to date).

Foreign Policy of India: Text of Documents, 1947-59, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1959.

India (A Reference Annual), 1955 to date.

India: 1947 Selected Documents on Asian Affairs, Vol. II: External Affairs, ed., S.L.Poplai, Oxford University Press, 1959.

Indian Institute of Public Administration, Organisation and Working of the Government of India, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1958.

Parliamentary Debates (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha), 1952-1970.

Pillai Committee Report, 1966.

Poplai, S.L., Foreign Affairs Reports, Indian Council of World Affairs, Vol. XII, No. I, January 1963.

Policy Statement, Praja Socialist Party, Delhi, 1956.

Raghuvira, Presidential Address at the X th Annual Session of the BJS, December 29-31, 1950.

Report of the Committee on the Indian Foreign Service, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1965.

Report, 1950-51 to 1969-70, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 1961.

Resolutions of the Emergent Annual Session of the BJS, Bhopal, January 10, 1963.

Resolutions of the X th All India Session of the BJS, Bhopal, December 29-31, 1962.

Resolutions of the Central Executive Committee of the CPI, Delhi, September 10-15, 1964.

Resume: Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. VIII, No. 25, September 7, 1962.

Resume: Lok Sabha Debates, III Series, Vol. V, No. 51, June 22, 1962.

Secretariat Training School, Organisational set-up and Functions of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, 1969.

Selected Speeches, Jawarharlal Nehru, Publications Division, New Delhi, 1961.

Swatantra Party: The First National Convention, Patna, March 1964.

The Indian Communist Party Documents, 1930-35.

Third Lok Sabha: 1962-63: A Souvenir, Part II, Statistical Statements, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, March 1967.

The United Nations Conference on International Organisation-I, April 29, 1945.

The United Nations Conference on International Organisation: Documents, 1952.

The UN General Assembly IX th Session: Official Records, 492, Plenary Session, October 6, 1954.

U.S. News and World Report, January 27, 1965.

Vyas Bachraj, Presidential Address at the XII th Plenary Session of the BJS, Vijayawada, January 23-24, 1965.

White Papers, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China, Nos. I-XIV, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 1954-68.

SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS

Aron, Raymonds, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, R. Howard and A.B. Fox, Doubleday, New York, 1966.

Bains, J.S., India's International Disputes: A Legal Study, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1962.

Bandyopadhyaya, J., Indian Nationalism Versus International Communism: The Role of Ideology in International Politics, Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1966.

———, The Making of India's Foreign Policy, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1970.

Barkes, R.N., and Bedi, M.S., The Diplomacy of India, Stanford University Press, 1958.

Basu, D.D., Commentary on the Constitution of India, Sarkar, Calcutta, 1952.

Beaufre, A., An Introduction to Strategy with Particular Reference to Problems of Defence, Politics, Economics and Diplomacy in Nuclear Age, tr. E.H. Barry Praeger, New York, 1965.

Beloff, Max, Foreign Policy and the Democratic Processes, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1963.

———, Bharti, S., Vijayanand, Can Indira Accept The Challenge, Bombay, 1966.

Brecher, Michael, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World, Oxford University Press, 1961.

———, NEHRU, A Political Biography, (Abridged ed.), Oxford University Press, London, 1961.

Burns, Allan (ed), Parliament as an Export, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1966.

Carr E.H., Twenty Years' Crisis, London, 1958.

Carlson, L., Geography and World Politics, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1963.

Chakravarty, B.M., India Speaks To America, Orient Longmans, New Delhi, 1966.

Chakravarty, P.C., India-China Relations, Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1961.

_____, India's China Policy, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1968.

Craig, A., (ed.) The Diplomats, 1919-1939, Princeton University Press, 1953.

Dalvi, Brig. J.P., Himalayan Blunder, Thacker & Co., Bombay, 1969.

Eekelen, W. Ven, India's Foreign Policy And The Border Dispute With China, Martinus-Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970.

Erdman, H.L., The Swatantra Party And Indian Conservatism, Cambridge University Press, 1958.

Fartyal, H.S., Role of Opposition in the Indian Parliament, Cambridge University Press, 1958.

Frankel, J., The Making of Foreign policy, Oxford, London, 1963.

Good, R.C., Foreign Policies in Sixties, Baltimore, 1965.

Gupta, Sisir, India and Regional Integration in Asia, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1964.

Harrison, Selig S., India: The Most Dangerous Decades, Princeton University Press, 1960.

Jain, Girilal, India Meets China in Nepal, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1959.

Jhanglami, M., Jana Sangh and Swatantra: A Profile of the Rightist Parties in India, Manaktas, Bombay, 1967.

Jennings, Ivor, Some Characteristics of Indian Constitution, 1952.

Jansen, G.H., Afro-Asia and Non-alignment, Faber & Faber, London, 1966.

Jones, Morris., Parliament in India, Longmans, London, 1957.

Karunakaran, K.P., India in World Affairs: 1950-53, Oxford University Press, 1954.

Kaul, B.M., The Untold Story, Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1967.

Kishore, M.A., Jan Sangh and India's Foreign Policy, Associated Publishing House, New Delhi, 1969.

Kundra, J.C., Indian Foreign Policy, J.B. Wolters, Gromingen, 1955.

- Laski, H.J., American Presidency: An Interpretation, 1960.
- Levi Warner, Free India In Asia, Minneapolis, 1952.
- London, Kurt., The Making of Foreign Policy: East and West, J.B. Lippincot Co., Philadelphia, 1965.
- Macridis, R.C., Foreign Policy in World Politics, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1967.
- Masani, M.R., Why Swatantra?, Popular Prakasham, Bombay, Undated.
- Maxwell, N., India's China War, Jaico, Bombay, 1971.
- Menon, K.P.S., Many Worlds: An Autobiography, Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Menon, V.K.K., India and the Chinese Invasion, Contemporary Publishers, Bombay, 1963.
- Misra, K.P. (ed.), Studies in Indian Foreign Policy, Vikas Publications, New Delhi, 1969.
- More, S.S., Practice and Procedure of Indian Parliament, Bombay, 1959.
- Morris, Jones., Parliament in India, Longmans, London, 1957.
- Mukerjee, Hiren., India and Parliament, People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1962.
- _____, The Gentle Colossus, Jaico, Bombay.
- Myrdal, Gunnar., Asian Drama, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London, 1968.
- Nayar, Kuldip., Between the Lines, Jaico Publishing House, New Delhi, 1970.
- Nehru, J.L., Independence and After: A Collection of Speeches, 1946-49, New York, 1950.
- _____, An Autobiography, Bodley Head, London, 1942.
- _____, Discovery of India, Signet Press, Calcutta, 1946.
- _____, Glimpses of World History, Lindsay Drummond, London, 1938.
- Nizami, T.A., The Communist Party and India's Foreign Policy, Associated Publishing House, New Delhi, 1971.
- NKrumah, Kwame, I Speak of America: Statement of African Ideology, Heinemann, London, 1961.

Norman Dorothy, Nehru: The First Sixty Years, Vol. II., Bombay, 1965.

Pillai, K. Raman, India's Foreign Policy: Basic Issues and Political Attitudes, Meenakshi, Meerut, 1969.

Prasad, Bimla, Origin of Indian Foreign Policy, Bookland, Calcutta, 1960.

Pylee, M.V., India's Constitution, Asia Publishing House, Bombay.

Rajan, M.S., India in World Affairs, 1954-56, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1966.

Rao, P.V.R., Defence Without Drift, Popular Prakasham, Bombay, 1970.

Rahman, M.M., Politics of Non-Alignment, Associated Publishing House, New Delhi, 1969.

Richards, Peter G., Parliament and Foreign Affairs, Allen and Unwin, London, 1967.

Sinha, Satyanarayan, China Strikes, Blanford Press, London, 1964.

Sherwani, Latif Ahmad., India, China and Pakistan: A General and Regional Geography, Methuen, London, 1960.

Spate, O.H.K., India and Pakistan, London, 1967.

Venkateswaran, R.G., Cabinet Government in India, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1967.

Wallace, Victor H., (ed.) Paths to Peace, Melbourne, 1957.

Wallace Hangens, After Nehru Who?, Rupert Hart Davis, London, 1963.

Weiner, Myron, Party-Politics in India, Princeton University Press, 1957.

Wheare, K.C., Legislatures, Oxford University Press, London, 1963.

Wright, Quincy., The Study of International Relations, Appleton-Century Crofts, New York, 1955.

Zinkin, Taya., Reporting India, Chatto and Windus, London, 1962.

ARTICLES

Anthony, Frank., "Recent Changes in Our Parliamentary Scene," The Times of India, New Delhi, 26.1. 1970.

Appodorai, A., "India's Foreign Policy", International Affairs, January 1949.

____ "The Foreign Policy of India", in J.E. Black and K.W. Thomson (eds.), Foreign Policies in a Challenging World, Harper, New York, 1963.

Ash, M.A., "An Analysis of Power, with Special Reference to International Politics", World Politics, Vol. III, 1950-51

A Special Correspondent "Parliament and International Treaties", Parliamentary Studies, Vol. XII, No. 4, April 1968.

Bajpai, G.C., "India and the Balance of Power", Indian Yearbook of International Affairs, 1952.

____ "Ethical Stand in World Issues: Cornerstone of India's Foreign Policy", in K.P. Misra(ed), Studies in Indian Foreign Policy, Vikas Publications, New Delhi, 1969.

Bandyopadhyaya, J., "China, India and Tibet", India Quarterly, October-December 1962.

____ "Making of Foreign Policy: A Tentative Subsystemic Model for South Asia", South Asian Studies, July 1968.

Berkes, R.N., "India and the Communist World", Current History, March 1959.

____ "India's Ties with the Commonwealth", Current History, March 1959.

Bilgrami, J.R., "India and the United Nations", The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XXVI., No. 2, April-June 1965.

Bozeman, A.B., "India's Foreign Policy Today: Reflections upon its Sources", World Politics, Vol. X, 1957-58.

Brecher, Michael., "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State Sys-tem of Southern Asia", World Politics, January 1963.

——— "Elite Images and Foreign Policy Choices", Pacific Affairs, Summer 1967.

Chanakya, "The Rastrapati", Modern Review, Vol. LXII, November 1937.

Cohen, B.C., "Foreign Policy-Making: Modern Design", World Politics, Vol. V, 1952-53.

Cohen, J.B., "India's Foreign Economic Policies", World Politics, Vol. VII, 1954-55.

Das Gupta, A.K., "Impact of Chinese Aggression on India's Economy", International Studies, Vol. V, July 1963-April 1964.

De Sola.Pool, "Content Analysis for Intelligence Purposes", World Politics, Vol. XII, 1959-60.

Devdutta, "Non-Alignment and India", The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, October-December, 1962.

Dominice, Christian, "Parliament's Role and Mission", Parliamentary Studies, Vol. X, No. 9, September, 1966.

Edwards, Michael, "Illusion and Reality in India's Foreign Policy", in K.P. Misra (ed.), Studies in Indian Foreign Policy, Vikas Publications, New Delhi, 1969.

Evans Allan, "Intelligence and Policy Purposes", World Politics, Vol. XII, 1959-60.

Friedman, "Indian Nationalism and the Far-East", Pacific Affairs, March 1940.

Gabriel, S., "The Role of the President in Conduct of the Foreign Relations in the U.S.A.", Parliamentary Studies, Vol. XI, No. 8, August 1967.

Gautam, M., "India's Foreign Policy: The Congress View", India Quarterly, January-March, 1951.

Good, Robert C., "National Interest and Moral Theory: The 'Debate' among Contemporary Realists", in Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good (eds.), Foreign Policy in Sixties, Baltimore, 1965.

Gopal, S., "India, China and the Soviet Union", Australian Journal of Politics and History, August 1966.

Gopalaswami, K., "India China Boundary Question", International Studies, Vol. V, July 1963-April 1964.

Gottmann, Jean., "Geography and International Relations", World Politics, January 1951.

Guha, Ashok., "India's Foreign Economic Policy", International Studies, April 1968.

Gupta, Sisir, "Power Structure in South Asia," Round Table, April 1970.

Harrison, Selig, S., "Troubled India and Her Neighbours", Foreign Affairs, January 1965.

Hilsman, R., "Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs", World Politics, Vol. V, 1952-53.

Ilchman, F., "Political Development and Foreign Policy: The Case of India", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. IV, No. 3, 1966.

Indian Official, "India as a World Power", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXVIII, 1948-49.

Joshi, P.C., "The Nehru Legacy", Mainstream, Vol. III, No.39, May 29, 1965.

Karan, P.P., "India's Role in Geopolitics", India Quarterly, Vol. IX, No. 2, 1953.

Karnik, V.B., "Jawaharlal Nehru: Foreign Policy", in A.B. Shah, (ed.), India's Defence and Foreign Policies, Manaktalas, Bombay 1966.

Kunta, D.K., "The Role of Opposition and Working in Parliament", Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 26.1. 1970.

Levi, Warner., "Foreign Policy: The Shastri Era", in K.P.Misra (ed.), Studies in Indian Foreign Policy, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1969.

_____, "The Elite: Nature of New India's Foreign Policy", Asian Survey, November, 1957.

Lyon, Peter, "India's Foreign Policy: Interplay of Domestic and External Factors", South Asian Studies, January, 1969.

_____, "Neutrality as State Policy: The Case for India", in K.P.Misra (ed.), Studies in Indian Foreign Policy, Vikas Publications, New Delhi, 1969.

Martin, Paul., "The Role of Canadian Parliament in the Formulation of Foreign Policy", Parliamentarian, Vol. L., October 1969.

Mathur, R.N., "Parliamentary Procedure in India", Parliamentary Studies, Vol. II., No. 5, 1958.

Misra, K.P., "Foreign Policy Planning Efforts in India", The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal, January, 1970.

_____, "The Concept of Non-Alignment: Its Implications and Recent Trends", in K.P.Misra (ed.), Studies in Indian Foreign Policy, Vikas Publications, New Delhi, 1969.

Mitra, Basant., "Diplomatic Technique", Seminar, No. 50, October, 1963.

Moraes, Frank., "Peking Plans and India's Mistake", The Indian Express, New Delhi, 11-2-1961.

Morgenthau, Hans J., "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid", The American Political Science Review, June, 1962.

Mukherjee, Dilip., "Decision-Making for Defence", The Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis Journal, January, 1969.

Nehru, J.L., "Changing India", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, April 1963.

Notes and Comments, "The Debates on Address", Parliamentary Studies, Vol. IV, NO. 3, March 1960.

"Cease-Fire", Parliamentary Studies, Vol. VI, NO. 12, December 1962.

"Parliament and Foreign Policy", Parliamentary Studies, Vol II., No. 3, August 1963.

Nikhhamin, V., "India's Role in World Affairs", International Affairs, Vol. I, January 1958.

Palmer, Norman, D., "India and the United States: Maturing Relations", Current History, March 1959.

——— "India's Foreign Policy", Political Quarterly, Vol. XXXIII, 1962.

——— "Trans Himalayan Confrontation", Orbis, Winter, 1963.

——— "Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: The New Statecraft, Reassessed", Orbis, Fall 1969.

Pandit, Vijayalaxmi., "India's Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3, April 1956.

Panikkar, K.M., "The Himalayas in India's Defence", India Quarterly, Vol. III, No. 2, 1947.

Park, Richard, L., "Indian-African Relations", Asian Survey, July 1965.

——— "India's Foreign Policy", in Roy C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics, II ed., 1962.

Parliamentary Correspondent, "Parliament in Session", Parliamentary Studies, Vol. XII, No. 1, January 1968.

Power, Paul F., "Indian Foreign Policy: The Age of Nehru", The Review of Politics, Vol. XXVI, 1964.

Rajan, M.S., "Foreign Policy in Action 1954-56", India Quarterly, July-September, 1960.

——— "India and Pakistan as Factors in Each Other's Foreign Policy", International Studies, April 1962.

——— "India and World Politics in the Post-Nehru Era", International Journal, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, 1968-69.

_____, "Chinese Aggression and the Future of Non-Alignment", International Studies, Vol. V, July 1963-April 1964.

_____, "India and the Common-Wealth", Australian Journal of Politics and History, August 1966.

Rajdoot, "Sunlight on the Summit or Sunset", Mainstream, Vol. V, No. 8, October 22, 1964.

Rajgopalachari, C., "The Task Before Us", Swarajya, November 17, 1962.

Rudolph L.I and S.H., "Generals and Politicians in India", Pacific Affairs, Spring 1964.

Suchrader, Erich., "Mahatma Gandhi and the Formulation of the Foreign Policy Principles of India", United Asia, November-December 1968.

Seth, Nareshwar Dayal, "India's Policy Towards China", The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XXIX, NO. I, January- March 1968.

Sethi, J.D., "National Security", Seminar, No. 77, January 1966.

Shankdher, S.L., "Administrative Accountability to Parliament", Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. XII, No. 3, July-September 1966.

Shastri, Lal Bhadur., "Great Importance of the United Nations", Review of International Affairs, Vol. XVI, January 20, 1965.

Singh, Biswanath, "Legality of the Mc Mahon Line", Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XXVIII, January-June 1967.

Singh, Vishal, "India- Pakistan and South-East Asia", International Studies, July-October 1966.

Som-Dutta, Major General., "The Defence of India's Northern Borders", India Quarterly, January 1966.

Sprout, Horold, "Geopolitical Hypotheses in Technological Perspective", World Politics, January 1963.

Subhrahmanyam, K., "Ebb and Flow of Power in the Indian Ocean Area", USI Journal, January-March 1968.

_____, "Role of Intelligence in National Security", Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 1968.

_____, "Decision-Making in Defence", Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses Journal, April 1970.

_____, "The Challenge of the Seventies: India's Security", Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi,

Tiwari, B.B., "Parliamentary Questions", Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, Vol. I, No. 3, July-September 1967.

Trikamdas, P., "India and Empire", Political Science Quarterly, October-December, 1938.

Vagts, Alfred, "The Balance of Power: Growth of an Idea", World Politics, Vol. V, 1952-53.

Younger, Kenneth, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy", British Journal of Sociology, Vol. VI, June 1955.

NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

India Quarterly, New Delhi.

Link, New Delhi.

Mainstream, New Delhi.

Modern Review, Calcutta.

Observer, New Delhi.

Seminar, New Delhi.

Swarajya, Madras.

The Hindustan Times, New Delhi.

The National Herald, New Delhi and Lucknow.

The Indian Express, New Delhi.

The Pioneer, Lucknow.

The Statesman, New Delhi.

The Times of India, New Delhi.

The Tribune, Ambala.

~~~~~